kernel: a hostile return address cannot fault the kernel

SYSRETQ with a non-canonical RIP raises a general protection fault in ring
0 — on the kernel stack, an instruction after the swapgs that installed the
user's GS base. It is one of the better-known escalation primitives, and
ring 3 reaches it without any kernel bug at all: the processor saves the
address of the instruction after SYSCALL, so a program whose SYSCALL is the
last two bytes of the last canonical page returns to the first
non-canonical address. The new test does exactly that.

The exit path now sign-extends the return address from bit 47 and compares;
if the value changed, it returns through IRETQ instead, which commits the
privilege change before fetching the new address, so the fault arrives from
ring 3 and the process dies like any other. Four register-only operations
and a branch that a correct program can never take — it could not have
executed at a non-canonical address in the first place. Bit 47 is the right
pivot because danos builds four-level page tables and nothing sets the
five-level bit; a future port must move the pivot, and the comment says so.

SFMASK grows one bit while we are here. SYSCALL, unlike an interrupt gate,
does not clear the nested-task flag, so the kernel had been running every
system call with whatever ring 3 last chose — harmless while the only exit
was SYSRETQ, and a question worth not having now that one exit is IRETQ.
The kernel is never nested; ring 3 still gets its own flag back.

Suite 113/113. The new case asserts the refusal counter rather than the
dying process: the emulator we test on kills it either way, so only the
counter distinguishes a guard that ran from one that did not.

docs/os-development/smep-smap.md

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # SMEP and SMAP — supervisor-mode hardening
 
-*Design, 2026-07-31. H2 (SMEP) has landed; HS and H3 are the remaining work. Companion to
+*Design, 2026-07-31. H2 (SMEP) and HS (the SYSRET guard) have landed; H3 is the
+remaining work. Companion to
 [protocol-namespace.md](protocol-namespace.md) on the security track — this is
 the hardware half; that is the namespace half.*
 
@@ -136,6 +137,11 @@ Broadwell+ for SMAP; AMD Zen+ for both). The test images should run with
   hardening bucket, independent fix (validate RCX before `sysretq`, fall
   back to `iretq`), should ride the same branch as H2/H3 but is not
   SMEP/SMAP.
+  **Status — landed 2026-08-01 (HS).** The syscall exit sign-extends the
+  return RIP from bit 47 (danos is 4-level only; nothing sets CR4.LA57) and
+  falls back to `iretq` when that changes it, counting each refusal for the
+  `sysret-canonical` case. Ring 3 could reach it: `syscall` as the last two
+  bytes of the last canonical page returns to `user_half_end`.
 - **KPTI / Meltdown-class leaks are out of scope.** SMEP/SMAP police
   architectural accesses, not speculative ones. danos runs one kernel
   mapping in every address space and accepts that on affected hardware;

docs/security-track-plan.md

@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ plain `main` checkout always tells the truth about where the work is.**
 
 | | |
 |---|---|
-| Working on | **HS** — SYSRET canonical-RIP guard |
+| Working on | **H3** — SMAP (the last phase) |
 | Branch carrying it | `feat/security-group-4` (pushed to origin) |
 | On `main` | everything through P4c — groups 1, 2 and 3 merged |
-| Awaiting merge | H2 — lands with the group 4 merge |
+| Awaiting merge | H2, HS — land with the group 4 merge |
-| Suite | 112 cases, all passing |
+| Suite | 113 cases, all passing |
 | Last updated | 2026-08-01 |
 
