merge: security track group 4 — SMEP, the SYSRET guard, and SMAP

# Conflicts:
#	docs/security-track-plan.md

docs/coding-standards.md

@@ -182,6 +182,26 @@ test for "is this an abbreviation I must expand" is simply: *is there a longer w
 is a clipped form of?* If yes, write the word. If it's an initialism standing in for a
 phrase, leave it.
 
+## Kernel code touches user memory only through `user-memory`
+
+A syscall argument is an attacker-controlled integer. Kernel code never
+dereferences one: every read of a process's memory goes through
+`copyFromUser` and every write through `copyToUser`
+(`system/kernel/user-memory.zig`), which walk that address space's page tables
+and move the bytes through the physmap, with the permissions ring 3 itself
+would face. A bad pointer then fails the call instead of faulting the kernel,
+and a struct pulled in once cannot change underneath the checks that follow it.
+
+This is not a review convention — CR4.SMAP enforces it in hardware
+(`docs/os-development/smep-smap.md`), so a raw dereference of a user address is
+a #PF with a kernel instruction pointer the first time the QEMU suite reaches
+it. Which is also why **there is no `stac` in this tree, and never should be**:
+`stac` suspends exactly that enforcement, the copy layer needs no such window
+by construction, and a change that adds one has removed the guarantee rather
+than worked around a limitation. The same goes for the boot-time `clac` patch
+at the interrupt entry — it exists so that ring 3 cannot suspend SMAP either,
+by taking an interrupt with `EFLAGS.AC` set.
+
 ## Zen of Zig
 
 * Communicate intent precisely.

docs/os-development/smep-smap.md

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # SMEP and SMAP — supervisor-mode hardening
 
-*Design, 2026-07-31. Not yet implemented. Companion to
+*Design, 2026-07-31. H1 (the copy layer), H2 (SMEP), HS (the SYSRET guard) and
+H3 (SMAP) have all landed; the track is complete. Companion to
 [protocol-namespace.md](protocol-namespace.md) on the security track — this is
 the hardware half; that is the namespace half.*
 
@@ -136,6 +137,11 @@ Broadwell+ for SMAP; AMD Zen+ for both). The test images should run with
   hardening bucket, independent fix (validate RCX before `sysretq`, fall
   back to `iretq`), should ride the same branch as H2/H3 but is not
   SMEP/SMAP.
+  **Status — landed 2026-08-01 (HS).** The syscall exit sign-extends the
+  return RIP from bit 47 (danos is 4-level only; nothing sets CR4.LA57) and
+  falls back to `iretq` when that changes it, counting each refusal for the
+  `sysret-canonical` case. Ring 3 could reach it: `syscall` as the last two
+  bytes of the last canonical page returns to `user_half_end`.
 - **KPTI / Meltdown-class leaks are out of scope.** SMEP/SMAP police
   architectural accesses, not speculative ones. danos runs one kernel
   mapping in every address space and accepts that on affected hardware;

docs/security-track-plan.md

@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ plain `main` checkout always tells the truth about where the work is.**
 
 | | |
 |---|---|
-| Working on | **H3** — SMAP (the last phase) |
+| Working on | nothing — the track is complete |
-| Branch carrying it | `feat/security-group-4` (pushed to origin) |
+| Branch carrying it | — |
-| On `main` | everything through P4c — groups 1, 2 and 3 merged |
+| On `main` | every phase — groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 merged |
-| Awaiting merge | H2, HS — land with the group 4 merge |
+| Awaiting merge | nothing |
-| Suite | 113 cases, all passing |
+| Suite | 114 cases, all passing |
 | Last updated | 2026-08-01 |
 
 A checkbox below means the phase met its definition of green and was
@@ -95,8 +95,27 @@ group boundary.
   counter, not the outcome: measured with the guard's branch removed, TCG does
   not model Intel's ring-0 #GP and every outcome check still passed. Suite
   113/113)
-- [ ] **H3** — SMAP + boot-patched `clac`; `-cpu max` in the harness; negative tests
+- [x] **H3** — SMAP on every core, and the boot-patched `clac` that makes it
-- [ ] **merge** group 4 → main, push
+  hold. Hardware does not clear `EFLAGS.AC` on interrupt delivery and ring 3
+  sets it with `popfq`, so without the patch a hostile process suspends SMAP
+  for the length of any handler it can provoke; `clac` is #UD without the
+  feature, so the image ships the 3-byte canonical NOP at the first byte of
+  `isr_common` — ahead of the CPL test, because a fault nested in ring 0
+  inherits AC just as readily — and the boot processor overwrites it through
+  the physmap, the same door `smp.arm` and `process.run` already use to write
+  a page the executing mapping holds read-only. The two halves are wired
+  together rather than merely ordered: `initHardening` refuses CR4 bit 21
+  until the patch has been written *and* read back through the text address it
+  will be fetched from, so no core can turn SMAP on ahead of it and a
+  translation that lied leaves the machine unhardened and saying so instead of
+  enforcing over an entry path that cannot clear AC. The `smp` case now
+  requires SMAP on every core it lands on, which is the ordering checked from
+  the far end. New `fault-smap` case reads a mapped user page from ring 0 and
+  requires the fault: error code `0x1` — present, and nothing else, since a
+  SMAP violation has no bit of its own and U/S reports the ring of the access.
+  The suite is now the standing enforcement test, and it found nothing left to
+  find: H1's conversion of the nine stragglers was complete. Suite 114/114
+- [x] **merge** group 4 → main, push
 
 ---
 
@@ -547,6 +566,11 @@ review-level proof plus the existing fault cases regression. Suite 112.
 **Test:** new QEMU case `fault-smap`: ring-0 deliberate read of a mapped
 user page; expect vector 14 + `error code : 0x1` + kernel IP. And the
 whole suite becomes the tripwire — any missed straggler now fails loudly.
+*(Landed: the patch site sits at the very first byte of `isr_common`, and
+CR4.SMAP is refused on every core until the patch has been read back through
+the text mapping it will execute from — so the ordering is enforced, not
+merely documented. Error code observed: `0x1` exactly, present and nothing
+else. The tripwire found no missed straggler: H1 had converted them all.)*
 Suite 114 (HS added one).
 
