docs: the communication stack — /protocol namespace, layered model, non-unix hierarchy, SMEP/SMAP plan

The security-track design set. communication.md is the model: four layers
(namespace / protocol / channel / transport), packets and signals, parties
addressed by the channel and objects by target, transports as replaceable
buffer+doorbell mechanisms. protocol-namespace.md is L3+L2: /protocol names
contracts, resolution establishes a channel, init is the registrar,
restriction is per-process namespace delegation (with the microphone-prompt
worked example), the envelope is the universal packet header, migration
P1-P5 retires ServiceId. file-system-hierarchy.md replaces the unix-FHS
spec with the danos-native tree (/applications, /protocol, /system,
/volumes) and its migration table. ipc.md is re-cut as the kernel-ipc
transport document. smep-smap.md designs the kernel hardening: copy
discipline for the eight raw user-pointer syscalls, then SMEP, then SMAP
as a permanent tripwire.
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Samson
2026-07-31 18:11:28 +01:00
parent de9870175f
commit c96ef87714
14 changed files with 946 additions and 203 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ the whole reason for the arrangement ([vision.md](vision.md)).
danos is a **monorepo of sub-projects**. Each service or driver is a directory that is
its own Zig module — it can hold as many files as it needs, and other sub-projects
reach it *by module name*, never by a path into its files. The source tree deliberately
**mirrors the runtime FHS** ([danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md](file-system-development/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md)):
**mirrors the runtime file-system hierarchy** ([file-system-hierarchy.md](file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md)):
what you see under `system/` in the source is what a running danos represents under
`/system`.
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ what you see under `system/` in the source is what a running danos represents un
name.** `system/services/init/` contains `init.zig` (its root), and produces a binary
addressed as **`system/services/init`** — the repeated leaf resolves away:
| Source (root file) | Addressed as (module / binary / FHS path) |
| Source (root file) | Addressed as (module / binary / hierarchy path) |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| `system/services/init/init.zig` | `system/services/init` → `/system/services/init` |
| `system/drivers/ps2-bus/ps2-bus.zig` | `system/drivers/ps2-bus` → `/system/drivers/ps2-bus` |
+12 -4
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@@ -38,8 +38,11 @@ So the design is small:
the existing VFS wire protocol, whose read/write have stream semantics.**
No device numbers, no `/dev` special casing, no new syscalls, no new protocol —
a service mounts itself at a path (per the FSH, e.g. `/device/console`), clients
open it with `runtime.fs` like any file, and `FileStatus.kind` says what it is.
a service is reachable at a path, clients open it with `runtime.fs` like any
file, and the node kind says what it is. (Since the protocol namespace landed
in design, that path is `/protocol/console` — a protocol node, see
[os-development/protocol-namespace.md](os-development/protocol-namespace.md) —
rather than a mounted device file; the stream semantics below are unchanged.)
### Stream semantics (the actual contract change)
@@ -160,7 +163,12 @@ Phase 1 both list; neither track repeats them.
- [zig-self-hosting.md](zig-self-hosting.md) — ditto ("stdio as fds").
- [file-system-development/vfs-protocol.md](file-system-development/vfs-protocol.md) —
the wire protocol this note extends.
- [file-system-development/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md](file-system-development/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md)
— where `/device/console` lives.
- [file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md](file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md)
— the tree the console surfaces in.
- [os-development/protocol-namespace.md](os-development/protocol-namespace.md) —
supersedes this note's device-node naming: the console lands as a protocol
(`/protocol/console`, a protocol node), not a `/dev`-style device file. The
stream semantics designed here (line discipline, cooked/raw modes) carry over
unchanged.
- [device-driver-development/input.md](device-driver-development/input.md) — the
`InputEvent` stream the console cooks.
+98 -53
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@@ -1,34 +1,70 @@
# IPC: message-passing channels
# IPC: the kernel-ipc transport
Inter-process communication is the **backbone of a microkernel**. Once drivers and
services run isolated in their own address spaces ([vision](../vision.md)), they can't
just call each other — a request becomes a **message**. In a microkernel, whatever
just call each other — a request becomes bytes on a wire. In a microkernel, whatever
was a function call across a monolithic kernel is IPC, so it's a first-class
concern, not an afterthought.
There are two layers, built a milestone apart:
This document describes **one transport** — the bottom layer (L0) of the
communication stack defined in
[communication.md](../os-development/communication.md), which owns the model
and the vocabulary (*protocol*, *channel*, *packet*, *signal*, *endpoint*).
kernel-ipc is the **first** transport, not the only possible one: in
buffer-plus-doorbell terms it is a kernel-owned mailbox with the scheduler as
the doorbell. Its distinguishing properties, which the layers above may rely
on where they say so:
- **`system/kernel/ipc.zig`** — a bounded blocking channel between *kernel threads*,
described below. The primitive, and where the blocking discipline was worked out.
- **`system/kernel/ipc-synchronous.zig`** — synchronous call/reply between *processes*, across
address spaces. What user-space servers and drivers actually talk over. It's the
second half of this document.
- **Rendezvous.** A call is a synchronous meeting, copied sender-page to
receiver-page — natural backpressure, no queue to size.
- **Capability carriage.** The *only* transport that can move a handle
between processes. Channels are therefore always established over
kernel-ipc, and it remains every channel's control path even when bulk
data is negotiated onto a fatter transport (a shared-memory ring).
- **Verified source.** Every delivery carries the kernel-stamped badge — the
identity the channel layer attaches to received packets.
- **Bounded packets.** 256 bytes call/reply, 64 pushed — the floor every
protocol may assume on any transport.
## The channel
Three properties keep the networking analogy honest — kernel-ipc is
networking-*shaped*, not TCP:
The first form is a **bounded blocking channel** (`system/kernel/ipc.zig`): a fixed-size
ring buffer of messages with a producer/consumer rendezvous, built on the
scheduler's [wait queues](../os-development/scheduling.md).
- **Channels over it are RPC-shaped, not streams.** Packets, call/reply,
datagram pushes — closer to UDP plus RPC than to a byte stream. Ordering
exists per exchange (a reply answers its call), not across a channel.
- **Possession is the connection.** There is no handshake state in the
kernel: holding the capability *is* having the channel. A provider's one
endpoint terminates every client's channel at once, demultiplexed by badge
— like every client sharing the server's listening socket, with
per-connection state living in the provider, keyed by badge. A *private*
channel (a dedicated endpoint pair) is built when wanted: that is exactly
what `subscribe` does.
- **Packets never fragment.** If it doesn't fit in a packet, it isn't a
packet: bulk data lives in shared memory and a packet (or signal) is the
doorbell. The display path already works this way.
The rest of this document is the implementation, bottom-up: the kernel-thread
queue the blocking discipline was worked out on, then endpoints — this
transport's termination points.
## The kernel-thread queue
The first form is a **bounded blocking queue** (`system/kernel/ipc.zig`): a
fixed-size ring buffer of messages with a producer/consumer rendezvous, built
on the scheduler's [wait queues](../os-development/scheduling.md). (Its type
is still named `Channel(T, capacity)` — it predates the vocabulary above, and
is a *queue between kernel threads in one address space*, not a channel in
the model's sense; a rename can ride a later flag-day.)
`Channel(T, capacity)` is generic over the message type and buffer size. It holds a
ring buffer, a count, and two wait queues:
- **`send(msg)`** — if the channel is full, block on the *not-full* queue; otherwise
- **`send(msg)`** — if the queue is full, block on the *not-full* queue; otherwise
write the message, bump the count, and wake a waiting receiver.
- **`receive()`** — if the channel is empty, block on the *not-empty* queue; otherwise
- **`receive()`** — if the queue is empty, block on the *not-empty* queue; otherwise
take a message, drop the count, and wake a waiting sender.
Neither side busy-waits: a full channel parks the sender, an empty one parks the
Neither side busy-waits: a full queue parks the sender, an empty one parks the
receiver, and each operation wakes the other side when it makes progress possible.
Two details make it correct:
@@ -45,47 +81,52 @@ Two details make it correct:
CPU. `waitLocked` / `wakeLocked` are the variants that assume the caller already
holds that critical section.
## Verifying it
### Verifying it
The `ipc` test (see [testing.md](../testing.md)) runs a producer and a consumer passing
**100 messages through a 4-slot channel**. The small buffer means the channel goes
**100 messages through a 4-slot queue**. The small buffer means the queue goes
full and empty over and over, so both the blocking-send and blocking-receive paths are
exercised heavily. The messages arrive intact and in order (their sum is the
expected `5050`), and neither task busy-waits — they block and wake each other.