 A checkbox below means the phase met its definition of green and was
@@ -81,7 +81,20 @@ group boundary.
   refusal paired with a control; suite 111/111)
 - [x] **merge** group 3 → main, push
 - [x] **H2** — SMEP on every core (shared CPUID helper; CR4 bit 20 set in the per-CPU bring-up both the BSP and every AP run, asserted per core by the smp case; ring-0-executes-user-pages audit clean incl. the pre-paging window on the loader's tables; fail-open with a posture line; `-cpu max` added to the harness since QEMU's default model has neither bit; new `fault-smep` case; suite 112/112)
-- [ ] **HS** — SYSRET canonical-RIP guard
+- [x] **HS** — SYSRET canonical-RIP guard (the syscall exit sign-extends the
+  return RIP from bit 47 and returns through `iretq` when that changes it —
+  four register ALU ops and a never-taken branch on the hot path, no load; the
+  fallback un-pops the rip slot so `iretq` consumes the frame entry already
+  built, reloads R11 from the rflags slot, and keeps the `swapgs` in the same
+  place relative to the ring change. 4-level is not an assumption but a fact:
+  nothing sets CR4.LA57, and the comment says what a 5-level port must change.
+  Ring 3 **can** reach the hazard — `syscall` as the last two bytes of the last
+  canonical page returns to `user_half_end` — so the new `sysret-canonical`
+  case is a real ring-3 probe doing exactly that, and dies of a ring-3 #GP at
+  `0x0000800000000000` while the kernel runs on. Its teeth are the refusal
+  counter, not the outcome: measured with the guard's branch removed, TCG does
+  not model Intel's ring-0 #GP and every outcome check still passed. Suite
+  113/113)
 - [ ] **H3** — SMAP + boot-patched `clac`; `-cpu max` in the harness; negative tests
 - [ ] **merge** group 4 → main, push
 
@@ -518,6 +531,8 @@ put the text in `expect`, per `qemu_test.py:189`). Suite 112.
 **Test:** kernel unit case driving a thread whose return RIP is forged
 non-canonical via the syscall path if constructible cheaply; otherwise the
 review-level proof plus the existing fault cases regression. Suite 112.
+*(Landed: it was constructible, and from ring 3 rather than by forgery — the
+`sysret-canonical` case, suite 113.)*
 
 ## H3 — SMAP
 
@@ -532,7 +547,7 @@ review-level proof plus the existing fault cases regression. Suite 112.
 **Test:** new QEMU case `fault-smap`: ring-0 deliberate read of a mapped
 user page; expect vector 14 + `error code : 0x1` + kernel IP. And the
 whole suite becomes the tripwire — any missed straggler now fails loudly.
-Suite 113.
+Suite 114 (HS added one).
 
 ---
 

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/cpu.zig

@@ -315,6 +315,20 @@ pub fn userExit() noreturn {
     user_exit_to_kernel();
 }
 
+/// The counter the syscall exit stub bumps when it refuses to return the fast way
+/// (isr.s, `sysret_non_canonical_count`).
+const non_canonical_returns = @extern(*u64, .{ .name = "sysret_non_canonical_count" });
+
+/// How many times this boot's system_call returns took the slow, safe exit because
+/// the return address was not a canonical address (the SYSRETQ canonical-RIP guard
+/// in isr.s; an architecture without the hazard reports 0 forever). A correct
+/// program cannot produce one — it could not have executed at a non-canonical
+/// address in the first place — so a nonzero count is exactly the number of times
+/// a process tried to make the kernel fault on its way out.
+pub fn nonCanonicalReturnCount() u64 {
+    return @atomicLoad(u64, non_canonical_returns, .monotonic);
+}
+
 /// Register the handler for the user system_call gate (int 0x80, vector 128). The
 /// handler may write the trap frame (see `setSystemCallResult`).
 pub fn setSystemCallHandler(handler: *const fn (*CpuState) void) void {