 ---

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/apic.zig

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 const boot_handoff = @import("boot-handoff");
 const io = @import("io.zig");
+const cpuid = @import("cpuid.zig");
 const paging = @import("paging.zig");
 
 /// The ACPI PM timer, as a calibration reference: an I/O port or MMIO counter.
@@ -331,8 +332,8 @@ fn calibratePit() void {
 /// TSC frequency from CPUID leaf 0x15 (crystal_hz * numerator / denominator), or
 /// null if the CPU doesn't enumerate it (common under QEMU, and on AMD).
 fn cpuidTscHz() ?u64 {
-    if (cpuid(0).eax < 0x15) return null;
+    if (!cpuid.supports(0x15)) return null;
-    const r = cpuid(0x15);
+    const r = cpuid.leaf(0x15);
     if (r.eax == 0 or r.ebx == 0 or r.ecx == 0) return null; // ratio/crystal not given
     return @as(u64, r.ecx) * r.ebx / r.eax;
 }
@@ -342,26 +343,8 @@ fn cpuidTscHz() ?u64 {
 /// at a constant rate across P/C-states and never stops. Requires the extended-leaf
 /// range to reach 0x80000007 first.
 fn tscIsInvariant() bool {
-    if (cpuid(0x80000000).eax < 0x80000007) return false;
+    if (!cpuid.supports(0x8000_0007)) return false;
-    return (cpuid(0x80000007).edx & (1 << 8)) != 0;
+    return (cpuid.leaf(0x8000_0007).edx & (1 << 8)) != 0;
-}
-
-const CpuidRegs = struct { eax: u32, ebx: u32, ecx: u32, edx: u32 };
-
-fn cpuid(leaf: u32) CpuidRegs {
-    var a: u32 = undefined;
-    var b: u32 = undefined;
-    var c: u32 = undefined;
-    var d: u32 = undefined;
-    asm volatile ("cpuid"
-        : [a] "={eax}" (a),
-          [b] "={ebx}" (b),
-          [c] "={ecx}" (c),
-          [d] "={edx}" (d),
-        : [leaf] "{eax}" (leaf),
-          [sub] "{ecx}" (@as(u32, 0)),
-    );
-    return .{ .eax = a, .ebx = b, .ecx = c, .edx = d };
 }
 
 // HPET registers: capabilities at +0x00 (period in the high dword, in fs; bit 13 =

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/cpu.zig

@@ -141,11 +141,41 @@ pub fn debugconWrite(bytes: []const u8) void {
 /// stack for double faults), then the IDT with exception handlers. After this a
 /// CPU fault is reported instead of triple-faulting. Install the fault handler
 /// (setFaultHandler) first so early faults are caught.
+///
+/// This is the **boot processor's** half of per-core bring-up; smp.apEntry is the
+/// other half and must keep the per-CPU steps in step with it (the system_call
+/// MSRs and the CR4 hardening bits are per-core state, so every core sets its own).
 pub fn init() void {
     gdt.init();
     tss.init();
     idt.init();
     pcpu.initSystemCall();
+    // The machine-wide half of SMAP, and it must precede every CR4 write: the
+    // interrupt entry has to be able to clear EFLAGS.AC before any core claims the
+    // bit. This is the boot processor and the application processors are still
+    // parked, so "before every core" is simply "here".
+    _ = pcpu.armSupervisorAccessPrevention();
+    // Safe this early, before the kernel is on its own page tables: the loader's
+    // bootstrap tables (boot/efi.zig) map with present|writable and never set the
+    // U/S bit, so no page the BSP executes from is user-accessible — and, for SMAP,
+    // no page it *reads* is either, so there is nothing for the new bit to refuse
+    // between here and the switch to the kernel's own tables.
+    pcpu.initHardening();
+}
+
+/// Whether ring 0 is barred from executing user-mapped pages on this core (CR4.SMEP
+/// on x86_64; the privileged-execute-never behaviour elsewhere). False means the CPU
+/// doesn't offer it and the machine is running unhardened — see per-cpu.zig.
+pub fn supervisorExecutePreventionEnabled() bool {
+    return pcpu.supervisorExecutePreventionEnabled();
+}
+
+/// Whether ring 0 is barred from *reading or writing* user-mapped pages on this core
+/// (CR4.SMAP on x86_64; the privileged-access-never behaviour elsewhere). False means
+/// either the CPU doesn't offer it or the interrupt entry could not be armed to clear
+/// AC — see per-cpu.zig; the machine boots either way, unhardened and saying so.
+pub fn supervisorAccessPreventionEnabled() bool {
+    return pcpu.supervisorAccessPreventionEnabled();
 }
 
 /// Build the kernel's own page tables (with real permissions) and switch onto
@@ -300,6 +330,20 @@ pub fn userExit() noreturn {
     user_exit_to_kernel();
 }
 
+/// The counter the syscall exit stub bumps when it refuses to return the fast way
+/// (isr.s, `sysret_non_canonical_count`).
+const non_canonical_returns = @extern(*u64, .{ .name = "sysret_non_canonical_count" });
+
+/// How many times this boot's system_call returns took the slow, safe exit because
+/// the return address was not a canonical address (the SYSRETQ canonical-RIP guard
+/// in isr.s; an architecture without the hazard reports 0 forever). A correct
+/// program cannot produce one — it could not have executed at a non-canonical
+/// address in the first place — so a nonzero count is exactly the number of times
+/// a process tried to make the kernel fault on its way out.
+pub fn nonCanonicalReturnCount() u64 {
+    return @atomicLoad(u64, non_canonical_returns, .monotonic);
+}
+
 /// Register the handler for the user system_call gate (int 0x80, vector 128). The
 /// handler may write the trap frame (see `setSystemCallResult`).
 pub fn setSystemCallHandler(handler: *const fn (*CpuState) void) void {

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/cpuid.zig

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+//! CPUID — the CPU describing itself.
+//!
+//! One helper for the whole architecture layer (the timer's TSC leaves, the
+//! supervisor-hardening feature bits), rather than a private copy per module.
+//! `leaf` always executes with ECX = 0, which is what every leaf danos reads
+//! wants: leaf 7's feature words live in sub-leaf 0, and leaves that ignore ECX
+//! don't care. A sub-leaf-taking caller would add its own entry point here.
+//!
+//! **Always gate on `supports` first.** CPUID does not fault on an out-of-range
+//! leaf — it returns the data of the highest supported leaf instead, which would
+//! be read as a feature bit that isn't there. The maximum lives in leaf 0 (basic
+//! range) and leaf 0x80000000 (extended range).
+
+pub const Registers = struct { eax: u32, ebx: u32, ecx: u32, edx: u32 };
+
+/// Execute CPUID for `number` at sub-leaf 0.
+pub fn leaf(number: u32) Registers {
+    var a: u32 = undefined;
+    var b: u32 = undefined;
+    var c: u32 = undefined;
+    var d: u32 = undefined;
+    asm volatile ("cpuid"
+        : [a] "={eax}" (a),
+          [b] "={ebx}" (b),
+          [c] "={ecx}" (c),
+          [d] "={edx}" (d),
+        : [leaf] "{eax}" (number),
+          [sub] "{ecx}" (@as(u32, 0)),
+    );
+    return .{ .eax = a, .ebx = b, .ecx = c, .edx = d };
+}
+
+/// Whether `number` is inside the range this CPU actually enumerates — the basic
+/// range for a leaf below 0x80000000, the extended range above it. Every read of
+/// a leaf beyond 0 or 0x80000000 must pass through here first (see the module doc).
+pub fn supports(number: u32) bool {
+    const maximum = if (number >= 0x8000_0000)
+        leaf(0x8000_0000).eax
+    else
+        leaf(0).eax;
+    return maximum >= number;
+}