## Endpoints: call/reply across address spaces
## Endpoints: the termination points
A channel connects two kernel threads sharing one address space. Real servers are
*processes*, so the payload has to cross an address-space boundary. That's
A queue connects two kernel threads sharing one address space. Real providers are
*processes*, so a packet has to cross an address-space boundary. That's
`system/kernel/ipc-synchronous.zig`, and its shape is L4's: a synchronous **rendezvous** at an
`Endpoint`, with the message copied directly from the sender's pages to the receiver's
`Endpoint`, with the packet copied directly from the sender's pages to the receiver's
(`copyAcross` walks both sets of page tables through the physmap — no CR3 switch, no
bounce buffer).
Two syscalls carry it:
Two syscalls carry the request/reply exchange:
- **`ipc_call(h, msg, reply)`** — copy `msg` to the server, block until it replies.
- **`ipc_call(h, msg, reply)`** — copy the request packet to the provider, block
until the reply packet comes back.
- **`ipc_reply_wait(h, reply, recv)`** — reply to the client you're still holding (if
any), then block for the next request. One syscall, because a server's steady state
any), then block for the next request. One syscall, because a provider's steady state
is *always* "finish the last one, wait for the next".
An endpoint is reached by **handle** — a small integer index into the process's handle
table (`Task.handles`), exactly like a file descriptor, and just as unforgeable. The
bootstrap problem (how do you get the first handle?) is solved by a tiny name registry:
a server calls `ipc_register(service_id, h)` under a well-known small integer, and a
client calls `ipc_lookup(service_id)`.
table (`Task.handles`), exactly like a file descriptor, and just as unforgeable.
The provider never learns the client's identity beyond the **badge** delivered
alongside each packet: the caller's task id, stamped by the kernel —
unforgeable source addressing, a property a network's source field lacks.
The server never learns the client's identity beyond a **badge**, delivered alongside
the message: the caller's task id.
The bootstrap problem — how a channel is first established — is the subject of
[protocol-namespace.md](../os-development/protocol-namespace.md): a protocol is
resolved by name and the channel arrives as a capability. (The mechanism this
replaces, `ipc_register`/`ipc_lookup` under compile-time `ServiceId` integers,
is retired by that design.)
### Interrupts are messages too
### Interrupts are signals
`notifyFromIsr` posts an *asynchronous* notification to an endpoint — no payload, no
`notifyFromIsr` posts an *asynchronous* signal to an endpoint — no payload, no
reply owed — and wakes whoever is blocked in `reply_wait`. Its badge has the top bit
set (`notify_badge_bit`), which is how a driver's single event loop distinguishes "a
client wants something" from "the hardware wants something". Notifications sit in a
client wants something" from "the hardware wants something". Signals sit in a
small coalescing ring on the endpoint, so an interrupt taken while the driver was busy
elsewhere is not lost.
elsewhere is not lost — coalesced, never dropped, which is exactly a signal's
contract (the *count* may collapse; the *fact* may not).
This is what makes a user-space driver possible at all, and it's the subject of
[drivers.md](drivers.md).
@@ -93,40 +134,44 @@ This is what makes a user-space driver possible at all, and it's the subject of
## What's next (partly done since)
- **Priority inheritance** through IPC — still open: a high-priority client
blocked on a low-priority server suffers unbounded priority inversion.
blocked on a low-priority provider suffers unbounded priority inversion.
- **Handle transfer.** *Landed as cap-passing (M13)*: `ipc_call` and
`ipc_reply_wait` carry an optional capability alongside the bytes (`send_cap`),
copying an endpoint or shared-memory handle into the peer's table. First user:
[input](input.md) subscribers register by handing over their own endpoint, and
class drivers get a private channel to one device.
copying an endpoint or shared-memory handle into the peer's table — the
mechanism by which channels are established and private channels built. First
user: [input](input.md) subscribers register by handing over their own
endpoint, and class drivers get a private channel to one device.
- **Asynchronous / buffered send** for the cases where a rendezvous is the wrong
shape (logging, notifications between servers). *Landed as `ipc_send`* — a
non-blocking post to an endpoint's bounded payload queue, delivered through
`reply_wait` as a buffered message (badge bit `notify_message_bit`). Built for, and
first used by, the [input service](input.md)'s keyboard-event broadcast, where a
synchronous push would let one dead subscriber hang the fan-out. A full queue drops
the oldest (discrete messages, not a coalescing level like the notification ring).
- **A bounded reply** — half landed. The copy is still 256 bytes
(`MESSAGE_MAXIMUM`) under the big kernel lock, but bulk transfer got its shared
shape (logging, event fan-out). *Landed as `ipc_send`* — a
non-blocking post of an event packet (≤ 64 bytes) to an endpoint's bounded
queue, delivered through `reply_wait` (badge bit `notify_message_bit`). Built
for, and first used by, the [input service](input.md)'s keyboard-event
broadcast, where a synchronous push would let one dead subscriber hang the
fan-out. A full queue drops the oldest — event packets are droppable by
design ([protocol-namespace.md](../os-development/protocol-namespace.md)'s
wiring section states the rule).
- **A bounded reply** — half landed. The copy is still one packet
(256 bytes) under the big kernel lock, but bulk transfer got its shared
pages: `shared_memory_create`/`map`/`physical`, the region handle delegated as
a capability (above). virtio-gpu's scanout surface is the first user
a capability (above) — the packets-never-fragment rule in practice.
virtio-gpu's scanout surface is the first user
([display-v2.md](display-v2.md)).
## Lifecycle conventions over IPC (M17)
Three conventions from [process-lifecycle.md](../os-development/process-lifecycle.md) ride the
notification mechanism:
signal mechanism:
- **Signals** arrive as notifications on the endpoint a process nominated with
`signal_bind` (`process.bindSignals`): badge = the signal bit plus the
coalesced pending mask (`process.signalsFrom` decodes). Statements,
- **Process signals** arrive as endpoint signals on the endpoint a process
nominated with `signal_bind` (`process.bindSignals`): badge = the signal bit
plus the coalesced pending mask (`process.signalsFrom` decodes). Statements,
never questions; no payload, no reply.
- **One-shot timers** (`timer_bind`, `time.timerOnce`) land as a
timer-bit notification — the timed wait: a service arms a deadline and keeps
timer-bit signal — the timed wait: a service arms a deadline and keeps
serving, instead of blocking in sleep.
- **The universal ping**: a **zero-length request is the liveness probe**,
answered with a zero-length reply by the service harness itself
(`service.run`). No protocol's requests start at length zero, so the
encoding cannot collide, and a wedged service simply fails to answer — which
is the diagnosis. Deep health ("can I reach my hardware?") stays a per-service
protocol message.
protocol packet.
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
# DanOS Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (DFHS)
Most modern Unix and Unix-like operating systems follow the FHS. DanOS has its own FHS structure which extends the unix FHS. Root path resolution is provided by the kernel-resident VFS root (`fs_resolve`, `system/kernel/vfs.zig`); mounted filesystem servers serve the subtrees they own.
## Directory structure
| Path | Description |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| / | Primary hierarchy root and root directory of the entire file system hierarchy. |
| /bin | Essential command binaries that need to be available in single-user mode, including to bring up the system or repair it, for all users (e.g., cat, ls, cp). |
| /boot | Boot loader files (e.g., EFI, initial-ramdisk.img ). |
| /dev | POSIX Device files (e.g., /dev/null, /dev/disk0, /dev/tty, /dev/random). |
| /etc | Host-specific system-wide configuration files. |
| /home | Users' home directories, containing saved files, personal settings, etc. |
| /lib | Libraries essential for the binaries in /bin and /sbin. eg realtime, system, ipc etc. |
| /sbin | Essential system binaries (e.g init) |
| /srv | Site-specific data served by this system, such as data and scripts for web servers, data offered by FTP servers, and repositories for version control systems |
| /system | DanOS operating system files (similar idea to C:\Windows). A true representation of danos — its layout mirrors the source tree, so `/system` is what danos *is*. |
| /system/devices | danos virtual device tree e.g. similar to /sys on linux but with danos device tree conventions (the structures in the devices module) |
| /system/drivers | driver binaries, one sub-project each (e.g. /system/drivers/pci-bus, /system/drivers/ps2-bus) |
| /system/services | system-service binaries — init, the FAT server, and other user-mode servers (e.g. /system/services/init, /system/services/fat) |
| /system/kernel | the kernel image |
| /test | Test fixtures for the QEMU integration suite. Read-only and initrd-backed like /system, and its layout likewise mirrors the source tree (the repo's test/ directory). Present on development and test images; a volume without it still boots. |
| /test/system/services | test-fixture binaries (e.g. /test/system/services/vfs-test, /test/system/services/thread-test) — the same path in the repo source tree and on the boot volume |
| /tmp | Directory for temporary files (see also /var/tmp). Often not preserved between system reboots and may be severely size-restricted. |
| /usr | Secondary hierarchy for read-only user data; contains the majority of (multi-)user utilities and applications. Should be shareable and read-only. |
| /var | Variable files: files whose content is expected to continually change during normal operation of the system, such as logs, spool files, and temporary e-mail files. |
## File types
POSIX specifies the long format of the ls command to represent the Unix file type as the first letter for an entry.