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/isr.s

@@ -187,11 +187,9 @@ user_exit_to_kernel:
 # CS/SS from STAR, masks RFLAGS with SFMASK (so IF is already clear), and jumps
 # here with RSP still the *user* stack. We swap in the kernel GS, switch to the
 # task's kernel stack via the per-CPU block, build a CpuState frame identical to
-# the interrupt path's, and reuse interruptDispatch (vector 128) — then SYSRET.
+# the interrupt path's, and reuse interruptDispatch (vector 128) — then SYSRET,
-#
+# unless the return RIP is non-canonical, in which case the canonical-RIP guard at
-# Hazard (acceptable while init is the only, trusted, user program): SYSRETQ #GPs
+# the exit below returns through IRETQ instead (docs/os-development/smep-smap.md).
-# in ring 0 if the return RIP (RCX) is non-canonical. A hostile user could arrange
-# that; hardening (canonical check / iretq fallback) is a later security-track item.
 .global syscall_entry
 syscall_entry:
     swapgs                       # kernel GS base
@@ -249,16 +247,79 @@ syscall_entry:
     pop %rax
     add $16, %rsp                # drop vector + error_code -> rsp at rip
     popq %rcx                    # rip -> RCX (SYSRETQ restores RIP from RCX)
+    # --- canonical-RIP guard ---
+    # SYSRETQ with a non-canonical RCX raises #GP *in ring 0* on Intel: on the
+    # kernel stack, after the swapgs below has already installed the user's GS
+    # base — a fault in the trusted base, on user-influenced state, which is the
+    # classic escalation primitive (CVE-2012-0217). Ring 3 gets to choose that RIP
+    # without any kernel bug: the CPU saves the address of the instruction *after*
+    # `syscall`, so a program executing `syscall` as the last two bytes of the last
+    # canonical page returns to 0x0000_8000_0000_0000. Nothing between entry and
+    # here rewrites the frame's rip (no signal or context-restore path exists that
+    # could), so this is the whole attack surface — and one compare closes it.
+    #
+    # Canonical means bits 63:47 all equal bit 47, so sign-extending from bit 47
+    # and comparing is the complete test. Bit 47 is the right pivot because danos
+    # is 4-level only: paging.zig builds a PML4 and nothing anywhere sets CR4.LA57
+    # (bit 12), so a linear address is 48-bit on every core, on every machine we
+    # boot. A future 5-level port must pivot on bit 56 instead — and should patch
+    # this shift pair at boot rather than branch on a feature flag, to keep the
+    # return path of every syscall in the system free of loads.
+    #
+    # Cost: four register-only ALU ops and one forward branch the predictor sees
+    # taken exactly never (a correct program cannot have a non-canonical return
+    # address — it could not have executed there). R11 is free scratch: SYSCALL
+    # already destroyed the user's copy, and the fast path overwrites it with the
+    # saved RFLAGS two instructions further on.
+    movq %rcx, %r11
+    shlq $16, %r11
+    sarq $16, %r11               # sign-extend from bit 47
+    cmpq %rcx, %r11              # changed by the round trip => non-canonical
+    jne .Lnon_canonical_return
     addq $8, %rsp                # skip the cs slot (SYSRETQ loads CS from STAR)
     popq %r11                    # rflags -> R11 (SYSRETQ restores RFLAGS from R11)
     popq %rsp                    # user rsp (the ss slot below is abandoned)
     swapgs                       # user GS base
     sysretq                      # -> ring 3: RIP=RCX, RFLAGS=R11, CS/SS from STAR
 
+# The guard's cold path: return through IRETQ, which is safe where SYSRETQ is not.
+# IRETQ loads CS — committing the privilege change to ring 3 — before the new RIP
+# is fetched, so the #GP arrives *from ring 3*: through the IDT, onto this task's
+# kernel stack, with a user CS in the frame, where isr_common swaps GS back and the
+# kernel kills the process like any other user fault. That ordering is why IRETQ is
+# the standard fallback for this exact case; the sysret-canonical test asserts it
+# on the machine we run on (the process dies, the kernel does not).
+#
+# State handed to ring 3 is identical to what the fast path would have produced.
+# IRETQ consumes the same 5-word frame the CPU pushes for an interrupt — rip, cs,
+# rflags, rsp, ss — which is exactly the frame syscall_entry built and the fast
+# path is part-way through dismantling, so un-popping the rip slot makes it whole:
+# same user RIP, same user RSP, same RFLAGS, and CS/SS = 0x23/0x1B, the very
+# selectors SYSRETQ would have loaded from STAR. R11 is reloaded from the frame's
+# rflags slot so even the register SYSRET synthesizes matches. The swapgs sits in
+# the same place relative to the ring change as the fast path's, so the swapgs
+# discipline is untouched: kernel GS while we still touch kernel data, user GS for
+# the instant before ring 3.
+.Lnon_canonical_return:
+    # Cold-path diagnostic: how many hostile return addresses this boot refused.
+    # `lock` because every core shares the counter, and it costs nothing here — a
+    # process that reaches this line is about to die.
+    lock incq sysret_non_canonical_count(%rip)
+    movq 8(%rsp), %r11           # rflags -> R11, exactly as the fast path leaves it
+    subq $8, %rsp                # un-pop the rip slot: rsp back at the iretq frame
+    swapgs                       # user GS base
+    iretq                        # -> ring 3, where the bad RIP faults harmlessly
+
 .section .bss
 .balign 8
 user_saved_rsp:
     .skip 8
+# Times the canonical-RIP guard above refused a SYSRETQ this boot. Read through the
+# architecture layer (cpu.zig nonCanonicalReturnCount); zero on any machine no
+# process has attacked.
+.global sysret_non_canonical_count
+sysret_non_canonical_count:
+    .skip 8
 .text
 
