danos/test/system/services/protocol-denied-test/protocol-denied-test.zig

//! protocol-denied-test — restriction stage one's own test fixture
//! (docs/os-development/protocol-namespace.md, "Restriction: per-process
//! namespaces, not ACLs"). One binary, one role, driven by the
//! `protocol-denied` kernel case:
//!
//! - `protocol-denied-test run` — the driver, and the assertions:
//!     1. a contract this binary IS granted opens: the reply says success and
//!        carries a capability — the channel itself. The control comes first
//!        and is repeated last, because every refusal below would read exactly
//!        the same against a registrar that had simply stopped opening things;
//!     2. a contract this binary is NOT granted is refused — and `/protocol`'s
//!        own listing is read first to prove the name is genuinely BOUND, so
//!        the refusal is a policy decision and not an accident of boot order;
//!     3. the refusal is **indistinguishable from a name that does not exist**.
//!        The fixture asks for a name nothing ever bound and compares the two
//!        answers field by field — status, node, payload length, the whole
//!        reply packet byte for byte, and the presence of a capability. That
//!        collapse is the model, not a nicety: "permission denied" and "not
//!        found" are one answer, so an open can never be used as an oracle for
//!        what exists outside a process's view, and stage two's supervisor can
//!        refuse, park for a human, or substitute a fake with the child unable
//!        to tell which happened;
//!     4. the third shape — neither granted nor bound — answers identically
//!        too, so all three collapse into one rather than two.
//!
//! **What this fixture deliberately does not claim.** Two channels are outside
//! what a ring-3 client can honestly assert:
//!
//! - *The registrar's log.* `klog_read` is ungated, so a line written on one
//!   branch and not the other would be readable here — but the ring carries
//!   every task's output, so searching it for a contract name proves nothing
//!   either way (the input service prints "input:" lines of its own). The
//!   guarantee is made at the source instead: `onOpen` in
//!   system/services/init/init.zig writes nothing on any branch, and says why.
//! - *Timing.* The difference worth measuring — a syscall or a serial write on
//!   one branch — is milliseconds, but this fixture shares four cores and a
//!   serial line with a booting system, so a measurement here would be noise
//!   wearing an assertion's clothes. `onOpen` asks both questions on every
//!   open, whatever the first one answers; that is the claim, and it is a claim
//!   about the code, checked by reading it.
//!
//! Prints `protocol-denied: ok` on success, or a `protocol-denied: FAIL` line
//! naming the step. Spawned bare (the initial-ramdisk sweep starts every bundled
//! binary), it exits silently so it cannot derange other tests.

const std = @import("std");
const channel = @import("channel");
const envelope = @import("envelope");
const file_system = @import("file-system");
const ipc = @import("ipc");
const logging = @import("logging");
const process = @import("process");
const time = @import("time");
const vfs_protocol = @import("vfs-protocol");

/// The contract this fixture provides and then reaches — under `/protocol/test`,
/// the subtree every `/test/` binary is granted. Binding it ourselves keeps the
/// granted case to one process: the registry does not know or care that the
/// provider on the other end of the channel is us.
const granted_contract = "test/denied-probe";

/// A contract this fixture is NOT granted and that the case makes sure IS bound:
/// the input service claims it, and only `input-source` and `input-test` are
/// named against it in /system/configuration/protocol.csv.
const forbidden_contract = "input";

/// A contract this fixture IS granted (the `test/*` subtree) and that nothing
/// ever binds. The comparison partner: refusal must look like this.
const absent_contract = "test/never-bound";

/// Neither granted nor bound. The third shape, so the collapse is into one
/// answer rather than two.
const forbidden_and_absent_contract = "display";

fn fail(step: []const u8) noreturn {
    _ = logging.write("protocol-denied: FAIL ");
    _ = logging.write(step);
    _ = logging.write("\n");
    process.exit(1);
}

// --- talking to the registrar directly --------------------------------------
//
// `channel.openEndpoint` folds every failure into null, which is exactly right
// for a client and useless here: the whole assertion is about the *shape* of the
// answer, so this fixture speaks the vfs protocol to the registry itself and
// keeps every byte that came back.