| type | symbol | Description |
|-------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| regular | - | An ordinary file holding an uninterpreted byte stream. Reads and writes are positional, and the file grows on demand (e.g., a binary in /bin, a config file in /etc). |
| directory | d | A container mapping names to other files. It may only be modified through directory operations, never written to directly. |
| symbolic link | l | A file whose contents are a path that is resolved in its place. The target need not exist, and may cross mount points. |
| FIFO special | p | A named pipe: an in-order byte stream between processes, where writers block until a reader opens the other end. |
| block special | b | A device node addressed in fixed-size blocks with the kernel free to buffer and reorder access (e.g., /dev/disk0). |
| character special | c | A device node addressed as an unbuffered byte stream, delivered to the driver in order (e.g., /dev/tty, /dev/null). |
| socket | s | A named endpoint for bidirectional message-passing between processes, bound to a path rather than an address. |
## /dev
`/dev` holds the names through which processes reach devices. It is deliberately not
the device tree: the tree — every node discovered by ACPI or PCI enumeration, with its
resources and its parent — lives under [/system/devices](#directory-structure) and is
addressed by device id. `/dev` is the much smaller set of devices that have a driver
willing to serve them, addressed by name.
A device node is not a file the VFS can read. The bytes live in a driver process
([drivers.md](../device-driver-development/drivers.md)), so opening a `/dev` name has to resolve to that driver's
IPC endpoint, and subsequent reads and writes are calls against it. Resolve-to-endpoint
is exactly what the kernel's `fs_resolve` already does for any mounted backend, and
`FileStatus.kind` is the field that marks a device node; **what is not implemented today
is `/dev` itself** — no service mounts it. (The flat eight-node ramfs this section once
described is retired: the kernel-resident VFS root in `system/kernel/vfs.zig` serves a
read-only initrd mount per top-level tree — `/system`, and `/test` on images that carry
the fixtures — with real directories and node kinds, and filesystem
backends such as the FAT server mount the rest.) The three sections below describe the
intended shape, and are honest about which parts the kernel can already support.
### Character devices
A character device is a byte stream with no addressable position: bytes are delivered
to the driver in the order written, and a read consumes what is there. Terminals,
serial lines, keyboards and mice are all of this shape. These are the natural first
device nodes in danos, because a character driver needs nothing the kernel doesn't
already provide — it claims its device, maps its registers with `mmio_map`, and blocks
on `replyWait` for either an interrupt or a client request. `system/drivers/ps2-bus/ps2-bus.zig`
is already that program, minus the file-node client half.
The obstacle was never the file type; it is which hardware a ring-3 driver can reach.
Direct `in`/`out` from user space is still a #GP (no TSS I/O bitmap, IOPL never raised),
but a driver no longer needs it: **`io_read`/`io_write`** grant port access the same way
`mmio_map` grants memory — gated by `device_claim` and the device's discovered `io_port`
resource. So the 16550 UART at `0x3F8` and the PS/2 controller at `0x60`/`0x64` (and thus
`/dev/ttyS0` and a keyboard node) are now writable as ordinary ring-3 drivers; the
low-rate legacy hardware that needs port I/O is fine with a syscall per access. A
memory-mapped device such as the framebuffer, needing no port I/O at all, remains the
easiest first entry.
### Block devices
A block device is addressed in fixed-size blocks and, unlike a character device, the
layer above is free to buffer, reorder, coalesce and retry requests against it. Disks
and other persistent storage are the whole population of this class.
A block driver is now **writable, but not yet memory-safe.** Every storage controller
worth naming is a bus master: it is programmed by handing it the physical address of a
descriptor ring and left to read and write memory on its own. That ring is exactly what
**`dma_alloc`** now provides — physically contiguous, pinned, uncacheable, with its
physical address disclosed — and **`/lib/device/mmio`**'s barriers order the descriptor writes
against the doorbell, and **`msi_bind`** delivers completions. So an AHCI or NVMe driver
can be written today (the M14/M15 work in [driver-model.md](../device-driver-development/driver-model.md); the earlier
"cannot host a block driver at all" is no longer true).
What is *not* yet true is that it is safe. A device programmed with an arbitrary physical
address writes to arbitrary physical memory, and page tables do not sit between a device
and RAM — an IOMMU does. The IOMMU is now *detected* (M16), but no translation domains
are programmed, so granting a DMA-capable device to a driver process is still equivalent
to granting ring 0. Until per-device domains confine a driver's DMA to the buffers it
`dma_alloc`'d, a block driver works but forfeits the isolation that motivates user-space
drivers — enforcement is the next step, and lands with that first driver. A ramdisk over
the initial ramdisk remains the one block-shaped thing that needs no driver process at all.
### Pseudo-devices
A pseudo-device has the interface of a device and no hardware behind it: `/dev/null`
discarding writes and reading as end-of-file, `/dev/zero` reading as an endless run of
zero bytes, `/dev/full` failing writes with `ENOSPC`, `/dev/random` and `/dev/urandom`
yielding unpredictable bytes.
These are the only `/dev` entries danos can implement immediately, and they are the
sensible place to start, because they are exactly the entries that need no driver
process, no `device_claim`, no MMIO grant and no interrupt. A future pseudo-device
service would answer them out of its own address space — `null` and `zero` are a few
lines each in its `read` and `write` handlers — and mount itself at `/dev` the way the
FAT server mounts `/mnt/usb`. The two pieces of structure every later device node
depends on (and that the flat ramfs of the time lacked) exist now: directories, so that
`/dev/null` is a path rather than a name; and a populated `FileStatus.kind`, so that a
caller can tell a character device from a regular file.
`/dev/random` is the one that is not free. It needs an entropy source, and the honest
options on this kernel are `RDRAND`/`RDSEED` where CPUID advertises them, and the HPET
counter's low bits as a poor fallback. Neither is a seeded CSPRNG, and a `/dev/random`
that is merely unpredictable-looking is worse than none — nothing should be keyed from
it until it is a real one.
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# The danos file-system hierarchy
danos is not unix, and its tree does not follow the unix FHS. Paths are the
system's universal namespace — files, the device inventory, and protocol
endpoints all live in one tree — but what a path *yields* differs by subtree:
bytes, facts, or a connection. Root path resolution is provided by the
kernel-resident VFS root (`fs_resolve`, `system/kernel/vfs.zig`); mounted
backends serve the subtrees they own.
Naming follows the codebase conventions: kebab-case, full words, no
abbreviations. Every top-level name says what its subtree *is*.
## The tree
| Path | What it is |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `/` | The root of the one namespace. |
| `/applications` | Installed applications, one directory per application — the directory is the identity, the same rule as source sub-projects. *(Planned; empty today.)* |
| `/protocol` | The contract namespace: one protocol node per contract, grouped into directories by domain (`/protocol/display`, `/protocol/networking/ip`). Synthetic — no bytes; opening a name yields a connection to the current provider. See [protocol-namespace.md](../os-development/protocol-namespace.md). |
| `/system` | The operating system — what danos *is*. Its program subtrees mirror the source tree exactly. |
| `/system/kernel` | The kernel image. |
| `/system/drivers` | Driver binaries, one per sub-project (`/system/drivers/pci-bus`, `/system/drivers/ps2-bus`). |
| `/system/services` | System-service binaries (`/system/services/init`, `/system/services/fat`). |
| `/system/devices` | The device inventory: every node hardware discovery found, with its resources and parent — the structures of the devices module, as a browsable virtual tree. Informational only; you *read about* hardware here and *talk to* it through `/protocol`. *(Planned; served by device-manager.)* |
| `/system/configuration` | Machine configuration (`init.csv`, `devices.csv`). Writable, served from the boot volume. |
| `/system/logs` | Per-boot logs: `/system/logs/<boot-stamp>/<binary-path>.log`. Writable, served from the boot volume. |
| `/test` | Test fixtures for the QEMU integration suite. Read-only and initrd-backed like the program subtrees of `/system`, mirroring the repo's `test/` directory. Present on development and test images; a volume without it still boots. |
| `/volumes` | Attached storage volumes, one directory per volume (`/volumes/usb`). A volume's own tree appears beneath its name. |
Read-only and writable halves of `/system`: the program subtrees (`kernel`,
`drivers`, `services`) and the future `devices` are immutable at runtime —
initrd-backed or synthetic — while `configuration` and `logs` are mutable
machine state served by the boot-volume FAT backend. The kernel's
reserved-prefix rule (no mount may shadow `/system`, `/test`, or `/protocol`)
needs a carve-out for exactly these two writable subtrees; that lands with the
path migration below.
