A new user-memory module owns every kernel touch of a user buffer:
copyFromUser, the new copyToUser, and the resolve behind both. The walk
accumulates the U/S and writable bits down all four levels with the MMU's
own AND rule — folding a 2 MiB leaf in before it resolves and refusing a
1 GiB leaf outright — so a copy honours what ring 3 itself would be
allowed, closing the presence-only trust model the IPC layer carried since
bring-up. It then confirms the frame is physmap-backed, because that is how
the copy reaches it: an mmio_map'd BAR passes the permission walk and would
otherwise fault ring 0 on an alias the physmap never mapped, on the IPC path
as much as the new one.
The nine stragglers that dereferenced user pointers raw now route through
it, so a bad pointer returns -EFAULT where it used to fault the kernel.
The write direction restructures its callees around kernel bounce buffers:
scheduler and devices-broker enumerate from a slot cursor (a task exiting
between chunks can neither duplicate nor lose an entry), klog_read drains
the ring in chunks, and fs_node stages headers and names contiguously.
fs_resolve copies out before installing the endpoint handle, so a faulting
copy cannot strand a capability; its out-capacity bound no longer adds an
unbounded ring-3 length to the base, which wrapped and trapped the kernel's
own overflow check. debug_write reads the caller's message once.
Suite 107/107 (new user-memory case: seven bad pointers refused, each
paired with a sound call that must still succeed).
/etc/init.csv and /etc/devices.csv become /system/configuration/*.csv (the
repo's etc/ moves to system/configuration/, mirroring the runtime tree),
/var/log becomes /system/logs, and /mnt/usb becomes /volumes/usb. The
kernel VFS gains a carve-out so FAT may serve exactly /system/configuration
and /system/logs beneath the initrd-backed /system while /system and /test
themselves stay unshadowable; FAT's single /var mount splits into those two
rewritten mounts. The kvfs readdir check learns /system's third child and
the ramdisk spawn sweep skips the configuration tree.
Suite 106/106.
VT-d and AMD-Vi are x86 hardware, but lived in the architecture-neutral
kernel tree and leaked further: the core's public Kind enum named both
vendors, and the ACPI parser read the VT-d version/capability registers
(raw volatile MMIO inside table discovery). Now the vendor backends
live in architecture/x86_64/ behind architecture.iommu — the core hands
over the discovery facts plus an injected environment (frame allocation
+ the log sink, the same pattern enablePaging uses) and receives the
hardware vtable back, so the backends never import kernel internals and
an ARM port supplies its SMMU with no core change. Discovery keeps
table facts only; the live-unit register check moved into VT-d detect
(version reading zero now stays fail-open). The unused kindOf() is
gone. Log shapes the harness pins (iommu online, DANOS-IOMMU-FAULT)
are unchanged; all five IOMMU QEMU cases pass.
initial_ramdisk's spawn-everything sweep counted the /etc data files
(devices.csv, init.csv) as spawnable programs — BadElf ever since the
boot tree started ferrying them — so it now counts only the /system and
/test trees. The init test waited for two raw user writes before
checking the last write for the heartbeat text; init's boot chatter
(heap ok, the /etc/init.csv lookup) satisfies the count long before the
first beat, so it now waits for the heartbeat itself. Both cases pass
again; these failures predate the build-packages work.
The second hardware backend. The IOMMU core, DMA-region capabilities, and
per-device enforcement are unchanged; this adds AMD-Vi (IVRS) as an
alternative to Intel VT-d (DMAR) under the same Backend vtable.
- parseIvrs records the IOMMU control-register base from the first IVHD;
the platform layer gains iommu_is_amd, and the core picks the backend by
vendor at init. VT-d and AMD-Vi are mutually exclusive on real hardware.
- iommu-amd.zig: a 2 MiB device table (every DTE zeroed = deny-all until a
device is claimed), AMD native-format page tables (4 KiB leaves), a
command buffer (INVALIDATE_DEVTAB_ENTRY / INVALIDATE_IOMMU_PAGES /
COMPLETION_WAIT) and an event log for faults. The DTE forwards
interrupts unmapped, so MSI passthrough works exactly as on VT-d.
- The boot log and the iommu self-test are now vendor-aware.
**UNTESTED on real AMD hardware** — danos is developed on Intel, so this
is validated only against QEMU's amd-iommu, and every log line and doc
says so. QEMU quirk handled: its amd-iommu does not observe the
COMPLETION_WAIT store form, but consumes the command ring synchronously on
the tail-register write, so invalidations are already applied by the time
we poll — the backend warns once and proceeds.
Cases: amd-iommu (detection + scratch-domain walker) and
amd-iommu-usb-storage (full storage stack through AMD device-table
translation with per-grant capabilities), both green. 106/106.
This completes the IOVA/IOMMU-enforcement track: per-device DMA domains on
both vendors, with buffers reachable only through delegated capabilities.
Replaces L2's interim DMA pool (every buffer reachable by every claimed
device) with true per-grant confinement: a device reaches only buffers
whose capability was delegated to its driver.
Kernel:
- DmaRegionObject (handle kind 2): a delegation token naming a dma_alloc'd
region, passable across processes on the IPC cap slot like an endpoint
or shared-memory object. Frames stay owned by the allocating address
space (freed on dma_free/teardown as before); the token carries a `dead`
flag so a stale downstream handle can no longer bind a freed region.
- dma_alloc gains the dma_shareable flag: it returns a capability handle
in r8 and every region is tracked in a registry. A task's own regions
auto-bind into the devices it claims (its rings just work); foreign
buffers are bound explicitly.
- dma_bind / dma_unbind / handle_close syscalls (51-53). dma_bind maps a
held region (or shared-memory) capability into a claimed device's domain;
it is idempotent. handle_close reclaims a table slot (raised 16 -> 32).
- dma_free and task death unmap a region from every domain and invalidate
BEFORE its frames return to the allocator — the stale-IOTLB use-after-
free window, closed structurally.