/// One `open` answer, kept whole.
const Answer = struct {
    /// Bytes the registrar replied with — the reply packet's length is itself a
    /// channel, so it is compared like any other field.
    length: usize = 0,
    packet: [vfs_protocol.message_maximum]u8 = .{0} ** vfs_protocol.message_maximum,
    /// Whether a capability rode the reply. The one field that actually matters
    /// to a client: the capability IS the channel.
    capability: bool = false,
    /// The reply header, decoded — compared field by field as well as byte for
    /// byte, so a failure says *which* field diverged.
    reply: vfs_protocol.Reply = .{ .status = 0, .node = 0, .len = 0 },

    fn bytes(self: *const Answer) []const u8 {
        return self.packet[0..self.length];
    }
};

/// The registry's endpoint, obtained the way every process obtains it: resolve
/// `/protocol`. The handle is the kernel's, shared with every other user of the
/// mount, so it is never ours to close.
fn registryEndpoint() ?ipc.Handle {
    // Patiently, for the same reason `bindPatiently` is patient: the kernel test
    // harness starts the registrar and this fixture together, so a first resolve
    // can land in the window before init has mounted `/protocol` at all. An
    // absent mount is a boot race and worth waiting out; a registrar that
    // answers has decided, and that answer is what the assertions below weigh.
    var attempt: u32 = 0;
    while (attempt < resolve_attempts) : (attempt += 1) {
        var relative: [channel.path_maximum]u8 = undefined;
        if (file_system.fsResolve(channel.root, 0, &relative)) |route| switch (route) {
            .kernel => return null, // a kernel route means something other than the registry owns the name
            .backend => |backend| return backend.handle,
        };
        time.sleepMillis(resolve_retry_ms);
    }
    return null;
}

/// The cadence `channel.bindPatiently` uses, for the same window.
const resolve_attempts: u32 = 200;
const resolve_retry_ms: u64 = 20;

/// One vfs-protocol request at the registry: the fixed header, then the contract
/// name inline. Names go bare (`input`, not `/input`) — the registrar normalises
/// both, and bare is what `bind` sends.
fn transact(registry: ipc.Handle, operation: vfs_protocol.Operation, name: []const u8, cursor: u64) ?Answer {
    var request: [vfs_protocol.message_maximum]u8 = undefined;
    if (vfs_protocol.request_size + name.len > request.len) return null;
    const header = vfs_protocol.Request{
        .operation = operation,
        .node = 0,
        .offset = cursor,
        .len = @intCast(name.len),
        .flags = 0,
    };
    @memcpy(request[0..vfs_protocol.request_size], std.mem.asBytes(&header));
    @memcpy(request[vfs_protocol.request_size..][0..name.len], name);

    var answer: Answer = .{};
    const got = ipc.callCap(
        registry,
        request[0 .. vfs_protocol.request_size + name.len],
        &answer.packet,
        null,
    ) catch return null;
    if (got.len < vfs_protocol.reply_size) return null;
    answer.length = got.len;
    answer.capability = got.cap != null;
    answer.reply = std.mem.bytesToValue(vfs_protocol.Reply, answer.packet[0..vfs_protocol.reply_size]);
    // A capability we did not ask to keep is a handle slot spent; the assertions
    // below only care that one arrived.
    if (got.cap) |handle| _ = ipc.close(handle);
    return answer;
}

/// `open(name)`, kept whole. Null only if the registry could not be reached at
/// all — a registrar that answered has decided, and its decision is the subject.
fn openContract(registry: ipc.Handle, name: []const u8) Answer {
    return transact(registry, .open, name, 0) orelse fail("the registry stopped answering");
}

/// Whether `/protocol` currently lists `name`. The namespace is browsable on
/// purpose (docs/os-development/protocol-namespace.md: `readdir` lists protocol
/// nodes like any others, so the tree stays diagnosable), and that is what lets
/// this fixture prove a refused name is really there — without it, "refused"
/// and "not bound yet" would be the same observation and the test would assert
/// nothing.
fn listed(registry: ipc.Handle, name: []const u8) bool {
    var cursor: u64 = 0;
    while (cursor < 64) : (cursor += 1) {
        const answer = transact(registry, .readdir, "", cursor) orelse return false;
        if (answer.reply.status != 0 or answer.reply.len == 0) return false; // end of directory
        const payload = answer.packet[vfs_protocol.reply_size..answer.length];
        if (payload.len < vfs_protocol.directory_entry_size) return false;
        const entry = std.mem.bytesToValue(vfs_protocol.DirectoryEntry, payload[0..vfs_protocol.directory_entry_size]);
        const text = payload[vfs_protocol.directory_entry_size..];
        const length = @min(@as(usize, entry.name_len), text.len);
        if (std.mem.eql(u8, text[0..length], name)) return true;
    }
    return false;
}