Deliberately not defined yet: a temporary-files location and per-application
mutable storage. Both belong to the `/applications` design and will be
specified there, not guessed at here.
## Node kinds
What a path resolves to. These fill `FileStatus.kind` and
`DirectoryEntry.kind` in the [vfs protocol](vfs-protocol.md)
(`library/protocol/vfs/vfs-protocol.zig`); enum values are append-only.
| Kind | Meaning |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `regular` | An ordinary file: an uninterpreted byte stream, positional reads and writes, grows on demand. |
| `directory` | A container mapping names to nodes; modified only through directory operations. |
| `character_device` | A node whose read/write have **stream semantics**: unseekable, reads block until bytes exist, size is meaningless. The console and every tty-shaped node ([character-devices-and-tty.md](../character-devices-and-tty.md)); what a POSIX layer's `isatty` detects. |
| `block_device` | A node addressed in fixed-size sectors — a raw volume. Reserved: recognized, nothing serves one yet. |
| `symbolic_link` | Reserved: a recognized value, not implemented by any backend. |
| `fifo` | Reserved for the future pipe object (wanted by the POSIX compatibility layer); not implemented. |
| `protocol` | A node naming a contract: `open` yields an IPC connection (an endpoint capability) instead of a file id — the kind of every leaf under `/protocol`. *(Being added; see protocol-namespace.md.)* |
Note the layering: `protocol` says what *opening the name* does (you get a
conversation); `character_device`/`block_device` say what *read and write
mean* on a node a provider serves you. The two compose — `/protocol/console`
is a protocol node in the registry, and the node opened over that connection
reports `character_device`, which is what gives it stream semantics. Only
`socket` is retired (its value stays reserved for wire stability): a named
rendezvous point is exactly what a protocol node is.
## What is deliberately absent
There is no `/bin`, `/boot`, `/dev`, `/etc`, `/home`, `/lib`, `/mnt`, `/sbin`,
`/srv`, `/tmp`, `/usr`, or `/var`. These encode unix history — the
binary/library split of small disks, configuration-as-scattered-text, devices
as magic files — that danos does not carry. A POSIX compatibility layer (the
Python track's mini-libc) may *present* whichever of these its programs
expect, mapped onto the real tree; the tree itself stays danos-native.
## Migration
The tree above is the specification; some code still writes the unix paths it
replaced. The flag-day converting them:
| Today (in code) | Becomes | Where |
|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| `/etc/init.csv` | `/system/configuration/init.csv` | `system/services/init/init.zig` |
| `/etc/devices.csv` | `/system/configuration/devices.csv` | `system/services/device-manager/device-manager.zig` |
| `/var/log/...` | `/system/logs/...` | `system/services/logger/logger.zig`, the FAT server's `/var` mount |
| `/mnt/usb` | `/volumes/usb` | `system/services/fat/fat.zig`, the fat/vfs tests |
| `ServiceId` lookup | resolve + open under `/protocol` | every service and client; [protocol-namespace.md](../os-development/protocol-namespace.md) |
The boot-image builder and the on-volume directory layout move in the same
change, so a freshly written image and the paths the services expect never
disagree.
+8 -3
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@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ Bitwise OR in `Request.flags`, meaningful for `open` only:
## NodeKind
Aligned to the FSH file-type table
(docs/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md):
Aligned to the node-kind table in the file-system hierarchy
(docs/file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md):
| value | kind |
|------:|------|
@@ -163,7 +163,12 @@ Aligned to the FSH file-type table
| 6 | socket |
Clients should map unknown values to *regular* rather than reject — the
table can grow.
table can grow. Kind 6 (`socket`) keeps its wire value but is retired from
the design — a named rendezvous point is exactly what a `protocol` node is,
planned as value 7 with the protocol namespace
(docs/os-development/protocol-namespace.md). `character_device` (stream
semantics — the tty/console shape) and `block_device` (raw sector-addressed
volumes, reserved) remain part of the design.
## Lifetimes and trust
+120
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@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
# Communication: the four layers
*Design, agreed 2026-07-31. The model document — the vocabulary and layering
every other communication document speaks.*
danos separates **what is said** from **how the bytes move**, so that the
mechanism is replaceable. The shape is a network stack's, cut into four
layers; a program only ever touches the top two.
```
L3 namespace /protocol/... names establishment points protocol-namespace.md
L2 protocol the language: packet schemas, verbs, targets the envelope, library/protocol/*
L1 channel two ends exchanging packets and signals the client library's Channel
L0 transport a buffer + a doorbell: moves the bytes ipc.md (kernel-ipc), later shm-ring, …
```
## Vocabulary
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| **protocol** | The language: which packets exist, what their fields mean, which verbs a provider answers. Defined transport-independently in a `library/protocol/*` module. |
| **channel** | An open conversation between two processes, speaking one protocol. Established by opening a `/protocol/...` name; both ends can send and receive. |
| **packet** | The unit a protocol transmits: a bounded, atomic header+payload. Never fragmented — if it doesn't fit, it isn't a packet; bulk data rides shared memory with a packet as the doorbell. |
| **signal** | A payload-less poke below the packet layer: "something happened, come look." Coalescing — the count may collapse, the fact may not. |
| **transport** | What moves the bytes of one channel: a buffer plus a doorbell. Chosen (and upgradable) at establishment, invisible above L1. |
| **endpoint** | A termination point where a transport delivers. The kernel-ipc transport's endpoint is its kernel mailbox object. |
## Addressing: parties by channel, objects by target
There are no network-style addresses in a packet. The two questions addresses
answer are answered at different layers:
- **Who am I talking to?** The **channel**, decided once at establishment.
Opening `/protocol/input` yields a channel; every packet sent on it goes to
the peer. Nothing to route per-packet — like TCP, where no HTTP request
carries the server's IP.
- **Who sent this?** Attached to every received packet **by the channel
layer**, from identity the transport can verify — under kernel-ipc, the
kernel-stamped badge. The sender never writes a source field, which is what
makes source unforgeable (the property a network's spoofable source header
lacks).
- **Which of your things?** The packet's **`target`** field: *object*
addressing within the already-chosen peer — the vfs protocol's node id, the
display protocol's layer id, a block volume. `target = 0` addresses the
provider itself; a protocol without objects never uses it.
`target` is how instance multiplicity stays out of the namespace. Ten USB
sticks and the namespace still holds exactly one name, `/protocol/block`: a
channel to the provider, `enumerate` lists the current volumes as targets, a
`targets_changed` signal announces hotplug, and a read names its volume in
`target`. The unix `/dev/sda`,`/dev/sdb` problem is dissolved, not renamed.
If a future transport genuinely routes between machines, *it* carries real
source/destination addressing internally at L0 — the way IP runs under TCP —
and none of it surfaces into the packet header. Protocols stay ignorant of
distance.
## The transport (L0): a buffer and a doorbell
Strip any transport to its skeleton and the same two parts remain:
| Transport | Buffer | Doorbell | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| **kernel-ipc** | kernel-owned mailbox (the `Endpoint`) | the scheduler (rendezvous wake) | the first transport — [ipc.md](../device-driver-development/ipc.md) |
| **shm-ring** | user-owned shared-memory ring | a signal | exists ad hoc (display bulk); to be formalized — the unlock for the 256-byte ceiling |
| network | NIC queue | an interrupt | someday, when danos networks |
Transports differ in their **properties**, which the channel layer exposes and
the protocol layer may depend on:
- **packet ceiling** — kernel-ipc: 256 bytes request/reply, 64 pushed. An
shm-ring's ceiling is its slot size. Kernel-ipc's 256 is the *floor* every
protocol may assume everywhere.
- **synchrony** — kernel-ipc's call is a rendezvous: natural backpressure, no
queue to size. An asynchronous transport buffers, so a channel over one
needs explicit flow control. Backpressure is a *transport property*, not a
channel guarantee — protocols that rely on it say so.
- **droppability** — pushed event packets may drop when a ring fills;
request/reply may not.
- **capability carriage** — **only kernel-ipc can move a capability.**
Handles are kernel objects; a user-space ring cannot transfer one. So
kernel-ipc is always the *establishment and control* transport — channels
are born on it, capabilities ride it — even when a channel's data is
negotiated onto something fatter.
That negotiation is the upgrade path: a channel starts on kernel-ipc; the
protocol's handshake may then delegate a shared-memory region (as a
capability, over kernel-ipc) and move its bulk traffic there. The display
path already does exactly this by hand; formalizing it in the channel layer
makes it every protocol's option.