Protocols (flag-day): block gains attach, usb-transfer gains dma_attach —
each carries a region capability on the cap slot. fat allocates its bounce
buffer shareable and attaches it; usb-storage allocates its transport
buffers shareable, attaches them to the controller, and forwards fat's
capability downstream; usb-xhci-bus binds and closes; virtio-gpu binds its
shared scanout surface. The physical addresses on the wire are unchanged
(identity IOVA), so no register-programming code moved.
Cross-process DMA (fat -> usb-storage -> xHC) now flows only through
delegated capabilities. iommu-usb-storage / iommu-usb-hid / iommu-fault
all green under per-grant enforcement; 104/104 overall (fail-open paths
unchanged).
Replaces L1's shared blanket identity domain with a private translation
domain per claimed PCI function. A device now reaches only:
- the DMA pool: every dma_alloc'd region, mapped into every claimed
device's domain (poolAdd/poolRemove, driven from the dma_alloc and
dma_free syscalls). This keeps the cross-process buffer handoff
working (fat's bounce buffer reaches the xHC) while blocking the
kernel, page tables, process heaps, MMIO, and unallocated RAM.
- its own firmware reserved region (RMRR), seeded at confine time.
The pool is the honest interim: devices can still reach one another's
DMA buffers. The DMA-region capability layer (next) narrows it to
per-grant reachability.
dma_free unmaps from every domain and invalidates BEFORE the frames
return to the allocator, closing the stale-IOTLB use-after-free window.
Driver death tears down its domains (detach + free tables) before the
broker claims and DMA frames are released.
New iommu_fault_drain syscall (+ driver.iommuFaultDrain) forces pending
fault records to the log on demand. The new iommu-fault case proves it:
a claimed e1000e is programmed to DMA-fetch its TX ring from an unmapped
page; VT-d faults the access (bdf 00:03.0 addr 0x1000 reason 0x6) and the
system stays alive. 104/104.
First enforcement step of the IOVA track. A vendor-neutral IOMMU core
(iommu.zig) drives an Intel VT-d backend (iommu-intel.zig) to give DMA a
real translation layer instead of the fail-open free-for-all M16 left.
- Boot posture is now stated explicitly: "iommu online (Intel VT-d)"
with version/agaw/rmrr, or "none present - DMA fail-open (unisolated)".
- DMAR parsing extended to select the INCLUDE_PCI_ALL unit (real Intel
PCs put an iGPU-scoped unit first) and record single-path-endpoint
RMRRs; multi-hop scopes and extra DRHDs are counted and warned, never
silently dropped.
- Translation is enabled at boot into a blanket identity domain (all RAM
+ RMRRs, 2 MiB leaves). PCI functions are enumerated post-boot by the
ring-3 pci-bus driver, so a device is attached to the domain when its
driver claims it (confineDevice, with claim rollback if confinement
fails) and detached on driver death, before broker release and DMA
frame teardown. Unclaimed devices are non-present: their DMA faults.
- Interrupt remapping stays off, so MSI writes to 0xFEE00000 bypass
translation and the interrupt-driven xHC keeps working.
- devices-broker gains pciAddressOf (derives BDF from the config-space
ECAM offset), unclaim, and forEachPciFunction.
Faults are drained and logged rate-limited as DANOS-IOMMU-FAULT.
Cases: iommu extended (translation on, scratch-domain map/resolve/unmap,
zero idle faults); new iommu-usb-storage and iommu-usb-hid run the full
storage + input stacks through translated DMA with MSI intact. 103/103.
library/device/pci is now the complete generic floor a leaf PCI driver
needs, instead of just what virtio-gpu used:
- pci-class: capability IDs, MSI/MSI-X/power-management/PCI-Express
register layouts, extended-capability header decode (host-tested),
per-bit command constants, remaining header offsets.
- pci.Function: header accessors, disableBusMaster + interrupt-disable
helpers, findCapability, programMsi/disableMsi, MsiX vector-table
struct, ensurePowerStateD0, functionLevelReset (BAR save/restore),
extended-capability iterator.
Proven by the new pci-caps QEMU case: a pci-cap-test fixture claims an
extra e1000e (PM+MSI+PCIe+MSI-X, no danos driver) and readback-verifies
every surface, including the first driver-side use of msi_bind.
usb-xhci-bus converts from 8 ms event-ring polling to message-signalled
interrupts: plain MSI where offered (real Intel xHC), MSI-X entry 0
otherwise (qemu-xhci has no MSI capability), byte-identical polling as
fallback. The timer survives as a 250 ms port-reconcile/lost-edge tick —
real-hardware USB2 hub debounce still needs it. MSI setup runs BEFORE
controller bring-up: QEMU's xhci only registers the MSI-X vector as used
when IMAN.IE is written while MSI-X is already enabled; interrupts are
silently dropped otherwise (real hardware does not care about the order).
101/101 QEMU cases green; real-hardware smoke passed (mouse works,
boot 2026-07-23T174805Z, plain-MSI branch, vector 33).
The 11 QEMU-suite fixtures lived mixed into system/services/ with their
binaries bundled at /system/tests/<name>. Now the repo path is the boot
path, like every real service: test/system/services/<name>. fat-test
moves out of the fat server's directory into its own; display-demo
stays a boot service.
- kernel VFS: setInitialRamdisk derives one read-only initrd mount per
top-level tree named by the ramdisk entry paths (/system, /test),
registers ancestors generically with self-parented roots, and refuses
backend shadowing of any initrd tree
- EFI loader: the fallback walk also enumerates \test (optional — a
volume without fixtures still boots); manifest and capsule unchanged
- path literals: vfs-test self-open + create probe, process-test
process_enumerate matches, the args-echo argv[0] expectation; the
kvfs case now covers the /test root end to end
- docs: DFHS /test rows, tree diagrams, loader prose, and the location
convention gain the third home; fixed the input-source link
100/100 QEMU cases pass.
Follow-up cleanup of the just-moved kernel device code:
- power.zig -> acpi.zig. Its reboot() is built entirely on the FADT reset
register (acpi.power_information) plus the legacy 0xCF9/8042 fallbacks — it is
ACPI reboot, so it becomes acpi.reboot (the "P" in ACPI). platform.reboot
still delegates; soft-off/S5 stays the ring-3 acpi service's job as before.
