A new user-memory module owns every kernel touch of a user buffer:
copyFromUser, the new copyToUser, and the resolve behind both. The walk
accumulates the U/S and writable bits down all four levels with the MMU's
own AND rule — folding a 2 MiB leaf in before it resolves and refusing a
1 GiB leaf outright — so a copy honours what ring 3 itself would be
allowed, closing the presence-only trust model the IPC layer carried since
bring-up. It then confirms the frame is physmap-backed, because that is how
the copy reaches it: an mmio_map'd BAR passes the permission walk and would
otherwise fault ring 0 on an alias the physmap never mapped, on the IPC path
as much as the new one.
The nine stragglers that dereferenced user pointers raw now route through
it, so a bad pointer returns -EFAULT where it used to fault the kernel.
The write direction restructures its callees around kernel bounce buffers:
scheduler and devices-broker enumerate from a slot cursor (a task exiting
between chunks can neither duplicate nor lose an entry), klog_read drains
the ring in chunks, and fs_node stages headers and names contiguously.
fs_resolve copies out before installing the endpoint handle, so a faulting
copy cannot strand a capability; its out-capacity bound no longer adds an
unbounded ring-3 length to the base, which wrapped and trapped the kernel's
own overflow check. debug_write reads the caller's message once.
Suite 107/107 (new user-memory case: seven bad pointers refused, each
paired with a sound call that must still succeed).
Replaces L2's interim DMA pool (every buffer reachable by every claimed
device) with true per-grant confinement: a device reaches only buffers
whose capability was delegated to its driver.
Kernel:
- DmaRegionObject (handle kind 2): a delegation token naming a dma_alloc'd
region, passable across processes on the IPC cap slot like an endpoint
or shared-memory object. Frames stay owned by the allocating address
space (freed on dma_free/teardown as before); the token carries a `dead`
flag so a stale downstream handle can no longer bind a freed region.
- dma_alloc gains the dma_shareable flag: it returns a capability handle
in r8 and every region is tracked in a registry. A task's own regions
auto-bind into the devices it claims (its rings just work); foreign
buffers are bound explicitly.
- dma_bind / dma_unbind / handle_close syscalls (51-53). dma_bind maps a
held region (or shared-memory) capability into a claimed device's domain;
it is idempotent. handle_close reclaims a table slot (raised 16 -> 32).
- dma_free and task death unmap a region from every domain and invalidate
BEFORE its frames return to the allocator — the stale-IOTLB use-after-
free window, closed structurally.
Protocols (flag-day): block gains attach, usb-transfer gains dma_attach —
each carries a region capability on the cap slot. fat allocates its bounce
buffer shareable and attaches it; usb-storage allocates its transport
buffers shareable, attaches them to the controller, and forwards fat's
capability downstream; usb-xhci-bus binds and closes; virtio-gpu binds its
shared scanout surface. The physical addresses on the wire are unchanged
(identity IOVA), so no register-programming code moved.
Cross-process DMA (fat -> usb-storage -> xHC) now flows only through
delegated capabilities. iommu-usb-storage / iommu-usb-hid / iommu-fault
all green under per-grant enforcement; 104/104 overall (fail-open paths
unchanged).
The adversarial review of the branch confirmed the big one: the shm/DMA
page-table walks and their pmm/heap calls ran outside the big kernel lock —
pre-existing, but fatal once the per-space cursors invited sibling threads to
race them (two concurrent creates could orphan a page table: one thread's
region silently unmapped, the frame leaked — a plausible root for the
long-standing intermittent AP ring-3 fault at the shm base). All three paths
now follow the mmap discipline: allocation, object build, record, and handle
under one lock hold with full rollback; the map itself per-page under brief
holds; dma_free's translate/unmap/free per-page likewise.
Contract edges from the same review: thread_spawn into a dying group returns
-ESRCH (was generic -1); process_kill during the condemned window answers
from the latch's stashed supervisor (0 or -EPERM, was -ESRCH once the leader
slot was reaped); exit derives the group reason from its own argument rather
than the racy exit_code global; a worker's thread_exit no longer overwrites a
concurrent group-kill stamp; checkGroupDead now asserts exactly-one
notification via the drained ring. Full suite: 100/100.
Eight new QEMU cases (thread-fault-group, kill-threaded-group,
kill-via-worker-tid, racing-triggers, exit-group, leader-thread-exit,
thread-exit-solo, shm-mapping-ref) driving seven new thread-test modes; a
shared checkGroupDead asserts the contract everywhere: one notification,
badged with the leader, reason on the leader's record, no member listed,
claims released first.