/// Wait until `/protocol` lists `name` — the providers this case needs come up
/// alongside the fixture, and racing them would make the assertions meaningless
/// rather than merely flaky.
fn awaitListed(registry: ipc.Handle, name: []const u8) void {
    var attempts: u32 = 0;
    while (attempts < 400) : (attempts += 1) {
        if (listed(registry, name)) return;
        time.sleepMillis(20);
    }
    _ = logging.write("protocol-denied: FAIL /protocol never listed ");
    _ = logging.write(name);
    _ = logging.write("\n");
    process.exit(1);
}

/// Every caller-visible field of two answers, compared. `step` names the pair so
/// a failure says which comparison broke and in which field.
fn expectIdentical(step: []const u8, refused: Answer, absent: Answer) void {
    if (refused.reply.status != absent.reply.status) fail(step); // the errno
    if (refused.reply.node != absent.reply.node) fail(step); // the node id an open would return
    if (refused.reply.len != absent.reply.len) fail(step); // payload bytes promised
    if (refused.length != absent.length) fail(step); // reply packet length
    if (refused.capability != absent.capability) fail(step); // the channel itself
    if (!std.mem.eql(u8, refused.bytes(), absent.bytes())) fail(step); // and every byte of it
}

fn run() void {
    const registry = registryEndpoint() orelse fail("resolve /protocol");

    // Provide the granted contract ourselves. `bindPatiently` waits out a
    // registry that has not mounted `/protocol` yet, which is the one thing
    // worth retrying — a registrar that answered has decided.
    const provider = ipc.createIpcEndpoint() orelse fail("create the provider endpoint");
    if (!channel.bindPatiently(granted_contract, provider)) fail("binding a granted contract was refused");

    // Both names must be bound before anything is asked of them, or the
    // comparison below would be between two boot races.
    awaitListed(registry, granted_contract);
    awaitListed(registry, forbidden_contract);

    // 1. The control. A granted, bound contract opens: success, and the
    //    capability that IS the channel.
    const allowed = openContract(registry, granted_contract);
    if (allowed.reply.status != 0) fail("a granted open was refused");
    if (!allowed.capability) fail("a granted open carried no channel");
    _ = logging.write("protocol-denied: granted open succeeded\n");

    // 2. The refusal. `input` is bound — the listing above proved it — and no
    //    manifest row names this binary against it.
    const refused = openContract(registry, forbidden_contract);
    if (refused.reply.status != -envelope.ENOENT) fail("an ungranted open did not answer -ENOENT");
    if (refused.capability) fail("an ungranted open carried a channel");
    _ = logging.write("protocol-denied: ungranted open refused as absent\n");

    // 3. The point of the whole fixture. A name this binary IS granted and that
    //    nothing has ever bound, answered by the same registrar in the same
    //    breath — and every caller-visible field of the two answers is the same.
    const absent = openContract(registry, absent_contract);
    expectIdentical("a refused open differed from a nonexistent name", refused, absent);

    // 4. And the third shape, so the two reasons collapse into one answer rather
    //    than into two that happen to match: neither granted nor bound.
    const neither = openContract(registry, forbidden_and_absent_contract);
    expectIdentical("a refused-and-absent open differed from the others", refused, neither);
    _ = logging.write("protocol-denied: refusal is indistinguishable from absence\n");

    // 5. The control again, after the refusals: the registrar is still opening
    //    what it should, so what steps 2-4 saw was policy and not a registry
    //    that had wedged.
    const again = openContract(registry, granted_contract);
    if (again.reply.status != 0 or !again.capability) fail("the granted contract stopped opening");
    _ = logging.write("protocol-denied: ok\n");
}

pub fn main(startup: process.Init) void {
    const role = startup.arguments.get(1) orelse return; // bare (ramdisk sweep): stay silent
    if (std.mem.eql(u8, role, "run")) run();
}