- device-tree.zig -> fdt.zig. It is a discovery *backend* (the ARM/FDT parser,
a sibling of acpi.zig), not part of the model — renaming it to its actual
subject kills the confusing device-tree / device-model DeviceTree name clash
and makes acpi.zig + fdt.zig read as the two parallel backends.
- Flatten: device-model.zig, acpi.zig, fdt.zig, platform.zig move out of the
system/kernel/devices/ subdir up into system/kernel/, joining devices-broker.zig
(already flat). The kernel dir is a flat pile by convention (only architecture/
is a subdir), so the subdir — and its poor "devices" name — is gone.
Pure restructure; "platform" module name unchanged, all cross-file deps are
relative siblings that moved together. zig build + test green; smoke, discovery,
acpi-parse, acpi-ps2, acpi-report, power-button, orderly-shutdown, reboot pass.
With the shared device data (device-abi, pci-class, usb-abi, usb-ids, acpi-ids,
aml) now in library/device/, what remained in system/devices/ was purely
kernel-internal: the firmware-discovery machinery and the rich pointer-based
device model (platform, device-model, acpi, device-tree, power), reached only
through the "platform" module by three kernel files. It belongs with the kernel.
Move it to system/kernel/devices/. A pure relocation: the "platform" module
name is unchanged and every cross-dir dependency is a module import, so only the
one b.path and some comments move. The top-level split is now clean —
system/kernel/ is the kernel, library/device/ the shared device libraries,
system/{drivers,services} the userspace. The runtime /system/devices concept
(the virtual device tree) is unaffected; system/kernel/devices/ is its
implementation.
Also fixes two comment refs that still pointed device-abi at its pre-Wave-1a
home (system/devices/) — it lives at library/device/model/ now.
zig build + test green; smoke, discovery, acpi-parse, acpi-ps2, acpi-report pass.
The adversarial review of the branch confirmed the big one: the shm/DMA
page-table walks and their pmm/heap calls ran outside the big kernel lock —
pre-existing, but fatal once the per-space cursors invited sibling threads to
race them (two concurrent creates could orphan a page table: one thread's
region silently unmapped, the frame leaked — a plausible root for the
long-standing intermittent AP ring-3 fault at the shm base). All three paths
now follow the mmap discipline: allocation, object build, record, and handle
under one lock hold with full rollback; the map itself per-page under brief
holds; dma_free's translate/unmap/free per-page likewise.
Contract edges from the same review: thread_spawn into a dying group returns
-ESRCH (was generic -1); process_kill during the condemned window answers
from the latch's stashed supervisor (0 or -EPERM, was -ESRCH once the leader
slot was reaped); exit derives the group reason from its own argument rather
than the racy exit_code global; a worker's thread_exit no longer overwrites a
concurrent group-kill stamp; checkGroupDead now asserts exactly-one
notification via the drained ring. Full suite: 100/100.
Eight new QEMU cases (thread-fault-group, kill-threaded-group,
kill-via-worker-tid, racing-triggers, exit-group, leader-thread-exit,
thread-exit-solo, shm-mapping-ref) driving seven new thread-test modes; a
shared checkGroupDead asserts the contract everywhere: one notification,
badged with the leader, reason on the leader's record, no member listed,
claims released first.
The shm-mapping-ref case flushed out the per-task DMA/shared-memory arena
cursor bug directly (a sibling's regions mapped over the worker's), so both
cursors moved to the AddressSpaceRef like the mmap/MMIO cursors before them
(threading M7 pattern). Runtime gains Thread.tryExitCurrent for the leader
-EPERM refusal path. Docs updated: threading.md's shared-fate gap is closed,
process-management.md and process-lifecycle.md describe the leader re-key,
plan status = implemented. Full suite: 100/100.
Each address space that maps a shared-memory region now holds its own
reference, recorded on the AddressSpaceRef and dropped when the space is
destroyed — so 'last reference' means no handles AND no mappings, and a
region's frames can no longer be freed out from under a sibling thread (or
any other live mapper) when the handle-holding task dies. The group-death
notification still posts after every mapping release. (docs/shared-fate-plan.md M3)
All process deaths (exit from any thread, ring-3 fault, process_kill) now kill
the whole thread group via killGroupLocked: latch the AddressSpaceRef as dying
(refusing new members, closing the thread_spawn escape), stamp every member
(leader carries the group reason — the record the supervisor reads), reap
parked members to fixpoint, condemn running ones. The leader's exit
notification and subscriber broadcast move to the group-death moment — the
last address-space reference drop — via scheduler.group_exit_hook, which
re-stamps the leader's exit record first. Leader thread_exit is refused with
-EPERM. kill_pending is atomic; exit_reason and fault_kill_count writes moved
under the big kernel lock. (docs/shared-fate-plan.md M2)
Every task carries its process leader's id (main task: own id; threads:
copied from the spawner; kernel tasks: 0, never followed). process_kill and
process_signal resolve any member id to the leader and authorize against the
leader's supervisor, making both capabilities per-process. ProcessDescriptor
gains the leader field. No fan-out yet (docs/shared-fate-plan.md M1).
Every doc verified claim-by-claim against the code by parallel audit agents,
then fixed and adversarially re-verified. Two waves of staleness corrected:
the originally audited findings (higher-half boot handoff, kernel VFS
takeover, fault isolation + claim release + driver restart, AML/S5 moving to
ring 3, threading's shipped design, USB+FAT landing) and a second pass of
adjacent claims the verifiers caught (smp.md 'not built yet' intro,
system-requirements' PS/2-only and no-storage claims, halting.md's red-panic
and no-IDT text, testing.md's serial mirroring, router-era vfs-protocol
wording, capsule-first boot loading).
threading.md now documents the shared-fate gap explicitly: the design says a
process dies whole, the kernel today kills only the offending thread.
Also fixes three stale code comments (isr.s exceptionHandler, acpi.zig
sleepValue, build.zig boot-volume) — comments only, no behavior change.