 # --- user-mode test program --------------------------------------------------
@@ -282,6 +343,24 @@ user_pf_start:
 1:  jmp 1b
 user_pf_end:
 
+# The SYSRET-guard program: two harmless system calls, the second placed so that
+# its *return address* is not canonical. The caller (tests.zig) copies these bytes
+# to the very end of the last canonical user page, so the final `syscall` occupies
+# the last two bytes of address space ring 3 can execute, and the RIP the CPU saves
+# into RCX for it is 0x0000_8000_0000_0000 — the first non-canonical address.
+# The first call proves the ordinary SYSRETQ path still works (the program only
+# reaches the second instruction pair by returning correctly from the first).
+# 39 is abi.SystemCall.current_core: no arguments, no side effects, always
+# succeeds; the test asserts the immediate below still matches that enum.
+.global user_sysret_start
+.global user_sysret_end
+user_sysret_start:
+    mov $39, %eax          # current_core
+    syscall                # canonical return address (mid-page): the fast path
+    mov $39, %eax          # current_core
+    syscall                # return address = the end of the page = non-canonical
+user_sysret_end:
+
 .text
 
 # Stub for a vector the CPU does NOT push an error code for: push a dummy 0.

system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/per-cpu.zig

@@ -80,7 +80,16 @@ pub fn initSystemCall() void {
     io.wrmsr(ia32_star, (@as(u64, 0x08) << 32) | (@as(u64, 0x10) << 48));
     const entry = @extern(*const anyopaque, .{ .name = "syscall_entry" });
     io.wrmsr(ia32_lstar, @intFromPtr(entry));
-    io.wrmsr(ia32_sfmask, 0x4_0700); // clear IF, TF, DF, AC on entry
+    // Clear IF, TF, DF, AC and NT on entry. The first four are the usual
+    // hygiene; NT is here because SYSCALL, unlike an interrupt gate, does not
+    // clear it for us, so without this the kernel runs every system call with
+    // whatever nested-task bit ring 3 last chose — and the canonical-RIP guard's
+    // cold path (isr.s) leaves through IRETQ, whose behaviour with NT set is a
+    // corner of the manuals not worth depending on either way. Masking it costs
+    // one bit and removes the question: the kernel is never nested, and ring 3
+    // still gets its own NT back, from R11 on the fast path and from the frame
+    // on the cold one.
+    io.wrmsr(ia32_sfmask, 0x4_4700);
 }
 
 // --- supervisor-mode hardening (CR4) ---------------------------------------

system/kernel/process.zig

@@ -124,15 +124,26 @@ pub const maximum_mount_rewrite = 32;
 const auxiliary_vector_null: u64 = 0; // AT_NULL — end of the vector
 const auxiliary_vector_page_size: u64 = 6; // AT_PAGESZ
 
-// The hand-assembled user program blob (isr.s, .rodata) — the isolation probe.
+// The hand-assembled user program blobs (isr.s, .rodata) — the isolation probes.
 const pf_start = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_pf_start" });
 const pf_end = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_pf_end" });
+const sysret_start = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_sysret_start" });
+const sysret_end = @extern([*]const u8, .{ .name = "user_sysret_end" });
 
 /// The isolation-proof program: reads a kernel-only page, must #PF.
 pub fn pfBlob() []const u8 {
     return pf_start[0 .. @intFromPtr(pf_end) - @intFromPtr(pf_start)];
 }
 