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/isr.s

@@ -187,11 +187,9 @@ user_exit_to_kernel:
 # CS/SS from STAR, masks RFLAGS with SFMASK (so IF is already clear), and jumps
 # here with RSP still the *user* stack. We swap in the kernel GS, switch to the
 # task's kernel stack via the per-CPU block, build a CpuState frame identical to
-# the interrupt path's, and reuse interruptDispatch (vector 128) — then SYSRET.
+# the interrupt path's, and reuse interruptDispatch (vector 128) — then SYSRET,
-#
+# unless the return RIP is non-canonical, in which case the canonical-RIP guard at
-# Hazard (acceptable while init is the only, trusted, user program): SYSRETQ #GPs
+# the exit below returns through IRETQ instead (docs/os-development/smep-smap.md).
-# in ring 0 if the return RIP (RCX) is non-canonical. A hostile user could arrange
-# that; hardening (canonical check / iretq fallback) is a later security-track item.
 .global syscall_entry
 syscall_entry:
     swapgs                       # kernel GS base
@@ -249,16 +247,79 @@ syscall_entry:
     pop %rax
     add $16, %rsp                # drop vector + error_code -> rsp at rip
     popq %rcx                    # rip -> RCX (SYSRETQ restores RIP from RCX)
+    # --- canonical-RIP guard ---
+    # SYSRETQ with a non-canonical RCX raises #GP *in ring 0* on Intel: on the
+    # kernel stack, after the swapgs below has already installed the user's GS
+    # base — a fault in the trusted base, on user-influenced state, which is the
+    # classic escalation primitive (CVE-2012-0217). Ring 3 gets to choose that RIP
+    # without any kernel bug: the CPU saves the address of the instruction *after*
+    # `syscall`, so a program executing `syscall` as the last two bytes of the last
+    # canonical page returns to 0x0000_8000_0000_0000. Nothing between entry and
+    # here rewrites the frame's rip (no signal or context-restore path exists that
+    # could), so this is the whole attack surface — and one compare closes it.
+    #
+    # Canonical means bits 63:47 all equal bit 47, so sign-extending from bit 47
+    # and comparing is the complete test. Bit 47 is the right pivot because danos
+    # is 4-level only: paging.zig builds a PML4 and nothing anywhere sets CR4.LA57
+    # (bit 12), so a linear address is 48-bit on every core, on every machine we
+    # boot. A future 5-level port must pivot on bit 56 instead — and should patch
+    # this shift pair at boot rather than branch on a feature flag, to keep the
+    # return path of every syscall in the system free of loads.
+    #
+    # Cost: four register-only ALU ops and one forward branch the predictor sees
+    # taken exactly never (a correct program cannot have a non-canonical return
+    # address — it could not have executed there). R11 is free scratch: SYSCALL
+    # already destroyed the user's copy, and the fast path overwrites it with the
+    # saved RFLAGS two instructions further on.
+    movq %rcx, %r11
+    shlq $16, %r11
+    sarq $16, %r11               # sign-extend from bit 47
+    cmpq %rcx, %r11              # changed by the round trip => non-canonical
+    jne .Lnon_canonical_return
     addq $8, %rsp                # skip the cs slot (SYSRETQ loads CS from STAR)
     popq %r11                    # rflags -> R11 (SYSRETQ restores RFLAGS from R11)
     popq %rsp                    # user rsp (the ss slot below is abandoned)
     swapgs                       # user GS base
     sysretq                      # -> ring 3: RIP=RCX, RFLAGS=R11, CS/SS from STAR
 
+# The guard's cold path: return through IRETQ, which is safe where SYSRETQ is not.
+# IRETQ loads CS — committing the privilege change to ring 3 — before the new RIP
+# is fetched, so the #GP arrives *from ring 3*: through the IDT, onto this task's
+# kernel stack, with a user CS in the frame, where isr_common swaps GS back and the
+# kernel kills the process like any other user fault. That ordering is why IRETQ is
+# the standard fallback for this exact case; the sysret-canonical test asserts it
+# on the machine we run on (the process dies, the kernel does not).
+#
+# State handed to ring 3 is identical to what the fast path would have produced.
+# IRETQ consumes the same 5-word frame the CPU pushes for an interrupt — rip, cs,
+# rflags, rsp, ss — which is exactly the frame syscall_entry built and the fast
+# path is part-way through dismantling, so un-popping the rip slot makes it whole:
+# same user RIP, same user RSP, same RFLAGS, and CS/SS = 0x23/0x1B, the very
+# selectors SYSRETQ would have loaded from STAR. R11 is reloaded from the frame's
+# rflags slot so even the register SYSRET synthesizes matches. The swapgs sits in
+# the same place relative to the ring change as the fast path's, so the swapgs
+# discipline is untouched: kernel GS while we still touch kernel data, user GS for
+# the instant before ring 3.
+.Lnon_canonical_return:
+    # Cold-path diagnostic: how many hostile return addresses this boot refused.
+    # `lock` because every core shares the counter, and it costs nothing here — a
+    # process that reaches this line is about to die.
+    lock incq sysret_non_canonical_count(%rip)
+    movq 8(%rsp), %r11           # rflags -> R11, exactly as the fast path leaves it
+    subq $8, %rsp                # un-pop the rip slot: rsp back at the iretq frame
+    swapgs                       # user GS base
+    iretq                        # -> ring 3, where the bad RIP faults harmlessly
+
 .section .bss
 .balign 8
 user_saved_rsp:
     .skip 8
+# Times the canonical-RIP guard above refused a SYSRETQ this boot. Read through the
+# architecture layer (cpu.zig nonCanonicalReturnCount); zero on any machine no
+# process has attacked.
+.global sysret_non_canonical_count
+sysret_non_canonical_count:
+    .skip 8
 .text
 
 # --- user-mode test program --------------------------------------------------
@@ -282,6 +343,24 @@ user_pf_start:
 1:  jmp 1b
 user_pf_end:
 
+# The SYSRET-guard program: two harmless system calls, the second placed so that
+# its *return address* is not canonical. The caller (tests.zig) copies these bytes
+# to the very end of the last canonical user page, so the final `syscall` occupies
+# the last two bytes of address space ring 3 can execute, and the RIP the CPU saves
+# into RCX for it is 0x0000_8000_0000_0000 — the first non-canonical address.
+# The first call proves the ordinary SYSRETQ path still works (the program only
+# reaches the second instruction pair by returning correctly from the first).
+# 39 is abi.SystemCall.current_core: no arguments, no side effects, always
+# succeeds; the test asserts the immediate below still matches that enum.
+.global user_sysret_start
+.global user_sysret_end
+user_sysret_start:
+    mov $39, %eax          # current_core
+    syscall                # canonical return address (mid-page): the fast path
+    mov $39, %eax          # current_core
+    syscall                # return address = the end of the page = non-canonical
+user_sysret_end:
+
 .text
 