Verified every deferred item in the nine docs with a what's-next section and
marked what has since landed (reaper, per-process CR3, higher-half kernel,
kernel heap, contiguous frame alloc, RSDP capture, cap-passing, driver restart
with backoff, PS/2 keyboard) while keeping the genuinely open items. Also
corrects interrupts.md's claim that the keyboard skipped the IO-APIC, and
updates scheduler.zig/heap.zig comments that predated the reaper and the big
kernel lock.
B2 — the 1-in-3 boot-time READ CAPACITY failure, root-caused: the xHCI
library's awaitTransfer claimed ANY unclaimed transfer event as its own
completion. An interrupt-endpoint event whose TRB pointer no longer
matched the armed subscription (an error or stale completion from the
keyboard/mouse polling concurrently with storage bring-up) fell through
and was misread as the bulk transfer's completion — desynchronizing the
mass-storage bulk protocol in controller state that SURVIVED driver
restarts, so every retry failed too. Awaited transfers now match the
event's slot id and endpoint DCI; foreign events are dropped and named.
Twelve consecutive runs of the previously-flaky cases pass; the full
suite is green with none of its old intermittents.
B1 — and when storage does fail transiently, the system now heals
instead of giving up forever: a nonzero exit maps to ExitReason.aborted
(a deliberate FAILURE exit — supervisors restart those with backoff,
unlike a clean .exited), usb-storage exits nonzero when a PRESENT
device fails bring-up, and the fat service no longer blocks its harness
polling for a block device and then dies — it serves immediately
(requests fail politely), retries on a 500 ms timer, and mounts
whenever storage appears, including after a driver restart.
First real per-process logs off the stick (the logging track paying for
itself): kernel.log showed 16-core bring-up costing 47 s — per-core gaps
of 2-21 s — on a machine whose clocksource is the TSC, so every AP runs
the pairwise warp check. QEMU always picks HPET, so the harness never
executed this path at all.
The check was bounded by ITERATIONS: 1<<20 warp ticks, each a locked
read-modify-write on a cacheline two cores fight over — microseconds
under real contention, not the nanosecond the '~1 ms' comment assumed —
and the 1<<32-PAUSE rendezvous 'bound' is ~2 minutes on modern Intel
(PAUSE ~140 cycles). Both are now bounded by TIME measured on the TSC
itself: ~5 ms of pairwise hammering per core (Linux's check_tsc_warp
budget — ample to catch a lagging TSC) and a ~100 ms rendezvous window.
The scroll path copied every pixel row up by one glyph height, READING
video memory — and VRAM reads are uncached-slow on real hardware.
Measured on the 16-core PC: ~90 seconds to bring the cores online,
almost entirely boot-transcript lines each paying a whole-screen scroll
copy. (QEMU never shows this: its 'VRAM' is host RAM.)
When the screen fills, the console now clears and restarts at the top —
writes only, once per screenful. The transcript reads the same as it
streams; only the scrollback illusion is gone, which a boot console
never needed.
Without serial and without working USB storage, a slow real-hardware
boot is undiagnosable — 'stabbing in the dark'. Two changes end that:
The log renderer stamps every line with boot-relative seconds
([ 12.045] ...), so every surface — serial, debugcon, and now the
screen — is a readable timeline. And the framebuffer console registers
as an ordinary log sink at boot: kernel AND userspace lines (device
bring-up, fat mounts, logger announcements) show live on screen until
the display service claims the framebuffer, which flips the console's
suppression and silences the sink automatically — the display-owns-the-
screen design is unchanged in normal operation; the console now simply
narrates the part of boot that happens before there IS a display.
On the machine that motivated this, the next boot will show by eye
where the minutes go — including whether the USB chain ever brings
storage up, and whether screen drawing itself crawls (the latent
non-write-combining framebuffer suspect: if these very lines paint
slowly, that's the answer).
Per docs/coding-standards.md (no Unix-abbreviation exception): syscalls
shared_memory_create/map/physical, kernel SharedMemoryObject + handlers,
runtime.shared_memory (library/runtime/shared-memory.zig), the
shared-memory-server/-client test services, the shared-memory QEMU case,
and docs incl. vdso.md's danos_shared_memory_*. 87/87 QEMU tests pass.
runtime.fs now routes every path through fs_resolve: kernel-served
/system nodes are read via fs_node (tokens, no open state); everything
under a userspace mount goes straight to the owning backend's endpoint
with the kernel-rewritten mount-relative path — one syscall of naming,
then the unchanged vfs-protocol rendezvous, public API untouched. mkdir/
unlink/rename resolve-then-forward (rename checks both paths land on
the SAME backend); mount is the fs_mount syscall.
The fat server mounts twice — /mnt/usb from the volume root and /var
from its /var subtree — so the logger now writes the FHS path
/var/log/<boot-stamp>/... and swapping the persistent medium later
touches only fat's two mount calls. With clients holding fat's node ids
directly, fat records each handle's owner, checks it, and sweeps a dead
client's handles via the published exit events (the old router's
pattern, now where the state actually lives).
The userspace vfs server and its router die; ServiceId.vfs=1 stays
reserved-retired; protocol.zig moves to system/vfs-protocol.zig (the
wire contract is backend-only now). vfs-test becomes the ring-3 proof
of the kernel VFS (own-binary ELF magic through /system, read-only
refusals, listing); vfs-client-death becomes the fat sweep test over
the full storage chain, with a ring-scanning check (the last-write
buffer is too racy under a chattering tree).
system/kernel/vfs.zig is the resolve+redirect router: fs_resolve (#46)
walks the kernel mount table; a path under the kernel-backed /system
mount (the initrd, seeded by setInitialRamdisk with a derived directory
table) yields a permanent stateless node token served by fs_node (#47)
— read/status/readdir with copy-out, initrd reads lock-free — while a
path under a userspace mount yields the backend's endpoint (installed
in the caller's table, DEDUPLICATED so 16 slots can't be exhausted by
repeated resolves) plus the rewritten mount-relative path; the caller
then speaks the unchanged vfs-protocol rendezvous directly. The kernel
never blocks on a userspace filesystem, holds no open-file state, and
refuses create-intent on the immutable /system.
fs_mount (#48) is the syscall form of the old router's op-6 cap-pass
(possession of the backend handle is the capability; an optional
rewrite prefix maps the mount into the backend's namespace — how /var
will reach the flash volume); fs_unmount (#49) removes one. A dead
backend's mount clears lazily on resolve.
