danos/test/system/services/user-memory-test
Daniel Samson 8d4a7cf240
kernel: user memory is reached only through a checked copy
A new user-memory module owns every kernel touch of a user buffer:
copyFromUser, the new copyToUser, and the resolve behind both. The walk
accumulates the U/S and writable bits down all four levels with the MMU's
own AND rule — folding a 2 MiB leaf in before it resolves and refusing a
1 GiB leaf outright — so a copy honours what ring 3 itself would be
allowed, closing the presence-only trust model the IPC layer carried since
bring-up. It then confirms the frame is physmap-backed, because that is how
the copy reaches it: an mmio_map'd BAR passes the permission walk and would
otherwise fault ring 0 on an alias the physmap never mapped, on the IPC path
as much as the new one.

The nine stragglers that dereferenced user pointers raw now route through
it, so a bad pointer returns -EFAULT where it used to fault the kernel.
The write direction restructures its callees around kernel bounce buffers:
scheduler and devices-broker enumerate from a slot cursor (a task exiting
between chunks can neither duplicate nor lose an entry), klog_read drains
the ring in chunks, and fs_node stages headers and names contiguously.
fs_resolve copies out before installing the endpoint handle, so a faulting
copy cannot strand a capability; its out-capacity bound no longer adds an
unbounded ring-3 length to the base, which wrapped and trapped the kernel's
own overflow check. debug_write reads the caller's message once.

Suite 107/107 (new user-memory case: seven bad pointers refused, each
paired with a sound call that must still succeed).
2026-07-31 20:57:49 +01:00
..
build.zig kernel: user memory is reached only through a checked copy 2026-07-31 20:57:49 +01:00
build.zig.zon kernel: user memory is reached only through a checked copy 2026-07-31 20:57:49 +01:00
user-memory-test.zig kernel: user memory is reached only through a checked copy 2026-07-31 20:57:49 +01:00