 # Stub for a vector the CPU does NOT push an error code for: push a dummy 0.
@@ -363,7 +442,27 @@ STUB_NOERR 128
 # If the interrupt came from ring 3 the GS base holds the user's value, so swap
 # in the kernel's before anything reads per-CPU data (swapgs discipline; see
 # percpu.zig). CS sits at offset 24 here (vector@0, error@8, RIP@16, CS@24).
+#
+# The first three bytes are the SMAP guard, and they come before everything —
+# before the CPL test, before the swapgs. Interrupt delivery does not clear
+# EFLAGS.AC (SYSCALL does, through SFMASK; an IDT gate does not), and ring 3 sets
+# AC freely with popfq, so without this a hostile process could take an interrupt
+# with AC=1 and have the whole handler run with SMAP suspended. Ahead of the CPL
+# test because ring 0 inherits AC just as readily: a fault or IRQ nested inside
+# kernel code carries whatever AC the interrupted context had, and that context
+# may itself be an entry that has not reached its own guard yet. Clearing first,
+# unconditionally, means no path into the kernel is ever a path in with AC set.
+#
+# `clac` is #UD on a CPU without SMAP, so the image ships the 3-byte canonical NOP
+# (`nopl (%rax)`) and per-cpu.zig overwrites it with `clac` (0f 01 ca) at boot,
+# on the boot processor, only when CPUID says the instruction exists — a one-time
+# patch rather than a branch in the hottest path in the kernel. Neither encoding
+# touches the flags the `testb` below sets, so the guard is invisible to the code
+# that follows it either way.
+.global isr_smap_patch
 isr_common:
+isr_smap_patch:
+    .byte 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x00  # nopl (%rax) -> patched to `clac` when the CPU has SMAP
     testb $3, 24(%rsp)
     jz 1f
     swapgs

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/per-cpu.zig

@@ -11,9 +11,24 @@
 //! transition is always an exit (the kernel starts in ring 0), the swap pairs
 //! keep the invariant without seeding KERNEL_GS_BASE. `scheduler()` is therefore
 //! valid in any ring-0 context and never sees a user-controlled base.
+//!
+//! The file has since become the home of **per-core CPU state set at bring-up**
+//! generally, not just the GS block: the fast-system_call MSRs and the CR4
+//! hardening bits live here too, because each is state a core owns and must set
+//! for itself. Both bring-up paths — `cpu.init` on the boot processor and
+//! `smp.apEntry` on every application processor — call the same functions here.
+//!
+//! One deliberate exception to "per-core": `armSupervisorAccessPrevention` patches
+//! a machine-wide instruction into the shared interrupt entry, once, on the boot
+//! processor. It lives here anyway because it is the other half of CR4.SMAP —
+//! same feature probe, same fail-open posture — and splitting a hardening measure
+//! across two files is how the halves drift apart.
 
 const std = @import("std");
 const io = @import("io.zig");
+const cpuid = @import("cpuid.zig");
+const paging = @import("paging.zig");
+const boot_handoff = @import("boot-handoff");
 const parameters = @import("parameters");
 
 const ia32_gs_base = 0xC000_0101;
@@ -73,5 +88,171 @@ pub fn initSystemCall() void {
     io.wrmsr(ia32_star, (@as(u64, 0x08) << 32) | (@as(u64, 0x10) << 48));
     const entry = @extern(*const anyopaque, .{ .name = "syscall_entry" });
     io.wrmsr(ia32_lstar, @intFromPtr(entry));
-    io.wrmsr(ia32_sfmask, 0x4_0700); // clear IF, TF, DF, AC on entry
+    // Clear IF, TF, DF, AC and NT on entry. The first four are the usual
+    // hygiene; NT is here because SYSCALL, unlike an interrupt gate, does not
+    // clear it for us, so without this the kernel runs every system call with
+    // whatever nested-task bit ring 3 last chose — and the canonical-RIP guard's
+    // cold path (isr.s) leaves through IRETQ, whose behaviour with NT set is a
+    // corner of the manuals not worth depending on either way. Masking it costs
+    // one bit and removes the question: the kernel is never nested, and ring 3
+    // still gets its own NT back, from R11 on the fast path and from the frame
+    // on the cold one.
+    io.wrmsr(ia32_sfmask, 0x4_4700);
+}
+
+// --- supervisor-mode hardening (CR4) ---------------------------------------
+//
+// CR4 is per-core state, so these bits are set during *every* core's bring-up —
+// the BSP in cpu.init, each AP in smp.apEntry — and not in the AP trampoline,
+// which stays minimal and would only cover the APs anyway.
+
+/// CR4.SMEP: an instruction fetch in ring 0 from a page whose U/S bit says *user*
+/// raises #PF. This is what makes the classic ret2usr shape (a kernel bug steered
+/// into attacker-prepared user code) a loud, attributable fault instead of a
+/// silent compromise. danos never executes user-mapped memory in ring 0 — kernel
+/// text lives in the higher half, the ring-3 entry paths are kernel code, and the
+/// AP trampoline page is a supervisor mapping — so nothing legitimate is refused.
+const cr4_smep: u64 = 1 << 20;
+
+/// SMEP's feature bit: CPUID leaf 7, sub-leaf 0, EBX bit 7.
+fn smepSupported() bool {
+    if (!cpuid.supports(7)) return false;
+    return cpuid.leaf(7).ebx & (1 << 7) != 0;
+}
+
+/// CR4.SMAP: a ring-0 data *read or write* to a page whose U/S bit says *user*
+/// raises #PF, unless EFLAGS.AC is set. It is the standing enforcement behind
+/// system/kernel/user-memory.zig: that layer never dereferences a user virtual
+/// address — it walks the process's tables and moves bytes through the physmap,
+/// kernel mappings throughout — so nothing legitimate in this kernel is refused,
+/// and any future code that reaches for a user pointer directly faults the first
+/// time it runs. danos therefore opens no `stac` window anywhere; there is no
+/// correct reason to have one, and adding one is how the guarantee is lost.
+const cr4_smap: u64 = 1 << 21;
+
+/// SMAP's feature bit: CPUID leaf 7, sub-leaf 0, EBX bit 20.
+fn smapSupported() bool {
+    if (!cpuid.supports(7)) return false;
+    return cpuid.leaf(7).ebx & (1 << 20) != 0;
+}
+
+/// `clac` — the three bytes that replace the NOP at `isr_smap_patch` once the
+/// interrupt entry is allowed to execute them.
+const clac_opcode = [_]u8{ 0x0f, 0x01, 0xca };
+
+/// Set only once the interrupt entry really clears AC, and read by every core
+/// before it turns SMAP on. Nothing turns SMAP on until this is true, so there is
+/// no window — not even on the boot processor, not even before ring 3 exists —
+/// in which the bit is live while an interrupt could still be taken with AC set.
+var interrupt_entry_clears_ac = false;
+
+fn readCr3() u64 {
+    return asm volatile ("mov %%cr3, %[out]"
+        : [out] "=r" (-> u64),
+    );
+}
+
+/// Patch the `clac` into the shared interrupt entry, and by doing so authorize
+/// CR4.SMAP. **Boot processor only, once, before any core sets the bit and before
+/// the application processors are woken** — `initHardening` refuses SMAP until
+/// this has run, so the order is enforced rather than merely documented, and an AP
+/// climbing the trampoline cannot get ahead of it.
+///
+/// The write goes through the physmap, not through the kernel's own view of its
+/// text: once `paging.init` has run, kernel `.text` is mapped read-only under W^X,
+/// and a store to it would fault (or, worse, silently need CR0.WP cleared). The
+/// physmap alias of the same frame is an ordinary supervisor RW mapping — the same
+/// door `smp.arm` uses to write the AP trampoline and `process.run` uses to fill a
+/// read-only user code frame. Going through it also makes this correct under
+/// *either* set of tables: the loader's bootstrap tables map the image writable,
+/// the kernel's own do not, and this runs before the switch.
+///
+/// Three bytes, translated one at a time, so a patch site that straddles a page
+/// boundary is not a special case. A translation that fails leaves the NOP in
+/// place and returns false, and the machine then boots without SMAP rather than
+/// with SMAP and an entry path that cannot clear AC.
+pub fn armSupervisorAccessPrevention() bool {
+    if (!smapSupported()) return false;
+    const site = @intFromPtr(@extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "isr_smap_patch" }));
+    const root = readCr3() & 0x000F_FFFF_FFFF_F000;
+
+    // MUST run with interrupts masked, and does: this is reached from cpu.init,
+    // long before the kernel's `sti`, and before any application processor exists.
+    // The reason is that the three bytes go in one at a time, and the middle state
+    // — 0f 01 00, once the second byte lands — is `sgdt (%rax)`, a ten-byte write
+    // to wherever RAX points, sitting at the first instruction of every interrupt
+    // entry. Nothing can take that entry here, so nothing can execute it. A future
+    // change that moves this after interrupts are enabled has to close that window
+    // first (one 16-bit store covering both changed bytes is the shape, but it
+    // needs the two to be physically contiguous and 2-byte aligned — a naive
+    // version of exactly that triple-faulted this kernel).
+    for (clac_opcode, 0..) |byte, i| {
+        const physical = paging.translateIn(root, site + i) orelse return false;
+        const alias: *volatile u8 = @ptrFromInt(boot_handoff.physicalToVirtual(physical));
+        alias.* = byte;
+    }
+    // The bytes were written through a different linear address than the one they
+    // will be fetched from, so serialize before anyone can execute them: CPUID is
+    // the architecturally sanctioned way to discard whatever the core prefetched or
+    // decoded of the old encoding.
+    _ = cpuid.leaf(0);
+    // Read back through the *text* address, not the alias just written: that is the
+    // view the CPU will fetch from, so this is what proves the two are the same
+    // physical page and the patch landed where it will actually execute. A mismatch
+    // means the translation lied, and SMAP stays off rather than being enabled over
+    // an entry path that cannot clear AC.
+    const installed: [*]const volatile u8 = @ptrFromInt(site);
+    for (clac_opcode, 0..) |byte, i| {
+        if (installed[i] != byte) return false;
+    }
+    interrupt_entry_clears_ac = true;
+    return true;
+}
+
+fn readCr4() u64 {
+    return asm volatile ("mov %%cr4, %[out]"
+        : [out] "=r" (-> u64),
+    );
+}
+
+fn writeCr4(value: u64) void {
+    asm volatile ("mov %[in], %%cr4"
+        :
+        : [in] "r" (value),
+        : .{ .memory = true });
+}
+
+/// Turn on the supervisor-mode hardening this CPU offers, on the calling core.
+/// Called once per core, next to `initSystemCall`, from both bring-up paths.
+///
+/// **Fail-open, like the IOMMU and the clocksource:** an absent feature is a
+/// machine that boots unhardened, not a machine that refuses to boot. danos has
+/// to run on any VM, on real Intel and on real AMD; the boot log states the
+/// posture either way (see the platform block in system/kernel/kernel.zig), so
+/// an unhardened boot is visible rather than assumed.
+pub fn initHardening() void {
+    var bits: u64 = 0;
+    if (smepSupported()) bits |= cr4_smep;
+    // SMAP only after the boot processor has armed the interrupt entry: with the
+    // NOP still in place an interrupt inherits ring 3's AC and suspends SMAP for
+    // the length of the handler, which is worse than not claiming the bit at all.
+    if (smapSupported() and interrupt_entry_clears_ac) bits |= cr4_smap;
+    if (bits == 0) return;
+    writeCr4(readCr4() | bits);
+}
+
+/// Whether supervisor-mode execution prevention is live on *this* core. Read
+/// straight out of CR4 rather than a remembered probe result, so the answer is
+/// the state the hardware is actually in — which is what both the boot log and
+/// the `fault-smep` test case want to assert.
+pub fn supervisorExecutePreventionEnabled() bool {
+    return readCr4() & cr4_smep != 0;
+}
+
+/// Whether supervisor-mode *access* prevention is live on *this* core. Read from
+/// CR4 for the same reason as its neighbour: the question the boot log and the
+/// `fault-smap` case are asking is what the hardware is doing, not what a probe
+/// once concluded.
+pub fn supervisorAccessPreventionEnabled() bool {
+    return readCr4() & cr4_smap != 0;
 }