+/// The SYSRET-guard program: two system calls, the second of which must be copied
+/// so that it ends at the last executable byte of the user half — its return
+/// address is then the first non-canonical address. Ends with `syscall`, so the
+/// caller places it at `page_size - len` inside the page at `user_half_end -
+/// page_size`; anywhere else and it proves nothing.
+pub fn nonCanonicalReturnBlob() []const u8 {
+    return sysret_start[0 .. @intFromPtr(sysret_end) - @intFromPtr(sysret_start)];
+}
+
 /// What debug_write syscalls produced (accumulated), and the exit system_call's code.
 pub var write_buffer: [256]u8 = undefined;
 pub var write_len: usize = 0;

system/kernel/tests.zig

@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ pub fn run(case: []const u8, boot_information: *const BootInformation) void {
         faultNull();
     } else if (eql(case, "fault-smep")) {
         faultSmep();
+    } else if (eql(case, "sysret-canonical")) {
+        sysretCanonicalTest();
     } else if (eql(case, "usermem")) {
         userMemTest();
     } else if (eql(case, "user-memory")) {
@@ -1667,6 +1669,99 @@ fn faultRecoveryTest(boot_information: *const BootInformation) void {
     result();
 }
 
+/// Spawn a ring-3 process whose second system call has to return to a NON-canonical
+/// address — the SYSRET hazard, staged the way a hostile program would stage it.
+/// The blob is copied to the *end* of the last canonical page of the user half, so
+/// its final `syscall` occupies the last two bytes ring 3 can execute and the return
+/// RIP the CPU hands the kernel is `user_half_end` itself, the first non-canonical
+/// address. Hand-built (address space, code page RO+X, stack RW+NX) like
+/// `spawnFaultingProcess` — a raw blob is not an ELF `spawnProcess` could load.
+/// Returns the process id, or null if any allocation failed.
+fn spawnNonCanonicalReturnProcess() ?u32 {
+    const blob = process.nonCanonicalReturnBlob();
+    const code_virtual = process.user_half_end - abi.page_size; // the last canonical page
+    const entry = code_virtual + abi.page_size - blob.len; // ends flush with the page
+    const flags = sync.enter();
+    defer sync.leave(flags);
+
+    const address_space = architecture.createAddressSpace() orelse return null;
+    const code_frame = pmm.alloc() orelse {
+        architecture.destroyAddressSpace(address_space);
+        return null;
+    };
+    // Fill through the physmap (the user mapping is read-only); int3 everywhere the
+    // blob doesn't cover, so a stray entry traps instead of sliding into it.
+    const code: [*]u8 = @ptrFromInt(boot_handoff.physicalToVirtual(code_frame));
+    @memset(code[0..abi.page_size], 0xCC);
+    @memcpy(code[abi.page_size - blob.len .. abi.page_size], blob);
+    architecture.mapUserPageInto(address_space, code_virtual, code_frame, false, true); // RO + X
+
+    const stack_frame = pmm.alloc() orelse {
+        architecture.destroyAddressSpace(address_space); // frees code_frame too — it's mapped
+        return null;
+    };
+    architecture.mapUserPageInto(address_space, process.stack_base_virtual, stack_frame, true, false); // RW + NX
+
+    // Supervised by the calling test task, so exitReasonOf can read the verdict.
+    return scheduler.spawnUserLocked(address_space, entry, process.stack_base_virtual + abi.page_size, 0, 4, "sysret-probe", scheduler.currentId(), null, 0) orelse {
+        architecture.destroyAddressSpace(address_space);
+        return null;
+    };
+}
+
+/// The SYSRET canonical-RIP guard (docs/os-development/smep-smap.md, "Adjacent,
+/// deliberately separate"): a process must not be able to make the kernel fault on
+/// its own way out of a system call. `sysretq` with a non-canonical RIP in RCX #GPs
+/// *in ring 0* on Intel — on the kernel stack, with the user's GS base already
+/// installed — so the exit path checks the return address first and returns through
+/// `iretq` instead, which faults in ring 3 where a bad address is just a dead
+/// process.
+///
+/// The probe reaches the hazard the way an attacker would: its `syscall` is the last
+/// two bytes of executable address space, so the return address the CPU saves is the
+/// first non-canonical one. Three things then have to be true — the guard fired, the
+/// *process* died of a protection fault (so the fault landed in ring 3, not in the
+/// kernel), and this task is still here to say so.
+///
+/// The counter is what makes this a regression test rather than a decoration.
+/// Measured with the guard's branch commented out (2026-08-01): QEMU's TCG does not
+/// model Intel's ring-0 #GP — `sysretq` simply returns to the bad address and the
+/// process dies in ring 3 anyway, so every *outcome* check still passed and only the
+/// counter noticed. On real Intel silicon the same run takes the kernel down. Assert
+/// the mechanism, not just the outcome, whenever the emulator is the softer machine.
+/// The probe's first system call is deliberately ordinary: it only reaches the second
+/// one by returning correctly from the first, so the fast path is exercised too.
+fn sysretCanonicalTest() void {
+    log("DANOS-TEST-BEGIN: sysret-canonical\n", .{});
+    const blob = process.nonCanonicalReturnBlob();
+    check(
+        "the probe's system call number still matches the ABI",
+        blob.len > 1 and blob[0] == 0xB8 and blob[1] == @intFromEnum(abi.SystemCall.current_core),
+    );
+
+    const before = architecture.nonCanonicalReturnCount();
+    check("no return has been refused yet this boot", before == 0);
+    process.fault_kill_count = 0;
+    const probe = spawnNonCanonicalReturnProcess() orelse 0;
+    check("the probe process spawned", probe != 0);
+
+    // Drop below the probe so it gets the core, and wait for the kill.
+    scheduler.setPriority(1);
+    const deadline = architecture.millis() + 5000;
+    while (process.fault_kill_count < 1 and architecture.millis() < deadline) scheduler.yield();
+    scheduler.setPriority(4);
+
+    const refused = architecture.nonCanonicalReturnCount() - before;
+    check("the guard refused exactly one sysretq", refused == 1);
+    check("the probe was killed (not the machine)", process.fault_kill_count == 1);
+    check(
+        "the probe died of a protection fault — the iretq fallback faulted it in ring 3",
+        process.exitReasonOf(scheduler.currentId(), probe) == @intFromEnum(abi.ExitReason.protection_fault),
+    );
+    log("sysret-canonical: {d} non-canonical return(s) refused; core {d} still running\n", .{ refused, scheduler.currentCpuIndex() });
+    result();
+}
+
 /// Address-space refcount (docs/threading-plan.md M1): every process holds exactly one
 /// reference to its address space, released when it dies, so `destroyAddressSpace` runs
 /// exactly once per space — no leak, no double-free. Spawn and kill several ring-3