## The channel (L1)
A channel has two ends, and **the ends are peers**: each may send packets,
each may receive, each may signal. Request/reply is a *pattern* over the
channel — a send with a correlated receive, which the kernel-ipc transport
happens to accelerate as a single rendezvous — not the definition of it. The
event stream (subscribe, then pushes) and the change signal (poke, then
re-read) are the other two patterns; all three are catalogued in
[protocol-namespace.md](protocol-namespace.md)'s wiring section.
The channel layer's obligations: deliver packets whole, attach the verified
source to every receive, expose the transport's properties, and hide the
transport's mechanics. The client library's `Channel` type is this layer made
concrete — a program holds channels that speak protocols and never touches a
raw handle.
## The protocol (L2) and the namespace (L3)
A protocol defines its packets through the envelope — every packet begins
`{operation, target}`, reserved verbs (`describe`, `enumerate`, `subscribe`,
`unsubscribe`) mean the same thing in every protocol, and `Define` checks
every packet against the transport floor at compile time. The full treatment,
including how names are granted, resolved, and restricted per process, is
[protocol-namespace.md](protocol-namespace.md).
Establishment points are named by contract — `/protocol/display`, never
`/protocol/ipc-1` — because the name must outlive the mechanism: a
transport named in the namespace could never be swapped, which would defeat
this document's premise.
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# The protocol namespace
*Design, agreed 2026-07-31. Supersedes the `ServiceId` registry. Not yet implemented —
the migration plan at the end is the work list.*
How a program finds, connects to, and is restricted from the things it talks to.
Three ideas, kept deliberately separate:
1. **Naming** — a path under `/protocol` names a *contract*, not a service.
2. **Access** — resolving that path yields an endpoint *capability*; what a process
cannot resolve, it cannot reach.
3. **Transport** — unchanged: packets over channels, moved by whichever
transport the channel rides (kernel-ipc first).
This document is layers **L3** (the namespace) and **L2** (the protocol
and its envelope) of the communication stack;
[communication.md](communication.md) owns the model and the vocabulary
(*protocol* the language, *channel* the conversation, *packet* the
transmitted unit, *signal* the payload-less poke, *transport* the
replaceable mechanism), and
[ipc.md](../device-driver-development/ipc.md) is the first transport.
## Why ServiceId has to go
Today a service calls `ipc_register(service_id, endpoint)` and a client calls
`ipc_lookup(service_id)`, where `ServiceId` is a compile-time enum in `abi.zig`
backed by a flat 16-slot table in the kernel. Three defects, in rising order:
- **Static.** The id space is baked into the ABI at compile time. A third-party
program can never introduce a service; the one place danos is *less* dynamic
than its own design.
- **Ungated.** `ipc_register` is callable by any process and *replaces* an
existing registration. Any process can hijack `.fat` or `.display` and
impersonate it. `ipc_lookup` is equally ambient.
- **Unrestrictable.** Because lookup is a syscall available to everyone, there is
no point at which "this process may not talk to the display" can be enforced.
Any future file-access restriction would be bypassable by speaking to the FAT
server directly.
## Naming: contracts, not services
`/protocol/<name>` names a protocol — the contract a conversation follows — and
resolving it connects you to whatever process currently provides that contract.
The client never cared *which* binary answers; it cares that its messages are
understood. Naming the contract makes that explicit, and buys:
- **Swappable providers.** Replace the display server; `/protocol/display`
routes to the new one; clients notice nothing.
- **Test fakes.** Spawn a program whose namespace wires `/protocol/display` to a
mock. The name promises the protocol; the mock speaks it.
- **One vocabulary.** The names mirror `library/protocol/`: a program imports
the `display-protocol` module, then opens `/protocol/display`. What you
compiled against and what you ask the namespace for are the same word.
A leaf names one contract — kebab-case, full words, matching the
`library/protocol/` module that defines its wire format — and related
contracts group into directories: `/protocol/networking/ip`,
`/protocol/networking/bluetooth`. Directories organize *contracts only*;
they never encode addressing (see below), so a directory appears because a
domain has several contracts, never because hardware multiplied. The module
tree mirrors the namespace (`library/protocol/networking/ip` ↔
`/protocol/networking/ip`), and registrar grants scope naturally to subtrees
— an application installed at `/applications/foo` can be granted
`/protocol/applications/foo/...` and nothing above it. `/protocol` is
top level, beside `/system` and `/applications`, because the boundary it names
is spoken on both sides: applications talk to protocols as much as the OS does
(see [file-system-hierarchy.md](../file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md)).
**Addressing lives inside the protocol, never in the path.** Which volume, which
layer, which input device — that is a destination field in the messages, the way
TCP carries a destination address, and the way danos protocols already work (the
display protocol multiplexes layer ids; the vfs protocol addresses node ids).
The namespace answers exactly one question — *may this process speak this
protocol at all* — so `/protocol/block` is one name no matter how many disks are
attached. The source address is never in the message either: it is the IPC
badge, stamped by the kernel per message, unforgeable — a property TCP's source
address does not have.
`/system/devices` (the device inventory) stays purely informational: facts for
diagnosis, never a routing mechanism. Unix conflated the two in `/dev`; danos
does not. You *read about* hardware in `/system/devices`; you *talk to* it
through `/protocol`.
## Resolution: a protocol node in the VFS
The kernel VFS router already does the hard part: `fs_resolve` matches a mount
prefix and installs the backend's endpoint capability in the caller's handle
table. The registry is just a backend mounted at `/protocol` — ring 3, like FAT.
Connecting is a normal vfs-protocol `open` with one twist in the reply:
```
client kernel router registry backend
│ fs_resolve("/protocol/display") │
│──────────────────────────▶│ prefix match: /protocol │
│◀── registry endpoint ─────│ (capability installed) │
│ vfs open("display") ──────────────────────────────────────▶│
│◀───────────────── Reply + capability = provider endpoint ──│
│ ipc_call(provider, display-protocol messages...) │
```
Both capability moves use machinery the kernel already has: request-direction
and reply-direction `send_cap` on `call`/`replyWait`. The vfs protocol needs two
additions, both append-only:
- `NodeKind.protocol` — a node that names a contract; its `open` establishes
a **channel** (delivered as an endpoint capability) instead of returning a
file id. The node is the protocol, the channel is the conversation, and the
addressing inside the packets decides where within the provider each one
lands. `readdir` over `/protocol` lists protocol nodes like any others, so
the tree stays browsable for diagnosis.
- The convention that an `open` reply may carry a capability. File backends
(FAT) never use it; synthetic backends (the registry, later the device
inventory) do.
The path lookup happens once, at connect time. The hot path — `ipc_call` on the
cached endpoint — is untouched. A provider crash turns the cached endpoint dead
(`-EPEER`), and the client's recovery is to re-resolve: the restart story falls
out of the naming layer for free.
## Registration: the registrar, held by init
The registry backend is **init**. It is already PID 1, already spawns every
service from its manifest, and already holds the supervision link to each — it
is the process that *knows* which binary is which. (If init grows
uncomfortable, the same design lifts into a dedicated registry service that
init spawns first and delegates to; nothing below changes.)
- **Binding.** A service creates its endpoint and sends the registry a `bind`
request with the protocol name as payload and the endpoint attached as the
call's capability.
- **Authorization.** Init's manifest gains a column: the protocols each spawned
binary may bind. A `bind` from any process not granted that name is refused
(`-EPERM`) — the badge identifies the caller, the supervision records map
badge to binary. This is the registrar authority; it never leaves init.
- **Collision is an error.** A name already bound refuses a second bind — never
last-writer-wins. When a provider dies, init (its supervisor) unbinds its
names; the restarted instance binds again.
- **Provenance.** The registry records name → task id → binary path, so a
diagnostic listing answers "who serves this?" at a glance:
```
/protocol/display pid 12 /system/services/display
/protocol/input pid 7 /system/services/input
```
`ipc_register` and `ipc_lookup` retire; the `ServiceId` enum leaves `abi.zig`.
The kernel keeps one residual rule: `/protocol` becomes a reserved prefix like
`/system` — `fs_mount` refuses to shadow it, and init's boot-time mount is the
only one it will ever hold. (Full gating of `fs_mount` is a separate item on
the security track; the reserved prefix closes the hole for this namespace
without waiting for it.)
## Restriction: per-process namespaces, not ACLs
danos has no users and no principals, deliberately. Restriction is therefore
**delegation**: what a process may open is decided by whoever spawned it, and
enforcement is absence — a protocol you cannot resolve does not exist for you.
"Permission denied" and "not found" are the same answer, which is the same
discipline the device layer already follows: the claim is the capability; here,
the resolvable name is the capability.