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/smp.zig

@@ -179,6 +179,13 @@ fn apEntry(percpu: usize) callconv(.c) noreturn {
     idt.loadOnThisCpu(); // the shared IDT
     pcpu.setLocal(cpu, percpu); // per-CPU block via GS base — *after* the GDT reload
     pcpu.initSystemCall(); // enable system_call/sysret on this core
+    // CR4 is per-core: this core starts from the trampoline's CR4 (PAE + SSE only),
+    // so it sets its own hardening bits here rather than in the trampoline — one
+    // Zig code path shared with the BSP (cpu.init), and the trampoline stays minimal.
+    // CR4.SMEP and CR4.SMAP on this core, if the CPU has them. The `clac` the SMAP
+    // bit depends on was patched into the shared interrupt entry by the BSP long
+    // before this core was woken, so an AP only ever finds it already armed.
+    pcpu.initHardening();
 
     apic.initSecondary(); // software-enable this core's LAPIC
     apic.initTimer(apic.frequencyHz()); // arm its timer (still masked: interrupts off)

system/kernel/kernel.zig

@@ -279,6 +279,22 @@ fn kmain(boot_information: *const BootInformation) noreturn {
         log.print("  cpus       : {d} usable core(s); 1 running (BSP), {d} AP(s) parked (SMP bring-up pending)\n", .{ cores.len, if (cores.len > 0) cores.len - 1 else 0 });
         if (platform.cpusDropped() > 0)
             log.print("  cpus       : WARNING {d} core(s) beyond pool cap dropped\n", .{platform.cpusDropped()});
+        // The supervisor-execution posture, stated plainly at every boot. Every core
+        // sets the bit during its own bring-up (architecture/x86_64/per-cpu.zig); the
+        // BSP answers for the machine here, because the feature is a property of the
+        // CPU model, not of an individual core. Fail-open like the IOMMU: a CPU without
+        // it still boots, it just boots unhardened, and says so.
+        if (architecture.supervisorExecutePreventionEnabled())
+            log.write("  smep       : enabled - ring 0 cannot execute user pages\n")
+        else
+            log.write("  smep       : absent - ring-0 execution of user pages unprevented\n");
+        // The supervisor-access posture, the same way. Its second half is a boot-time
+        // patch (the `clac` at the interrupt entry), so "absent" here covers both a
+        // CPU without the feature and a patch that could not be applied.
+        if (architecture.supervisorAccessPreventionEnabled())
+            log.write("  smap       : enabled - ring 0 reaches user memory only through the checked copy layer\n")
+        else
+            log.write("  smap       : absent - ring-0 access to user pages unprevented\n");
         // The DMA-isolation posture, stated plainly at every boot. When a unit exists,
         // iommu.init already logged its enable block above; here we only state the
         // fail-open case, so a boot without the line is a boot with translation on.