Dormant this milestone: the userspace vfs still serves runtime.fs
unchanged; the kvfs QEMU case covers the kernel side (resolution, ELF
magic read-through, /system listing, read-only + unknown refusals)
until the M-G cutover exercises the syscalls end-to-end.
tests.zig wrote markers straight to serial, racing user-process records
rendered on other cores — visible as 16-byte UART-FIFO interleave once
the tagged renderer emitted several writes per record. Markers now go
through kernel log print (same serial sink, now under the log lock), the
renderer composes each line into one buffer and hits each sink once, and
the vfs-client-death needle drops the old self-written 'vfs: ' prefix.
library/runtime/log.zig wires std.log to the tagged ring: the root shim
installs std_options for every binary (programs may override), logFn
formats one line per record and emits it with its level via
debug_write — the payload no longer carries the process's name; the
kernel stamps identity structurally and the serial renderer prints the
'<binary path>: ' prefix, so the transcript keeps its shape.
Migrate every writeLine/logLine/log helper family (init, vfs, fat,
device-manager, acpi, pci-bus, ps2-bus x3, usb-hid x2, usb-storage,
usb-xhci-bus, virtio-gpu — 104 call sites) to std.log.info, dropping
the hand-written prefixes. A leveled record is a complete line by
contract (raw emissions may still build lines from pieces). Test
fixtures and the display/input services keep raw writes for now — their
ring records are attributed by the kernel regardless.
Harness regexes follow the renamed prefixes (usb-hid-keyboard,
discovery) and path-named restart lines.
Replace the linear keep-earliest RAM buffer with a 512 KiB ring of
framed records (log-ring.zig, host-tested): every debug_write becomes
one record per payload line, stamped by the kernel with the sender's
pid, task name (its binary path), level, per-boot sequence number, and
monotonic timestamp. Attribution is structural — a payload cannot forge
another sender's tag, and newline injection lands inside the forger's
own next record. Oldest records are overwritten when full; sequence
gaps make the loss countable.
debug_write gains a level argument (err/warn/info/debug/raw; old
two-arg callers clamp to raw). klog_read becomes a stream-offset read
that fails once the cursor falls behind the ring's tail; the new
klog_status (#45) returns the cursors plus the boot wall-clock anchor —
what the logger service will name per-boot log directories with.
The log now guards itself with a dedicated spinlock (BKL -> log lock
order, never the reverse); panic paths use a bounded try-acquire and
fall back to sinks-only. Serial rendering keeps the historical
transcript byte-identical for kernel and legacy raw output; leveled
records get a kernel-rendered name prefix. log-flush/init's interim
drains start at the ring tail and write framed records until the logger
service replaces them.
processRunning compared literal names against task names that are now
full binary paths; the acpi-ps2/usb-report harness regexes assumed
unprefixed driver names in device-manager spawn/restart lines.
Retire the build-time ramdisk packer and the packed initial-ramdisk.img.
make-fat-image.py now lays every user binary out at its FHS path on the
boot volume (system/services, system/drivers, system/tests), and the EFI
loader walks \system at boot, packing what it finds into an in-RAM v2
initial_ramdisk whose entry names are full FHS paths. init rides the
table like every other binary: its dedicated handoff fields are gone and
the kernel spawns PID 1 via the same lookup as everyone else
(process.spawnBundled).
system_spawn resolves names by exact path first, then unique basename,
and normalizes argv[0] to the stored path — so task names (and, next,
the tagged log ring's attribution) are honest binary paths everywhere.
initrd v2 rejects the old magic so a stale image fails loudly.
Groundwork for per-process logging (/var/log/<boot-stamp>/<binary-path>.log)
and the kernel-VFS /system mount.
Both EDID moments the system has are now captured and carried to the
compositor's frame clock:
- EFI: the loader derives refresh from the preferred detailed timing
(pixel clock / total pixels) while GOP is still alive — the only moment
it is readable — and hands it through the boot handoff into the
display0 node's DisplayInfo (new refresh_hz field, 0 = unknown).
- GPU: the virtio-gpu driver derives the same figure from its own EDID
read and carries it in the attach_scanout announce (request.y).
updateFrameClock() re-derives the interval from the active backend's
info at bring-up and again on every backend change — the boot
framebuffer's clock dies with the GOP floor at upgrade, replaced by the
GPU's rate. Unknown rate defaults to 60 Hz; the result is clamped to
[30, 120] Hz so a mis-parsed EDID can neither starve nor flood the
compositor. Rate only, never phase: without vblank, presents still
free-run (docs/display-v2.md, 'Fenced is not vsync').
Observed in QEMU: OVMF exposes no EDID for the VGA adapter, so the GOP
floor logs 'frame clock 62 Hz (default)' (real firmware does expose it);
the virtio-gpu EDID advertises 75 Hz and the upgrade logs 'frame clock
76 Hz (panel EDID)'. The display kernel test asserts refresh_hz rides
the seeded node; all 7 display QEMU cases pass.
Two real bugs visible in a normal `zig build run-x86-64` boot (but not in the
display-demo test, which spawns no input service):
- Two cursors. The demo drew its own cursor layer while the display service
now draws one too (its mouse-listener thread). The demo's went through the
client IPC protocol and lagged; the service's is in-process and tracks
tightly — "one responds better than the other."
- Animation frozen until the mouse moves. The demo called a *blocking*
`mouse.next()` (ipc_reply_wait) inside its animation loop, so the sliding
box advanced only one frame per mouse event. In the display-demo test
there is no input service, so subscribeMouse() returned null and the loop
ran free on its 30ms timer — which is exactly why the test passed while
the real boot was broken.
