Daniel Samson
1379b699f3
A protocol is reached by name now, not by a compile-time integer. Init is PID 1 and already knows which binary it started, so init serves /protocol as a vfs backend: bind claims a contract with the provider's endpoint attached, open answers with that endpoint as the reply's capability, and readdir lists what is bound with the task and binary behind it. The kernel reserves the prefix — nothing may mount over it, under it, or unmount it — and ServiceId, ipc_register and ipc_lookup are gone, their syscall numbers left vacant. A bind is authorized by who the caller *is*: the kernel-stamped binary together with the supervising task's identity, matched against /system/configuration/protocol.csv. Identity, not spelling — spawn is ungated, so an attacker can run any bundled binary, and a name-only rule would have let it launder grants through an init of its own making. A name a live process holds is refused to everyone else; a dead one's is released. Three review rounds against a hostile ring-3 process found what 108 green tests could not, because the suite contains no attacker. Publishing init's supervision endpoint as the registry put PID 1's mailbox in every process's hands, where two forged bytes reached the shutdown path: privileged traffic is now believed only from the task that holds the contract it speaks for. A capability arriving on a request outlived every path that ignored it, one handle per call until the table was full — in init, and in the harness ten services share — so the arriving capability is owned by the turn and released unless a handler says otherwise. And the kernel let anyone holding an endpoint handle aim signals, timers, exit notices and interrupts at it: binding now requires having created it. Suite 108/108. The new protocol-registry case asserts eleven properties, each one an attack that must fail.
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Zig
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Zig
//! init (PID 1) as a binary package (docs/build-packages-plan.md): this file
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//! names the binary and EXACTLY the modules its source imports — the shared
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//! recipe resolves each name from the domains the zon declares. The root build
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//! consumes the artifact for the boot image and forwards its -Dserial here.
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const std = @import("std");
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const build_support = @import("build-support");
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pub fn build(b: *std.Build) void {
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const exe = build_support.userBinary(b, .{
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.name = "init",
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.root_source_file = b.path("init.zig"),
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.imports = &.{
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"csv", "envelope", "file-system", "ipc", "logging", "memory", "power-protocol",
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"process", "time", "vfs-protocol",
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},
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});
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// init reads the same `serial` flag the kernel does: its liveness heartbeat
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// is a serial/test-build diagnostic (the QEMU harness's init tests assert
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// on it, and -Dserial images emit it), so a flashable image runs a purely
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// event-driven PID 1 that wakes only for real work. The root build forwards
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// its top-level -Dserial as this dependency option.
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const serial = b.option(bool, "serial", "Compile the serial liveness heartbeat in (forwarded from the root -Dserial)") orelse false;
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const init_options = b.addOptions();
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init_options.addOption(bool, "serial", serial);
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build_support.programModule(exe).addImport("build_options", init_options.createModule());
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b.installArtifact(exe);
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}
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