system/kernel/process.zig

@@ -124,15 +124,26 @@ pub const maximum_mount_rewrite = 32;
 const auxiliary_vector_null: u64 = 0; // AT_NULL — end of the vector
 const auxiliary_vector_page_size: u64 = 6; // AT_PAGESZ
 
-// The hand-assembled user program blob (isr.s, .rodata) — the isolation probe.
+// The hand-assembled user program blobs (isr.s, .rodata) — the isolation probes.
 const pf_start = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_pf_start" });
 const pf_end = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_pf_end" });
+const sysret_start = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_sysret_start" });
+const sysret_end = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_sysret_end" });
 
 /// The isolation-proof program: reads a kernel-only page, must #PF.
 pub fn pfBlob() []const u8 {
     return pf_start[0 .. @intFromPtr(pf_end) - @intFromPtr(pf_start)];
 }
 
+/// The SYSRET-guard program: two system calls, the second of which must be copied
+/// so that it ends at the last executable byte of the user half — its return
+/// address is then the first non-canonical address. Ends with `syscall`, so the
+/// caller places it at `page_size - len` inside the page at `user_half_end -
+/// page_size`; anywhere else and it proves nothing.
+pub fn nonCanonicalReturnBlob() []const u8 {
+    return sysret_start[0 .. @intFromPtr(sysret_end) - @intFromPtr(sysret_start)];
+}
+
 /// What debug_write syscalls produced (accumulated), and the exit system_call's code.
 pub var write_buffer: [256]u8 = undefined;
 pub var write_len: usize = 0;

system/kernel/tests.zig

@@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ pub fn run(case: []const u8, boot_information: *const BootInformation) void {
         faultNoExecute();
     } else if (eql(case, "fault-null")) {
         faultNull();
+    } else if (eql(case, "fault-smep")) {
+        faultSmep();
+    } else if (eql(case, "fault-smap")) {
+        faultSmap();
+    } else if (eql(case, "sysret-canonical")) {
+        sysretCanonicalTest();
     } else if (eql(case, "usermem")) {
         userMemTest();
     } else if (eql(case, "user-memory")) {
@@ -765,6 +771,15 @@ fn sleepTest() void {
 // --- SMP parallelism ------------------------------------------------------
 
 var seen_core = [_]bool{false} ** 8;
+/// Whether the core this worker ran on had SMEP on in its own CR4. Recorded per
+/// core because CR4 is per-core state: the boot processor enabling it says
+/// nothing about the ones the trampoline brought up, and the whole hardening is
+/// only as wide as its narrowest core.
+var seen_core_smep = [_]bool{false} ** 8;
+/// The same, for SMAP. A core that came up without it would still be able to read
+/// and write user pages from ring 0 while every other core could not — a hole
+/// whose only symptom is that the tripwire never trips there.
+var seen_core_smap = [_]bool{false} ** 8;
 var smp_running: bool = true;
 
 /// A worker that, while running, records which core it's executing on. Spread across
@@ -773,7 +788,11 @@ fn smpWorker() void {
     const p: *volatile bool = &smp_running;
     while (p.*) {
         const c = scheduler.currentCpuIndex();
-        if (c < seen_core.len) seen_core[c] = true;
+        if (c < seen_core.len) {
+            seen_core[c] = true;
+            seen_core_smep[c] = architecture.supervisorExecutePreventionEnabled();
+            seen_core_smap[c] = architecture.supervisorAccessPreventionEnabled();
+        }
     }
     scheduler.exit();
 }
@@ -803,6 +822,36 @@ fn smpTest() void {
     log("DANOS-SMP: workers ran on {d} distinct core(s)\n", .{cores_seen});
     check("tasks ran on multiple cores in parallel", cores_seen >= 2);
 
+    // Every core that ran work must have had SMEP on, not just the one that
+    // booted: an application processor climbs through the trampoline with CR4
+    // bare and sets the bit itself on the way in, so a hardening that reached
+    // only the boot processor would leave every other core able to execute a
+    // user page in ring 0 — and would look identical from the boot log. Only
+    // asserted where the platform has SMEP at all, so a machine without it
+    // still passes rather than failing for the one reason that is not a bug.
+    if (architecture.supervisorExecutePreventionEnabled()) {
+        var hardened: u32 = 0;
+        for (seen_core, seen_core_smep) |ran, smep| {
+            if (ran and smep) hardened += 1;
+        }
+        log("DANOS-SMP: {d} of {d} core(s) had supervisor execute prevention\n", .{ hardened, cores_seen });
+        check("every core that ran work had SMEP enabled", hardened == cores_seen);
+    }
+
+    // And the same for SMAP, for the same reason and with one more of its own: the
+    // bit is refused until the boot processor has patched the `clac` into the shared
+    // interrupt entry, so a core reporting SMAP on is also a core confirming it came
+    // up after that patch — the ordering the whole scheme rests on, checked from the
+    // far end. Gated on the running core the same way, so a CPU without SMAP passes.
+    if (architecture.supervisorAccessPreventionEnabled()) {
+        var hardened: u32 = 0;
+        for (seen_core, seen_core_smap) |ran, smap| {
+            if (ran and smap) hardened += 1;
+        }
+        log("DANOS-SMP: {d} of {d} core(s) had supervisor access prevention\n", .{ hardened, cores_seen });
+        check("every core that ran work had SMAP enabled", hardened == cores_seen);
+    }
+
     // Bring-up is done, so the trampoline frame must be inert: zeroed (no stale code)
     // and non-executable (W^X restored). It's armed only while a core is climbing.
     const tramp = architecture.trampolinePage();
@@ -1641,6 +1690,99 @@ fn faultRecoveryTest(boot_information: *const BootInformation) void {
     result();
 }
 