The compositor now owns the cursor (docs/display.md), so the demo should draw
none and read no input: it becomes a pure client-animation proof whose loop is
independent of the mouse. Removes its cursor layer, mouse subscription, and the
blocking read.
Also harden displayDemoTest to spawn the `input` service alongside the demo
(matching real boot): a client that blocks its animation loop on a mouse read
would now stall before `display-demo: ok` and fail the test, instead of
passing because no input service happened to be present.
Verified: display / display-service / display-demo / display-cursor all green.
The display's first use of threads (docs/threading.md, docs/display.md). The
compositor stays the single owner of the framebuffer — only the main
service.run loop touches the backend and layer stack — and a dedicated
mouse-listener thread runs beside it:
- Listener: blocks on input.subscribeMouse(), accumulates relative dx/dy
into an absolute cursor position clamped to the screen, and hands it to
the compositor. It never touches the compositor, so no lock guards the
framebuffer; a parked next() lets the core halt.
- CursorChannel: a single-slot latest-value cell under a Thread.Mutex (the
renderer wants where the cursor is now, not a replay of deltas), with a
coalesced self-ipc.send poke that wakes the main loop — parked in
replyWait — as a message-notification. At most one poke is queued while
the last is undrained, so a fast mouse can't flood the endpoint.
- Render: the cursor is a top-z compositor layer; on the poke the main loop
moves it via configure + present (which damages old + new footprints).
The display binary opts into threads (addThreadedUserBinary), and
input-source gains a "mouse" mode that publishes pure motion to drive it.
Two kernel-level findings this surfaced, both fixed:
1. IPC handles do not cross threads. The handle table lives on the Task, so
the listener can't reuse the main loop's endpoint handle — it
ipc.lookup(.display)s its own handle to the same endpoint to poke through.
2. Concurrent IPC from two threads raced unlocked kernel state. The display
is the first process issuing IPC syscalls from two threads at once, which
exposed a data race (flaky #GP in installEntry): create_ipc_endpoint /
ipc_register / ipc_lookup allocate from the kernel heap and mutate the
global registry, endpoint refcounts, and handle tables without the big
kernel lock. They were safe only while a process couldn't race itself.
They now sync.enter() like call/reply_wait/send already did (the kernel
heap has no lock of its own yet — heap.zig: "a lock comes with
threads/SMP" — so the big lock keeps its callers serialized).
Test: -Dtest-case=display-cursor (smp:4) spawns the input service, the
threaded display, and input-source in mouse mode; asserts the display's
"cursor tracking mouse ok" marker once the cursor has tracked a run of motion
end to end. Verified green 6/6 under stress (the race hit ~1-in-4 before the
lock fix) and in the full 29-case QEMU guardrail suite; zig build test clean.
The "fs.base" spelling read like a field/submodule access, but no such
identifier exists — it meant the x86_64 FS segment base (the IA32_FS_BASE
MSR). Two problems fixed:
- Arch-neutrality: in generic docs, the runtime, and the plan, the mechanism
is now named by its arch-neutral concept — the "thread pointer" — matching
the already-renamed `thread_pointer` Task field, `set_thread_pointer`
syscall, and `architecture.setThreadPointer` fn. x86-specific spots keep
the precise names: `IA32_FS_BASE` (the MSR), `%fs:8`/`%fs:0`, variant-II.
- Stale identifiers: the M10 section in threading-plan.md still referenced
`fs_base` on Task and `architecture.setFsBase` — both renamed away in the
arch-neutral pass. Corrected to `thread_pointer` / `setThreadPointer`.
The x86-only `thread-tls` test (which really does write `%fs:8`) now says
"FS base" (no dot) consistently, matching the established form already in
tests.zig. The matched serial markers ("thread-tls: ok" / "thread-tls:
FAIL") are unchanged; only a non-load-bearing FAIL parenthetical was
reworded.
Verified: zig build clean, thread-tls passes.
Expand the abbreviations flagged in docs/coding-standards.md (names spelled
out in full unless an acronym) across the kernel, runtime, ABI, tests, and
docs:
aspace -> address_space (AspaceRef -> AddressSpaceRef, retainAspace ->
retainAddressSpace, loaded_aspace -> loaded_address_space, the
liveAspaceCount/aspaceDestroyCount test hooks, etc.)
vaddr -> virtual_address
paddr -> physical_address
The kernel test case and its serial markers are renamed to match:
aspace-refcount -> address-space-refcount (kernel dispatch string and
test/qemu_test.py case name kept in sync). Prose in docs uses the natural
"address space"/"virtual address"; backticked field/identifier references
use the code spelling.
Also expand the bare "AS" abbreviation in three ABI comments and reframe the
set_thread_pointer ABI/handler docs to lead with the arch-neutral concept
(user-space TLS thread pointer; x86_64 IA32_FS_BASE, aarch64 TPIDR_EL0)
rather than x86 FS-first, matching scheduler.zig's existing framing.
Foreign ABI names preserved: the ELF p_vaddr field and mmap/mmio remain.
Verified: zig build, zig build test, and the full 25-case QEMU guardrail
suite all green.
The M10 TLS work leaked x86 naming into the generic kernel: Task.fs_base,
PerCpu.loaded_fs_base, and architecture.setFsBase. The *mechanism* was already
abstracted (the generic scheduler calls through the architecture layer; the
wrmsr IA32_FS_BASE lives in architecture/x86_64/cpu.zig), but the *names* would
force an aarch64 port to implement a 'setFsBase' that writes TPIDR_EL0.
Rename to the neutral concept: Task.thread_pointer, PerCpu.loaded_thread_pointer,
architecture.setThreadPointer (x86_64 impl writes IA32_FS_BASE; aarch64 -> TPIDR_EL0).
Also neutralise the user_arg comment (first argument register, rdi on x86_64).
No behaviour change; thread-tls/thread-mutex/smp/process-kill + host tests pass.
runtime.Thread.RwLock (reader-preferring, lock/tryLock/unlock +
lockShared/tryLockShared/unlockShared) and WaitGroup (start/finish/wait), both on
the existing Mutex/Condition.