test/qemu_test.py

@@ -355,6 +355,21 @@ CASES = [
                r"(?=.*ring 0 \(kernel\))(?=.*error code : 0x11)"
                r"(?=.*fault addr : 0x0000700000000000)",
      "fail":   r"SMEP not enforced|SMEP not enabled|no frame for the probe page"},
+    # SYSRET canonical-RIP guard: a ring-3 probe whose `syscall` sits on the last two
+    # bytes of executable address space, so the return RIP the kernel must hand back
+    # is 0x0000800000000000 — non-canonical, and a ring-0 #GP if it reached SYSRETQ.
+    # The kernel must return through IRETQ instead, which faults the *process* in
+    # ring 3: the kill line names a general protection fault at exactly that address,
+    # and the probe's own result line reports the guard counter. Any "ring 0 (kernel)"
+    # report, panic or reset here is the hazard itself, so they are failures.
+    # TCG does not model the ring-0 #GP (measured: with the guard removed these two
+    # lines are unchanged), so the case's teeth are the counter assertion inside
+    # DANOS-TEST-RESULT, not the kill line.
+    {"name": "sysret-canonical",
+     "expect": r"(?s)(?=.*killed by general protection fault \(vector 13\))"
+               r"(?=.*IP\s+: 0x0000800000000000)"
+               r"(?=.*DANOS-TEST-RESULT: PASS)",
+     "fail":   r"DANOS-TEST-RESULT: FAIL|CPU EXCEPTION|KERNEL PANIC"},
     # Memory grants: the mmap/munmap path hands out user pages into a process's
     # arena, translate resolves them, munmap frees them, and no frames leak.
     {"name": "usermem",