+/// Spawn a ring-3 process whose second system call has to return to a NON-canonical
+/// address — the SYSRET hazard, staged the way a hostile program would stage it.
+/// The blob is copied to the *end* of the last canonical page of the user half, so
+/// its final `syscall` occupies the last two bytes ring 3 can execute and the return
+/// RIP the CPU hands the kernel is `user_half_end` itself, the first non-canonical
+/// address. Hand-built (address space, code page RO+X, stack RW+NX) like
+/// `spawnFaultingProcess` — a raw blob is not an ELF `spawnProcess` could load.
+/// Returns the process id, or null if any allocation failed.
+fn spawnNonCanonicalReturnProcess() ?u32 {
+    const blob = process.nonCanonicalReturnBlob();
+    const code_virtual = process.user_half_end - abi.page_size; // the last canonical page
+    const entry = code_virtual + abi.page_size - blob.len; // ends flush with the page
+    const flags = sync.enter();
+    defer sync.leave(flags);
+
+    const address_space = architecture.createAddressSpace() orelse return null;
+    const code_frame = pmm.alloc() orelse {
+        architecture.destroyAddressSpace(address_space);
+        return null;
+    };
+    // Fill through the physmap (the user mapping is read-only); int3 everywhere the
+    // blob doesn't cover, so a stray entry traps instead of sliding into it.
+    const code: [*]u8 = @ptrFromInt(boot_handoff.physicalToVirtual(code_frame));
+    @memset(code[0..abi.page_size], 0xCC);
+    @memcpy(code[abi.page_size - blob.len .. abi.page_size], blob);
+    architecture.mapUserPageInto(address_space, code_virtual, code_frame, false, true); // RO + X
+
+    const stack_frame = pmm.alloc() orelse {
+        architecture.destroyAddressSpace(address_space); // frees code_frame too — it's mapped
+        return null;
+    };
+    architecture.mapUserPageInto(address_space, process.stack_base_virtual, stack_frame, true, false); // RW + NX
+
+    // Supervised by the calling test task, so exitReasonOf can read the verdict.
+    return scheduler.spawnUserLocked(address_space, entry, process.stack_base_virtual + abi.page_size, 0, 4, "sysret-probe", scheduler.currentId(), null, 0) orelse {
+        architecture.destroyAddressSpace(address_space);
+        return null;
+    };
+}
+
+/// The SYSRET canonical-RIP guard (docs/os-development/smep-smap.md, "Adjacent,
+/// deliberately separate"): a process must not be able to make the kernel fault on
+/// its own way out of a system call. `sysretq` with a non-canonical RIP in RCX #GPs
+/// *in ring 0* on Intel — on the kernel stack, with the user's GS base already
+/// installed — so the exit path checks the return address first and returns through
+/// `iretq` instead, which faults in ring 3 where a bad address is just a dead
+/// process.
+///
+/// The probe reaches the hazard the way an attacker would: its `syscall` is the last
+/// two bytes of executable address space, so the return address the CPU saves is the
+/// first non-canonical one. Three things then have to be true — the guard fired, the
+/// *process* died of a protection fault (so the fault landed in ring 3, not in the
+/// kernel), and this task is still here to say so.
+///
+/// The counter is what makes this a regression test rather than a decoration.
+/// Measured with the guard's branch commented out (2026-08-01): QEMU's TCG does not
+/// model Intel's ring-0 #GP — `sysretq` simply returns to the bad address and the
+/// process dies in ring 3 anyway, so every *outcome* check still passed and only the
+/// counter noticed. On real Intel silicon the same run takes the kernel down. Assert
+/// the mechanism, not just the outcome, whenever the emulator is the softer machine.
+/// The probe's first system call is deliberately ordinary: it only reaches the second
+/// one by returning correctly from the first, so the fast path is exercised too.
+fn sysretCanonicalTest() void {
+    log("DANOS-TEST-BEGIN: sysret-canonical\n", .{});
+    const blob = process.nonCanonicalReturnBlob();
+    check(
+        "the probe's system call number still matches the ABI",
+        blob.len > 1 and blob[0] == 0xB8 and blob[1] == @intFromEnum(abi.SystemCall.current_core),
+    );
+
+    const before = architecture.nonCanonicalReturnCount();
+    check("no return has been refused yet this boot", before == 0);
+    process.fault_kill_count = 0;
+    const probe = spawnNonCanonicalReturnProcess() orelse 0;
+    check("the probe process spawned", probe != 0);
+
+    // Drop below the probe so it gets the core, and wait for the kill.
+    scheduler.setPriority(1);
+    const deadline = architecture.millis() + 5000;
+    while (process.fault_kill_count < 1 and architecture.millis() < deadline) scheduler.yield();
+    scheduler.setPriority(4);
+
+    const refused = architecture.nonCanonicalReturnCount() - before;
+    check("the guard refused exactly one sysretq", refused == 1);
+    check("the probe was killed (not the machine)", process.fault_kill_count == 1);
+    check(
+        "the probe died of a protection fault — the iretq fallback faulted it in ring 3",
+        process.exitReasonOf(scheduler.currentId(), probe) == @intFromEnum(abi.ExitReason.protection_fault),
+    );
+    log("sysret-canonical: {d} non-canonical return(s) refused; core {d} still running\n", .{ refused, scheduler.currentCpuIndex() });
+    result();
+}
+
 /// Address-space refcount (docs/threading-plan.md M1): every process holds exactly one
 /// reference to its address space, released when it dies, so `destroyAddressSpace` runs
 /// exactly once per space — no leak, no double-free. Spawn and kill several ring-3
@@ -4296,6 +4438,105 @@ fn faultNoExecute() void {
     log("DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL (NX not enforced)\n", .{});
 }
 