Two stages, deliberately ordered so the useful half lands first:
**Stage one — the registry filters by badge.** Init is both the spawner and the
registry, so its manifest already knows which binary may *open* which protocols
(a second manifest column, beside the bind grants). An `open` from a process
whose binary is not granted that protocol is refused. No new kernel mechanism
at all; the display driver's view can be narrowed to nothing, a future
downloaded application's to `display` and `input`, today.
**Stage two — spawn passes the namespace.** `spawn` gains an initial
capability: the child's connection to *its* registry view, chosen by the
spawner. A newly spawned process starts with an empty handle table and this one
handle — its world is whatever its parent wired in. This removes the last
ambient reach (`fs_resolve` finding `/protocol` globally), lets any supervisor
— not just init — narrow or fake a child's view (an application launcher
granting an app only what its manifest declares; a test harness substituting
every provider), and composes down the supervision tree. Stage one's manifest
column becomes the *content* of the view init builds, so nothing is thrown
away.
### A worked example: the microphone prompt
The scenario stage two exists for: an application opens
`/protocol/audio-input`, and the user should be asked. The supervisor is an
ordinary user process — an application launcher — and the flow needs no new
security concepts:
1. The launcher spawned the app with a namespace channel that terminates at
**the launcher itself**. The app's whole world is a conversation with its
supervisor.
2. The app's `open("audio-input")` packet lands in the launcher,
badge-stamped. The launcher spawned the app, so badge → binary path
(`/applications/foo`) is its own supervision record — "remember my choice"
needs no identity system.
3. Grant unknown → the launcher parks the request and shows a prompt (it is a
user process with display access; init never does UI). Blocking an open on
a human is architecturally fine: opens are connect-time, never hot-path.
4. **Yes** → the launcher opens `/protocol/audio-input` in *its own*
namespace and attaches the resulting channel to the parked reply. The app
cannot tell a prompt happened — a consented open is indistinguishable from
a direct one, merely slower.
5. **No** → refuse the open, indistinguishable from "no such protocol" — or
hand the app a **fake**: a silence-generating provider. The test-fake
mechanism doubles as a privacy feature.
The capability discipline holds throughout: the launcher can only grant what
it holds — if init never gave the launcher `audio-input`, no prompt can
conjure it. Consent is delegation flowing down the supervision tree, never a
global ACL edit. And the provider still sees the app's badge on every packet,
so a coarser second check at the audio service remains possible.
Two mechanical requirements this scenario pins on stage two:
- **Parked replies.** A prompt takes seconds, and the service loop holds one
outstanding reply today — the launcher must park request A, keep serving B
and C, and reply to A later (by badge). The kernel already tracks owed
replies (that is how death delivers `-EPEER`); multiple parked replies is
the extension, in the harness and, if needed, the kernel.
- **Granted channels are dedicated, hence revocable.** Once the app holds a
channel capability, nobody reaches into its handle table — so a
prompt-granted channel must be one that can be *killed*: a dedicated
endpoint pair (or per-client session at the provider) whose death turns
the app's capability into `-EPEER`. Revoking microphone access is then
killing that channel, using machinery that already exists.
One adjacent problem, named and deferred: **trusted UI**. The prompt is only
meaningful if the app cannot draw a convincing fake or overlay the real one —
a display-layer question (a reserved surface for the supervisor chain), owned
by the display track, not this one.
Fine-grained restriction *within* a protocol (this process may use volume A but
not volume B) is not the namespace's job. The capability-shaped answer, when it
is needed: the supervisor pre-opens a connection scoped to one target and passes
that connection to the child, which never opens `/protocol/block` at all.
Delegation again, not ACLs.
## The envelope: one addressing scheme for every protocol
Every protocol module today hand-rolls its `Request`/`Reply` with an
`operation` first field. That convention becomes a library, so addressing is
uniform and the rules are enforced by construction rather than by review. New
module: **`library/protocol/envelope`** (the one protocol-layer module that is
not itself a protocol).
```zig
/// Every packet a danos protocol transmits begins with this header.
pub const Header = extern struct {
operation: u32, // the verb; values 0..15 are reserved universal verbs
_padding: u32 = 0,
/// Object addressing, never party addressing: which of the peer's
/// objects this packet operates on — a volume, layer, node, device.
/// 0 addresses the provider itself. Parties are addressed by the
/// channel; the protocol defines target's meaning; the field's place
/// and width are universal.
target: u64 = 0,
};
/// Reserved verbs, answered by every provider.
pub const operation_describe: u32 = 0; // -> protocol name, version, target kinds
pub const operation_enumerate: u32 = 1; // -> the current targets, one per reply page
pub const operation_subscribe: u32 = 2; // capability = the subscriber's endpoint
pub const operation_unsubscribe: u32 = 3;
pub const first_protocol_operation: u32 = 16;
/// Every reply begins with this.
pub const Status = extern struct {
status: i32, // 0 or a negative errno
_padding: u32 = 0,
len: u32 = 0, // payload bytes following the header
_padding2: u32 = 0,
};
```
A protocol is then *defined through* the envelope, not beside it:
```zig
pub const Protocol = envelope.Define(.{
.name = "display",
.version = 1,
.operations = &.{
.{ .name = "configure_layer", .request = ConfigureLayer, .reply = void },
.{ .name = "blit", .request = Blit, .reply = void },
...
},
});
```
`Define` is comptime and is where the enforcement lives:
- verbs are numbered automatically from `first_protocol_operation`, so no
protocol can collide with the reserved range;
- every packet is size-checked at compile time against the kernel-ipc floor
— `packet_maximum` (256) for request/reply, `post_maximum` (64) for event
packets. Ceilings are transport properties
([communication.md](communication.md)); the floor is what every protocol
may assume on any transport. The errors that today surface as runtime
truncation become compile errors, and packets-never-fragment is enforced
at the source;
- the generated type carries encode/decode helpers and a provider-side dispatch
table, so a provider answers `describe` automatically and unknown operations
with `-ENOSYS` uniformly;
- the service harness (`library/kernel/service.zig`) accepts the generated
dispatch type, which is what makes the envelope *enforced*: a protocol that
bypasses `Define` does not plug into the harness.
Universal conventions that ride on the reserved verbs:
- **`describe`** is the version handshake. Version lives in the handshake, not
in every message — the 256-byte budget is too small to spend per call.
- **`enumerate`** is how multi-target protocols expose their targets, and the
standard `targets_changed` notification (a notify bit) tells subscribers to
re-enumerate — arrival and removal of volumes, layers, devices all take the
same shape. Hotplug fits the notification ring far better than a filesystem
tree ever did.
- **Source is the badge.** No protocol defines a "sender" field; the kernel's
per-message badge is the only source identity, and providers key per-client
state on it.
### Paths resolve once; integers do the work
A rule the envelope makes official: **a path appears in a conversation at most
once — at resolve or open — and everything after it addresses integers.** The
namespace resolves `/protocol/display` to an endpoint; a backend's `open`
resolves a path payload to a node id; from then on every packet carries the
integer in `target`. Integers compare in one instruction and fit the fixed
header, and the 256-byte message budget never re-carries path strings on the
hot path. This is already the system's shape — vfs node ids, display layer ids
— and the envelope pins it as the required shape for every protocol.
Two integer identities, not to be confused:
- **An open handle** — what vfs `open` returns today: transient, meaningful
only within one client's session with one provider, swept when the client
exits. Cheap, and all a protocol usually needs. Handles must be **scoped per
client** — validated against the badge, or drawn from a per-client id
namespace. (Today the FAT server's node ids are guessable small integers
honoured across clients; that hole closes with this rule.)
- **A persistent node identity** — a unix inode number, stable across opens
and renames. danos deliberately does not promise this, because FAT cannot
deliver it: a FAT file's identity is its directory entry, and rename or
truncation moves every candidate anchor. If a future filesystem or a cache
layer needs stable identity, that is the backend's promise to make, never
the protocol's assumption.
The five existing protocol modules (`vfs`, `display`, `input`, `power`,
`block`, plus `scanout`, `usb-transfer`, `device-manager`) rebase onto the
envelope during the migration flag-day. `input-protocol`'s subscribe/publish
split and `vfs-protocol`'s node addressing both map cleanly (`node` and layer
ids become `target`).
## Wiring: how conversations flow
The patterns below are channel-layer (L1) shapes; the delivery mechanics are
the kernel-ipc transport's, described here because it is the transport every
channel starts on. Kernel-ipc provides exactly three delivery shapes, and
every one is unicast. An endpoint is a mailbox owned by one process — its
creator receives; anyone holding its capability sends into it. That direction
never reverses:
1. **Synchronous call** — request/reply. The kernel parks the caller and
`replyWait` delivers the reply straight back, so the provider answers
without holding any capability to the client. Badge-stamped, blocking, and
the *only* shape that carries capabilities (in the request, and in the
reply — which is how a reverse path is bootstrapped).