A compile-time Futex seam gated on builtin.os.tag: the futex syscalls on danos, a
spin+yield mock off-target (Zig 0.16 has no std.Thread.Futex; wake is a no-op
since the state machines re-check). thread.zig is wired into zig build test, so
Mutex/RwLock/WaitGroup run as host unit tests with real std.Thread threads (test
blocks compile only under test, so std.Thread there is fine on freestanding).
thread-rwlock QEMU case: 2 writers set both halves of a value under the exclusive
lock while 3 readers check they match under the shared lock; zero half-write
observations across ~150k reads.
Marks Phase 2 (M7-M11) built. threading.md/threading-plan.md status updated.
Gate: host zig build test covers the sync primitives; thread-rwlock PASS (3x);
full Done gate 26/26 (whole thread-* suite + guardrail); build clean.
Each thread gets its own x86_64 thread pointer (FS base) for user-space TLS.
Task.fs_base is restored on every context switch only when it changes (same
conditional-load discipline as CR3; architecture.setFsBase -> wrmsr
IA32_FS_BASE). New set_thread_pointer=44 syscall sets the caller's fs_base and
loads it now. The kernel never touches FS, so no swapgs complication.
The runtime lays a small per-thread TLS block at the top of each thread's stack
(self-pointer at %fs:0 + scratch) and the thread trampoline calls
set_thread_pointer before any user code — so every spawned thread has a private,
switch-stable thread pointer, reclaimed with the stack.
thread-test tls mode: two threads write unique markers to their own %fs:8 and,
after both wrote, read back — a shared fs.base would clobber one (cross-talk).
Deferred: the Zig threadlocal *compiler* layer (ELF variant-II PT_TLS + linker
sections + template copy) — high-uncertainty, no consumer today; this lands the
load-bearing per-thread fs.base it builds on. See docs/threading-plan.md M10.
Gate thread-tls PASS (3x); full guardrail 25/25; build + host tests clean.
join no longer needs a per-thread IPC endpoint. New thread_join(tid) syscall
blocks the caller until the task with id tid exits; the exit paths call
wakeJoinersLocked. join only reclaims the joined thread's USER stack, which the
thread vacates the instant it enters the kernel to exit, so waking at exit time
(not reap time) is safe — no reaper/aspace juggling or user-memory write, and
equally std-shaped (like pthread_join). thread_spawn drops the exit-endpoint arg
(runtime passes no_cap). thread-test's join mode runs 40 spawn+join cycles that
would exhaust the 16-slot handle table under the old endpoint scheme.
Also harden the M8 reaper: its single per-core reap slot could be overwritten by
a second death on that core before draining (a fresh-task/SMP timing window), an
intermittent one-stack leak that made task-reap ~20% flaky. Replace it with a
per-core reap LIST plus a .reaping task state so a pending slot can't be reused
before its stack is freed. task-reap now 11/11 isolated.
Deferred: detached-thread user-stack reclaim (still at process exit, as in M3).
Gate thread-join PASS (3x); full guardrail 26/26; build + host tests clean.
A dead task's kernel stack was leaked (no reaper), so every process/thread death
bled kernel memory. Now exit()/exitUserLocked record the dying task in a per-core
reap_after_switch slot and switch away; the task that resumes on that core frees
the stack in switchTo's tail (on its own stack, lock still held so the slot can't
be reused). reapKillPendingLocked drains the slot on the timer tick as a safety
net for the fresh-task case (a fresh task enters via the trampoline, bypassing
switchTo's tail). A task killed while not running is freed directly in
destroyTaskLocked. live_stack_bytes is the observable.
Fixed a migration bug this exposed: the post-switchContext reap read the pc
parameter, but a migrated task carries a stale pc in its saved switchTo frame ->
it freed the wrong core's pending stack (a #GP under SMP). Re-fetch thisCpu()
after the switch.
Gate task-reap PASS (5x isolated, 2x in the 24-case batch); full guardrail 24/24
incl. fault-recovery/supervision/process-kill/smp/affinity; build + host green.
Move the mmap/mmio grant-arena cursors off Task into the per-address-space object
(scheduler aspace_refs, exposed via aspaceMmapNextPtr/aspaceDeviceMapNextPtr), so
sibling threads in one address space hand out disjoint grants. systemMmap reserves
a range under a brief lock then maps per page under a short-held lock (not the
whole grant): the big lock runs with interrupts disabled, so pinning it across a
multi-MiB memset+map froze other cores. Guard the runtime heap's rawAlloc/rawFree
with a Thread.Mutex, gated on !single_threaded so ordinary binaries compile it out.
thread-test gains an alloc mode: 4 threads x 500 alloc/fill/verify/free cycles;
any overlap between concurrent allocations is caught by the pattern check.
Also fix the affinity guardrail: its 3-billion-iteration busy-loop had
codegen-dependent wall-time (adding a function to tests.zig swung it ~4s -> ~63s
and timed it out). Reworked to wait on the wall clock instead.
Gate thread-alloc PASS (3x); full guardrail 23/23 green; build + host tests clean.
New thread_self=42 syscall backs runtime.Thread.getCurrentId (the calling
thread's kernel task id). thread-test gains an id mode: two workers read
getCurrentId and the main thread confirms all three ids are non-zero and
distinct. Per-thread threadlocal TLS is deferred by design (no consumer; it would
need context-switched fs.base for an unused feature), as are RwLock/WaitGroup.
Marks the threading feature built (M1-M6): threading.md + docs/README.md status
updated, all thread-* cases wired into qemu_test.py.
Gate thread-id PASS; full suite green: 21/21 (thread-spawn/join/futex/mutex/id,
aspace-refcount, + 15 guardrail cases), zig build clean, zig build test green.
runtime.Thread.Mutex is the classic three-state futex mutex (unlocked/locked/
contended): the fast path is a single CAS and only a contended lock enters the
kernel. Condition is a futex sequence counter (wait/timedWait/signal/broadcast,
spurious wakeups allowed, use in a predicate loop); a signal racing the unlock
bumps the seq so it is never missed. Semaphore is permits guarded by
Mutex+Condition. All mirror std.Thread's shapes, ported onto runtime.Thread.Futex.
thread-test gains a mutex mode: 2 producers + 2 consumers move 2000 unique items
through an 8-slot ring (small enough that both sides block); the consumed
checksum and tally match exactly, proving the lock and condvars correct under
real cross-core contention.