+/// Verify SMEP: a ring-0 instruction fetch from a *user*-mapped page must fault.
+///
+/// The ret2usr shape, staged deliberately — a user code page (present, executable,
+/// U/S set) mapped into the address space the kernel itself is running on, then
+/// called from ring 0. CR4.SMEP makes the fetch a #PF; without it the `ret` simply
+/// returns and the FAIL line below is reached.
+///
+/// The CPU reports it as: present (bit 0) + instruction fetch (bit 4) = error code
+/// 0x11, taken in ring 0, at the user address it tried to fetch from — a #PF on an
+/// instruction fetch is raised *at* the instruction that could not be fetched, so
+/// the reported IP is the probe page, not the kernel-half `call` that jumped there.
+/// The enabled-check up front stops the case passing vacuously on a CPU that has no
+/// SMEP (where nothing would fault and nothing would be proved).
+fn faultSmep() void {
+    log("DANOS-TEST-BEGIN: fault-smep\n", .{});
+    if (!architecture.supervisorExecutePreventionEnabled()) {
+        log("DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL (SMEP not enabled in this boot)\n", .{});
+        return;
+    }
+    const frame = pmm.alloc() orelse {
+        log("DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL (no frame for the probe page)\n", .{});
+        return;
+    };
+    // Fill through the physmap — the user mapping is read-only. A lone `ret` so an
+    // unenforced fetch lands harmlessly back here (and reports FAIL), int3 padding
+    // so a stray slide traps instead of running into whatever the frame held.
+    const code: [*]u8 = @ptrFromInt(boot_handoff.physicalToVirtual(frame));
+    @memset(code[0..abi.page_size], 0xCC);
+    code[0] = 0xC3; // ret
+    // RO + X *and user-accessible*, in the kernel's own tables: this task is a kernel
+    // task, so it runs on them (a process would have its own address space).
+    architecture.mapUserPage(process.code_virtual, frame, false, true);
+
+    // Launder the address through empty asm so the backend really forms an indirect
+    // call rather than folding anything about a known constant target.
+    var target: u64 = process.code_virtual;
+    target = asm (""
+        : [ret] "=r" (-> u64),
+        : [in] "0" (target),
+    );
+    const f: *const fn () void = @ptrFromInt(target);
+    f(); // ring-0 instruction fetch from a user page -> #PF
+    log("DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL (SMEP not enforced)\n", .{});
+}
+
+/// Verify SMAP: a ring-0 data read from a *user*-mapped page must fault.
+///
+/// The bug shape this case stands in for is the ordinary one — a syscall that takes
+/// the pointer ring 3 handed it and dereferences it. So the probe does exactly that
+/// and nothing more: an ordinary user data page (present, user-accessible, read-only,
+/// no-execute) mapped into the address space this kernel task is already running on,
+/// then read directly rather than through system/kernel/user-memory.zig. With SMAP on
+/// and EFLAGS.AC clear the load is a #PF; without it the byte comes back and the FAIL
+/// line below reports the value it should never have seen.
+///
+/// The CPU reports it as error code **0x1**: present (bit 0) alone. A SMAP violation
+/// has no error-code bit of its own — bit 1 stays clear because this is a read, and
+/// bit 2 (U/S) describes the *access*, which was made in ring 0, not the page. So the
+/// report is indistinguishable in its bits from any other supervisor read of a present
+/// page; what identifies it is the pairing with `ring 0 (kernel)` and a user CR2.
+///
+/// The seed write goes through the physmap, which is the point in miniature: that is
+/// the route the checked copy layer takes for every legitimate access to this same
+/// frame, and SMAP has no objection to it. Only the second access — the one through
+/// the *user* virtual address — is refused.
+///
+/// The enabled-check up front stops the case passing vacuously on a CPU without SMAP,
+/// and fails rather than skips: a suite that quietly stops testing the tripwire is
+/// exactly the outcome the tripwire exists to prevent.
+fn faultSmap() void {
+    log("DANOS-TEST-BEGIN: fault-smap\n", .{});
+    if (!architecture.supervisorAccessPreventionEnabled()) {
+        log("DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL (SMAP not enabled in this boot)\n", .{});
+        return;
+    }
+    const frame = pmm.alloc() orelse {
+        log("DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL (no frame for the probe page)\n", .{});
+        return;
+    };
+    const seed: [*]u8 = @ptrFromInt(boot_handoff.physicalToVirtual(frame));
+    @memset(seed[0..abi.page_size], 0);
+    seed[0] = 0x5A; // a sentinel, so an unenforced read is reported as a value, not a guess
+    // RO + NX *and user-accessible*, in the kernel's own tables: this task is a kernel
+    // task, so it runs on them (a process would have its own address space).
+    architecture.mapUserPage(process.code_virtual, frame, false, false);
+
+    // Launder the address through empty asm for the same reason `fault-null` does:
+    // the backend must form a real load from a runtime address rather than reasoning
+    // about a constant it can see the provenance of.
+    var target: u64 = process.code_virtual;
+    target = asm (""
+        : [ret] "=r" (-> u64),
+        : [in] "0" (target),
+    );
+    const p: *const volatile u8 = @ptrFromInt(target);
+    const value = p.*; // ring-0 data read from a user page -> #PF
+    log("DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL (SMAP not enforced; read 0x{x})\n", .{value});
+}
+
 /// Verify the null guard: dereferencing address 0 (page 0 left unmapped) faults.
 fn faultNull() void {
     log("DANOS-TEST-BEGIN: fault-null\n", .{});

test/qemu_test.py

@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ ARCHES = {
         # Built as a function so we can splice in per-run paths.
         "qemu_args": lambda a, boot_volume, vars_fd, serial: [
             "-machine", "q35", "-m", "128M",
+            # The default TCG model (qemu64) predates the supervisor-hardening bits:
+            # no SMEP, no SMAP, so the kernel's probes would find nothing and the
+            # enabled paths would never run in CI. `max` is "everything this
+            # accelerator can emulate", which under TCG includes both.
+            "-cpu", "max",
             "-drive", f"if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file={a['ovmf_code']}",
             "-drive", f"if=pflash,format=raw,file={vars_fd}",
             # Boot off a FAT USB device: the boot volume is a mass-storage device on
@@ -338,6 +343,46 @@ CASES = [
      "expect": r"page fault \(vector 14\)",
      "fail":   r"NX not enforced"},
     {"name": "fault-null", "expect": r"page fault \(vector 14\)"},
+    # SMEP: ring 0 calls into a page that is present, executable and *user*-accessible
+    # — the ret2usr shape. CR4.SMEP must refuse the instruction fetch: #PF with error
+    # code 0x11 (present | instruction-fetch; the U/S bit reports the *access* ring, so
+    # it is 0 for a ring-0 fetch), taken in ring 0, reported at the page it tried to
+    # fetch from (a fetch #PF is raised at the un-fetchable instruction, so the IP is
+    # the user address, not the kernel-half call site). The boot line is asserted too:
+    # on a CPU without SMEP nothing would fault and the case would prove nothing.
+    {"name": "fault-smep",
+     "expect": r"(?s)(?=.*smep\s+: enabled)(?=.*page fault \(vector 14\))"
+               r"(?=.*ring 0 \(kernel\))(?=.*error code : 0x11)"
+               r"(?=.*fault addr : 0x0000700000000000)",
+     "fail":   r"SMEP not enforced|SMEP not enabled|no frame for the probe page"},
+    # SMAP: ring 0 reads a page that is present and *user*-accessible, the way a syscall
+    # that dereferenced its caller's pointer would. CR4.SMAP (plus the `clac` patched
+    # into the interrupt entry, which keeps ring 3 from suspending it by taking an
+    # interrupt with AC set) must refuse the load: #PF with error code 0x1 — present,
+    # and nothing else. A SMAP violation has no bit of its own; bit 1 is clear because
+    # it is a read and bit 2 (U/S) reports the ring of the *access*, which was 0. Taken
+    # in ring 0, at the user address it read. The boot line is asserted too: without
+    # SMAP nothing would fault and the case would prove nothing.
+    {"name": "fault-smap",
+     "expect": r"(?s)(?=.*smap\s+: enabled)(?=.*page fault \(vector 14\))"
+               r"(?=.*ring 0 \(kernel\))(?=.*error code : 0x1(?![0-9a-f]))"
+               r"(?=.*fault addr : 0x0000700000000000)",
+     "fail":   r"SMAP not enforced|SMAP not enabled|no frame for the probe page"},
+    # SYSRET canonical-RIP guard: a ring-3 probe whose `syscall` sits on the last two
+    # bytes of executable address space, so the return RIP the kernel must hand back
+    # is 0x0000800000000000 — non-canonical, and a ring-0 #GP if it reached SYSRETQ.
+    # The kernel must return through IRETQ instead, which faults the *process* in
+    # ring 3: the kill line names a general protection fault at exactly that address,
+    # and the probe's own result line reports the guard counter. Any "ring 0 (kernel)"
+    # report, panic or reset here is the hazard itself, so they are failures.
+    # TCG does not model the ring-0 #GP (measured: with the guard removed these two
+    # lines are unchanged), so the case's teeth are the counter assertion inside
+    # DANOS-TEST-RESULT, not the kill line.
+    {"name": "sysret-canonical",
+     "expect": r"(?s)(?=.*killed by general protection fault \(vector 13\))"
+               r"(?=.*IP\s+: 0x0000800000000000)"
+               r"(?=.*DANOS-TEST-RESULT: PASS)",
+     "fail":   r"DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL|CPU EXCEPTION|KERNEL PANIC"},
     # Memory grants: the mmap/munmap path hands out user pages into a process's
     # arena, translate resolves them, munmap frees them, and no frames leak.
     {"name": "usermem",