2. **Asynchronous send** — an event packet pushed into the receiver's post
ring, at most `post_maximum` (64) bytes, no reply owed, never blocks the
sender. Strictly one-way: to be pushed to, you must first hand the pusher
your endpoint.
3. **Signals** — payload-less notification bits, below the packet layer,
coalescing: "something changed, come look."
A bidirectional link is therefore always **a pair of endpoints**, one per
direction, each delivered by cap-passing. Three conversation patterns are
built from these, and the envelope names all three:
- **Request/response** — the synchronous call. The default, and the only
place capabilities move.
- **Event stream** — `subscribe` (a synchronous call whose attached
capability is the subscriber's own endpoint), after which the provider
pushes events asynchronously; `unsubscribe` or subscriber exit ends it.
Listened-to, not blocked-on.
- **Change signal** — a signal plus re-read: `targets_changed` →
`enumerate`. For state whose truth lives with the provider.
**Broadcast is a provider pattern, never a kernel primitive.** The kernel
does not know subscriber sets — a service does. The input service is the
model: sources *publish* (a unicast call to the service), the service
*broadcasts* (a fan-out loop of asynchronous sends over its subscriber list,
so one dead subscriber can never stall the rest). One fan-out point per event
domain, owned by the service that defines the event.
The harness owns the machinery: the subscriber table, the dead-subscriber
sweep (via process-exit notifications), and the fan-out loop — all written by
hand in `input.zig` today, lifted into the service harness so every protocol
gets identical semantics. `Define` declares a protocol's events (`.events`),
and each event type is checked against `post_maximum` at compile time,
generalizing the assert `input-protocol` already carries.
**Event packets are droppable.** A slow subscriber's ring fills, and the
provider must not block on it — so an event stream is a hint or a coalescing
signal, never a ledger. Anything that must not be lost is either re-readable
state (the change-signal pattern) or bulk data in shared memory with a
packet as the doorbell, which is how the display path already works — the
packets-never-fragment rule and this one are the same rule seen from two
sides.
**Source direction (open point).** Today event sources are *clients*: an
input driver resolves `/protocol/input` and delivers each event as a
synchronous `publish` call — one capability, obtained by resolution, covers
everything, and the badge tells the service exactly who each event came from.
The inversion — the service subscribing to each driver — would require every
driver to be individually discoverable and its endpoint ferried to the
service, machinery whose payoff (the service choosing its sources) the
namespace already provides more cheaply: only a process granted open on
`/protocol/input` can publish into it. Sources stay clients for now;
revisited at restriction stage two, when a supervisor can wire capabilities
at spawn time.
## What this deliberately does not solve
The wider security track, for which this namespace is the foundation, not the
whole:
- **File access restriction** — the point of the exercise. The same stage-two
namespace mechanism extends from protocol names to file paths: the spawner
decides which subtrees resolve. Designed separately once this lands.
- `fs_mount` gating beyond the reserved prefixes; `system_spawn` gating;
`klog_read` being world-readable; backends checking the badge on per-node
operations (the FAT server honours node ids across clients today).
- Kernel hardening items already noted in-tree: SMEP/SMAP and SYSRET
canonical-RIP, now designed in [smep-smap.md](smep-smap.md).
- Pipes/FIFOs for the POSIX layer — a byte-stream object *beside* message IPC,
wanted by the Python track, unrelated to naming.
- **Trusted UI** — a permission prompt an application cannot fake or overlay
(see the microphone example). A display-track concern: the supervisor chain
needs a reserved surface.
## Migration plan
Flag-day per phase, in the style of the DMA-capability conversion — no
dual-stack periods, the QEMU suite green at each phase boundary.
**P1 — mechanics, no behavior change.** The `envelope` module with its comptime
`Define`, unit tests; `NodeKind.protocol` and the open-reply-capability
convention in `vfs-protocol`; existing protocols untouched.
**P2 — the registry.** Init serves `/protocol` (bind with manifest
authorization, collision refusal, unbind on provider death, provenance);
kernel reserves the `/protocol` prefix; every service converts from
`ipc_register` to `bind`, every client from `ipc_lookup` to resolve-and-open;
`ServiceId`, `ipc_register`, `ipc_lookup` deleted. Tests: unauthorized bind
refused, collision refused, provider restart re-binds and a client re-resolves.
**P3 — restriction, stage one.** The open-grant column in init's manifest;
registry refuses ungranted opens. Test: a fixture process denied a protocol its
neighbour is granted.
**P4 — protocol rebase.** Existing protocol modules re-expressed through
`Define`; providers move onto the generated dispatch; `describe`/`enumerate`
answered everywhere; the conformance test fixture exercises the reserved verbs
against every registered provider.
**P5 — restriction, stage two.** Spawn's initial capability; namespace views
built by the spawner; ambient resolution of `/protocol` retired. Includes the
two requirements the microphone example pins: **parked replies** (a
supervisor parks an open, keeps serving, replies later by badge) and
**dedicated, killable granted channels** (revocation = channel death →
`-EPEER`). Scoped separately — it touches `spawn`, the loader contract, and
every supervisor — and lands together with the file-path half of namespacing.
The unix-path migration ([file-system-hierarchy.md](../file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md#migration))
is independent of P1–P5 and can land before or after.
+131
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@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
# SMEP and SMAP — supervisor-mode hardening
*Design, 2026-07-31. Not yet implemented. Companion to
[protocol-namespace.md](protocol-namespace.md) on the security track — this is
the hardware half; that is the namespace half.*
Two CR4 bits that make the CPU refuse the two things a kernel should never do
with user memory:
- **SMEP** (Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention, CR4 bit 20): instruction
fetch in ring 0 from a page whose U/S bit says *user* → #PF. Kills the
classic ret2usr exploit shape — a kernel bug that redirects control flow
can no longer land in attacker-prepared user code.
- **SMAP** (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention, CR4 bit 21): data read/write
in ring 0 to a user page → #PF, unless `EFLAGS.AC` is set. `stac`/`clac`
open and close deliberate access windows; danos's design needs no windows
at all (below).
Detection is CPUID leaf 7, subleaf 0, EBX bit 7 (SMEP) and bit 20 (SMAP).
Both bits are per-core state: the BSP and every AP must set them.
## Why, in danos terms
Every syscall argument is an attacker-controlled integer, and several take
pointers. A kernel bug that dereferences a crafted pointer reads, writes, or
executes memory of the attacker's choosing — the exact bug class the
isolation tracks exist to prevent. SMEP/SMAP turn that class from "silent
compromise" into "immediate, attributable #PF with a kernel RIP in the log."
The second benefit matters as much as the first: **SMAP is a permanent
tripwire.** Once it is on, any *future* syscall that touches user memory
directly — instead of going through the checked copy layer — faults the
first time the QEMU suite runs it. The discipline stops depending on review.
## Where danos already stands
The design is closer than it looks, because the IPC layer was built right:
- **The copy layer is already SMAP-proof.** `copyAcross` and `copyFromUser`
(`system/kernel/ipc-synchronous.zig:305,333`) never dereference a user
virtual address: they walk the page tables and move bytes through the
physmap — kernel mappings throughout. SMAP cannot object.
- **Syscall entry already clears AC.** `SFMASK = 0x4_0700` clears IF, TF,
DF, **AC** on every `syscall`
(`system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/per-cpu.zig:76`). The syscall path is
SMAP-clean from day one.
- **The interrupt path is not.** Hardware does *not* clear AC on IDT
delivery, and ring 3 can set AC with `popfq` — so a hostile process could
take an interrupt with AC=1 and have the handler run with SMAP suspended.
`isr_common` (`system/kernel/architecture/x86_64/isr.s:366`) needs a
`clac` beside its `swapgs`.
- **CR4 today:** the BSP inherits firmware CR4 (no kernel write anywhere);
APs set PAE/OSFXSR/OSXMMEXCPT in `trampoline.s:62-68`. Neither path sets
SMEP/SMAP yet, and both must.
- **The stragglers.** A handful of syscalls still dereference user pointers
raw after a bounds check — every one is a SMAP #PF waiting to happen, and
every one is *already* a latent kernel fault today (an unmapped-but-in-
range user page oopses the kernel instead of failing the call). The audit
list, from the 2026-07-31 survey of `system/kernel/process.zig`:
| Syscall | Raw access |
|---|---|
| `system_spawn` | name + argument blob (`:972`, `:980`) |
| `fs_resolve` | path in, result out (`:1780`, `:1797`) |
| `fs_mount` / `fs_unmount` | prefix + rewrite strings (`:1864`) |
| `fs_node` | read buffer out (`:1820`) |
| `debug_write` | message bytes (`:1700`) |
| `klog_read` | log bytes out (`:1740`) |
| `process_enumerate` | descriptor array out (`:1132`) |
| `device_enumerate` | descriptor array out (`:388`) |
(Some paths already do it right — the futex word and the device-register
descriptor go through `copyFromUser` (`:1087`, `:924`). The write
direction has no helper yet.)