Deferred with rationale (see docs/threading-plan.md): migrating join to a futex
completion word needs kernel clear-on-exit (else use-after-free munmapping a live
stack); host unit tests need a mockable Futex seam.
Gate thread-mutex PASS (3x); 17 guardrail/thread cases green; build + host tests
clean.
New private syscalls futex_wait(addr, expected, timeout_ns)=40 and
futex_wake(addr, count)=41. A waiter is a .blocked task tagged with
Task.futex_addr (no queue linkage); futex_wait reads the user word under the big
lock and parks only if it still equals expected, so a concurrent wake can't slip
between the check and the block. futex_wake scans the task table and readies up
to count waiters in the same address space. A timed wait also sets wake_at so the
existing wakeExpired times it out; futex_addr staying non-zero (only futex_wake
clears it) distinguishes timeout from a real wake. Waiters park in-kernel, so an
idle core still halts (no busy-wait).
runtime.Thread.Futex mirrors std.Thread.Futex (wait/timedWait/wake). thread-test
gains a futex mode: a waiter parks, the main thread wakes it (serial order
waiting/waking/woke, asserted by the case regex), and timedWait reports a
timeout.
Gate thread-futex PASS (3x); 18 guardrail cases green incl. sleep/event/ipc
blocking paths; build + host tests clean.
thread_spawn takes a 4th arg, an exit-endpoint handle: spawnThreadSupervised
resolves and refcounts it under the spawn lock (like spawnProcessSupervised), so
a thread's death posts a child-exit notification carrying its tid. runtime
Thread.join blocks in replyWait on that (private) endpoint for its tid, then
munmaps the stack; detach relinquishes the join (stack reclaimed at process
exit, for now). New current_core=39 syscall + Thread.currentCore() lets a worker
observe which core it ran on.
The closure now lives at the top of the thread's own (private) stack instead of
the heap, so spawn/join never touch the not-yet-thread-safe runtime heap.
thread-test gains a join mode: 4 workers x 100k atomic increments, joined, with
counter == N*K and >1 core stamped (real parallelism), plus a detached worker.
Gate thread-join PASS (4x, non-flaky); 17 guardrail/M1/M2 cases green; build +
host tests clean.
A thread is a task sharing the caller's address space. New private syscalls
thread_spawn(entry, stack_top, arg)=37 and thread_exit=38: thread_spawn goes
through scheduler.spawnThread (retains the shared aspace), thread_exit ends the
task like a process exit(0) (terminateCurrent -> releaseAspace, so the space
survives while siblings hold it). The closure pointer reaches the new thread in
rdi via a new jump_to_user_arg asm path and a per-task user_arg (0 for a normal
process, whose _start ignores it) - so the runtime trampoline is a plain C-ABI
Zig function, no naked asm.
runtime.Thread (library/runtime/thread.zig) mirrors std.Thread.spawn: mmap a
stack, heap-allocate the args closure, hand the kernel the trampoline + closure.
addThreadedUserBinary opts a binary into single_threaded=false; thread-test is
the first, and proves a worker runs in the shared address space via a shared
global the main thread polls.
Gate thread-spawn PASS; 16 guardrail cases green (incl. args/init/process on the
new jump_to_user_arg path) + aspace-refcount; build + host tests clean.
Route address-space lifetime through a refcount keyed by the page-table root
(scheduler.zig aspace_refs): retainAspace on the spawnUserLocked success path,
releaseAspace from both teardown paths (exitUserLocked, destroyTaskLocked),
destroying the space only when the last task on it exits. Behaviour is identical
today (every space has exactly one task); this is the foundation shared-address-
space threads (docs/threading.md) build on.
Test-observable liveAspaceCount/aspaceDestroyCount + a new aspace-refcount kernel
self-test and QEMU case: spawn and reap 5 ring-3 probes, assert live spaces return
to baseline and destructions advance by exactly 5 (destroyed once each, no leak,
no double-free). Gate passes; 13 guardrail cases green; build + host tests clean.
The kernel enabled SSE at boot and both kernel and userspace keep live values in
XMM (LLVM emits movdqu/movaps for >=16-byte struct copies, plus floats and SIMD),
yet the kernel never saved the SSE/FPU register file anywhere — not across
switch_context, not across the syscall boundary, not across interrupts. Any value
the compiler parked in an XMM register across a kernel entry could be silently
clobbered by kernel code, or by whatever the scheduler ran while the task blocked:
a whole-kernel, timing-dependent data-corruption bug.
It was the real root cause of the "device_enumerate corruption" Heisenbug: the
display service read garbage framebuffer geometry (height=0) because findDisplay
held the 16-byte .display field live in xmm0 across the claim/mmio_map syscalls,
and a timer preemption to the busy device-manager clobbered it. The tell that it
was register-only: memory always read correct, and the bug vanished whenever an
added syscall spilled the value to the stack.
Fix: fxsave/fxrstor the register file in the asm stubs (isr_common and
syscall_entry), right after pushing the GP trap frame — before any Zig kernel code
can touch XMM — and right before the pops. rbx bridges the exact rsp across the
call to interruptDispatch: it is callee-saved, so it survives even a blocking
dispatch that context-switches away and back, and `and $-16,%rsp; sub $512,%rsp`
gives fxsave its 16-byte-aligned scratch on the kernel stack. Context-switch-time
save/restore alone is not enough — kernel code between the interrupt and switchTo
already clobbers XMM.
The commit-58927ed Gop.init workaround (copy scalar geometry fields rather than the
whole descriptor by value) is now redundant but harmless; left in place. Deferred:
a fresh task inherits the previous task's XMM (minor info-leak / nondeterminism),
and the fxsave runs on every interrupt including ring0->ring0.
Daniel Samson
Daniel Samson