- **One known gap inside the copy layer itself:** the walk checks presence,
not the leaf U/S and writable bits (`ipc-synchronous.zig:20-22` flags
this). Today that is nearly moot — the user half contains only mappings
the kernel itself created for that process — but it must close before
shared or copy-on-write mappings exist, and closing it is part of making
the copy layer the single trusted door.
## The plan
**H1 — copy discipline (the real work).** A `user-memory` kernel module:
`copyFromUser` / `copyToUser` (the missing write direction) via the physmap
walk, with U/S and writable leaf checks closing the in-tree TODO. Convert
the eight stragglers. This fixes the latent unmapped-page kernel fault on
its own — it is worth doing even if SMEP/SMAP never shipped. QEMU suite
green; no behavior change visible to correct programs.
**H2 — SMEP.** A leaf-7 feature probe (the kernel has per-leaf `cpuid`
helpers in `apic.zig` to generalize); set CR4.SMEP during per-CPU bring-up
on BSP and APs — prefer the Zig-side per-CPU init over the trampoline
assembly, so one code path covers every core and the trampoline stays
minimal. Audit first that ring 0 never executes user-mapped pages: kernel
text lives in the kernel half, `jump_to_user` is kernel code, and the AP
trampoline page is kernel-mapped — expected clean, verify before flipping.
**H3 — SMAP.** Add `clac` at `isr_common` entry. `clac` is #UD on CPUs
without SMAP, so the instruction is a 3-byte NOP in the image, patched to
`clac` at boot when CPUID advertises SMAP (one-time patch beats a
conditional branch in the hottest path in the kernel). Then set CR4.SMAP in
the same per-CPU init. From this point the whole QEMU suite doubles as the
enforcement test: any missed raw dereference is a vector-14 with a kernel
RIP and a user CR2 — loud and attributable.
**H4 — keep it honest.** A line in the coding standards: kernel code
touches user memory only through `user-memory`; there is no `stac` anywhere
in the tree, and a PR that adds one is wrong by definition. SMAP enforces
the rule mechanically at test time.
Feature-gating follows the timekeeping rule (work on any VM, real Intel,
real AMD): both bits are probed, absence is logged and tolerated — like the
IOMMU's fail-open, the machine still boots, just unhardened. QEMU: TCG
implements both; KVM inherits the host (Intel Ivy Bridge+ for SMEP,
Broadwell+ for SMAP; AMD Zen+ for both). The test images should run with
`-cpu max` so the suite always exercises the enabled paths.
## Adjacent, deliberately separate
- **SYSRET canonical-RIP hardening** (`isr.s:192-194` documents it): a
non-canonical return RIP makes `sysretq` #GP *in ring 0* on Intel. Same
hardening bucket, independent fix (validate RCX before `sysretq`, fall
back to `iretq`), should ride the same branch as H2/H3 but is not
SMEP/SMAP.
- **KPTI / Meltdown-class leaks are out of scope.** SMEP/SMAP police
architectural accesses, not speculative ones. danos runs one kernel
mapping in every address space and accepts that on affected hardware;
revisit only if the threat model ever includes hostile native code on
shared machines.
+8 -8
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ sequential pass and hands the bytes to the kernel unmodified.
The capsule is a *performance artifact*, not a source of truth. The boot
volume's `/system` and `/test` file trees remain the canonical layout (see
[danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md](../file-system-development/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md));
[file-system-hierarchy.md](../file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md));
the capsule is a pre-baked snapshot of the same binaries, derived from the same
build graph, so the running system is identical whether the loader read the
capsule or walked the tree.
@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ so it need be no fancier. Little-endian throughout:
```
Header magic: u32 = "DNR2" (0x32524E44), count: u32
Entry × count name: [64]u8 (NUL-padded FHS path), offset: u64, len: u64
Entry × count name: [64]u8 (NUL-padded hierarchy path), offset: u64, len: u64
blobs... each entry's file bytes, at its offset within the image
```
- **Names are full FHS paths** (`/system/services/init`), not basenames — that
- **Names are full hierarchy paths** (`/system/services/init`), not basenames — that
is what "v2" means. The 64-byte capacity matches `abi.maximum_process_name`,
so a task named after its binary path is never truncated. Paths longer than
63 bytes are a build error (`pack-system-image.py` rejects them).
@@ -54,14 +54,14 @@ blobs... each entry's file bytes, at its offset within the image
## How it is built
`build.zig` maintains one `bundled` list — every user binary and its FHS home.
`build.zig` maintains one `bundled` list — every user binary and its hierarchy home.
Three artifacts are derived from that same list, in the same build graph, so
they cannot drift apart:
1. **The tree**: each binary installed at its FHS path (`zig-out/system/...`
1. **The tree**: each binary installed at its hierarchy path (`zig-out/system/...`
and `zig-out/test/...`, mirrored onto the FAT boot volume by
`tools/make-fat-image.py`).
2. **The manifest** (`system/manifest`): the FHS path of every bundled binary,
2. **The manifest** (`system/manifest`): the hierarchy path of every bundled binary,
one per line — the loader's per-file fallback input.
3. **The capsule**: `tools/pack-system-image.py` packs the same binaries into
the v2 container, installed at `zig-out/boot/system.img` and placed on the
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ the kernel (`kernel.zig`) then publishes the same bytes twice, to two
consumers:
- **The process layer** (`process.zig`): `system_spawn` looks binaries up in
the ramdisk via `Reader.find` — exact FHS path, or unique basename for
the ramdisk via `Reader.find` — exact hierarchy path, or unique basename for
pre-path callers — and loads them as fresh ring-3 processes. The stored path
becomes the task's name.
- **The VFS root** (`vfs.zig`, `setInitialRamdisk`): the image is mounted as
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ consumers:
paths, so `/system` and, when the fixtures are bundled, `/test`. Directory
nodes are derived from the entry paths (the unique parents), so the trees
are listable and their files readable over the normal VFS protocol — the
FHS boot tree every process sees comes straight out of the capsule bytes.
boot tree every process sees comes straight out of the capsule bytes.
The image is never copied after the handoff and never mutated: the initrd is
immutable, which is what makes the VFS's node serving lock-free.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ return real answers.
- `--disable-shared`; static `Modules/Setup`: `posix errno _io _codecs _weakref
time math _stat _collections itertools _functools _locale _sre` plus what the
interpreter core insists on; threadless build (WASI precedent).
- `Lib/` on the FAT image under the FSH (e.g. `/system/python/lib`);
- `Lib/` on the FAT image under the hierarchy (e.g. `/system/python/lib`);
`PYTHONHOME` set accordingly; `.pyc` written with **checked-hash
invalidation** (FAT's 2-second mtime granularity makes mtime-based validation
lie during fast edit-run cycles).
+1 -1
View File
@@ -257,5 +257,5 @@ in practice cares.
the spawn-argv work extends.
- [device-driver-development/ipc.md](device-driver-development/ipc.md) — the IPC
surface Python services speak.
- [file-system-development/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md](file-system-development/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md)
- [file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md](file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md)
— where `Lib/` and `site-packages` land on the image.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ Two current decisions fall out of this roadmap:
- [syscall.md](os-development/syscall.md) — the kernel↔runtime ABI `runtime.os` is built on.
- [sysv.md](os-development/sysv.md) — the entry stack (`argc/argv/envp/auxv`) danos already constructs.
- [ipc.md](device-driver-development/ipc.md) — the IPC the VFS/FAT operations travel over.
- [danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md](file-system-development/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md) — the
- [file-system-hierarchy.md](file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md) — the
filesystem layout the file surface serves.
- [coding-standards.md](coding-standards.md) — danos naming (why the compat spellings
are confined, and now retired).
+2 -2
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@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ pub const Operation = enum(u32) {
rename, // rename(old\0new payload) -> status
};
/// The type of a filesystem node, aligned to the FSH file-type table
/// (docs/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md). Fills `FileStatus.kind` and
/// The type of a filesystem node, aligned to the node-kind table
/// (docs/file-system-development/file-system-hierarchy.md). Fills `FileStatus.kind` and
/// `DirectoryEntry.kind`; `regular = 0` keeps the historical hardcoded value.
pub const NodeKind = enum(u32) {
regular = 0,