The shm-mapping-ref case flushed out the per-task DMA/shared-memory arena
cursor bug directly (a sibling's regions mapped over the worker's), so both
cursors moved to the AddressSpaceRef like the mmap/MMIO cursors before them
(threading M7 pattern). Runtime gains Thread.tryExitCurrent for the leader
-EPERM refusal path. Docs updated: threading.md's shared-fate gap is closed,
process-management.md and process-lifecycle.md describe the leader re-key,
plan status = implemented. Full suite: 100/100.
Each address space that maps a shared-memory region now holds its own
reference, recorded on the AddressSpaceRef and dropped when the space is
destroyed — so 'last reference' means no handles AND no mappings, and a
region's frames can no longer be freed out from under a sibling thread (or
any other live mapper) when the handle-holding task dies. The group-death
notification still posts after every mapping release. (docs/shared-fate-plan.md M3)
All process deaths (exit from any thread, ring-3 fault, process_kill) now kill
the whole thread group via killGroupLocked: latch the AddressSpaceRef as dying
(refusing new members, closing the thread_spawn escape), stamp every member
(leader carries the group reason — the record the supervisor reads), reap
parked members to fixpoint, condemn running ones. The leader's exit
notification and subscriber broadcast move to the group-death moment — the
last address-space reference drop — via scheduler.group_exit_hook, which
re-stamps the leader's exit record first. Leader thread_exit is refused with
-EPERM. kill_pending is atomic; exit_reason and fault_kill_count writes moved
under the big kernel lock. (docs/shared-fate-plan.md M2)
Every task carries its process leader's id (main task: own id; threads:
copied from the spawner; kernel tasks: 0, never followed). process_kill and
process_signal resolve any member id to the leader and authorize against the
leader's supervisor, making both capabilities per-process. ProcessDescriptor
gains the leader field. No fan-out yet (docs/shared-fate-plan.md M1).
Verified every deferred item in the nine docs with a what's-next section and
marked what has since landed (reaper, per-process CR3, higher-half kernel,
kernel heap, contiguous frame alloc, RSDP capture, cap-passing, driver restart
with backoff, PS/2 keyboard) while keeping the genuinely open items. Also
corrects interrupts.md's claim that the keyboard skipped the IO-APIC, and
updates scheduler.zig/heap.zig comments that predated the reaper and the big
kernel lock.
Per docs/coding-standards.md (no Unix-abbreviation exception): syscalls
shared_memory_create/map/physical, kernel SharedMemoryObject + handlers,
runtime.shared_memory (library/runtime/shared-memory.zig), the
shared-memory-server/-client test services, the shared-memory QEMU case,
and docs incl. vdso.md's danos_shared_memory_*. 87/87 QEMU tests pass.
Expand the abbreviations flagged in docs/coding-standards.md (names spelled
out in full unless an acronym) across the kernel, runtime, ABI, tests, and
docs:
aspace -> address_space (AspaceRef -> AddressSpaceRef, retainAspace ->
retainAddressSpace, loaded_aspace -> loaded_address_space, the
liveAspaceCount/aspaceDestroyCount test hooks, etc.)
vaddr -> virtual_address
paddr -> physical_address
The kernel test case and its serial markers are renamed to match:
aspace-refcount -> address-space-refcount (kernel dispatch string and
test/qemu_test.py case name kept in sync). Prose in docs uses the natural
"address space"/"virtual address"; backticked field/identifier references
use the code spelling.
Also expand the bare "AS" abbreviation in three ABI comments and reframe the
set_thread_pointer ABI/handler docs to lead with the arch-neutral concept
(user-space TLS thread pointer; x86_64 IA32_FS_BASE, aarch64 TPIDR_EL0)
rather than x86 FS-first, matching scheduler.zig's existing framing.
Foreign ABI names preserved: the ELF p_vaddr field and mmap/mmio remain.
Verified: zig build, zig build test, and the full 25-case QEMU guardrail
suite all green.
The M10 TLS work leaked x86 naming into the generic kernel: Task.fs_base,
PerCpu.loaded_fs_base, and architecture.setFsBase. The *mechanism* was already
abstracted (the generic scheduler calls through the architecture layer; the
wrmsr IA32_FS_BASE lives in architecture/x86_64/cpu.zig), but the *names* would
force an aarch64 port to implement a 'setFsBase' that writes TPIDR_EL0.
Rename to the neutral concept: Task.thread_pointer, PerCpu.loaded_thread_pointer,
architecture.setThreadPointer (x86_64 impl writes IA32_FS_BASE; aarch64 -> TPIDR_EL0).
Also neutralise the user_arg comment (first argument register, rdi on x86_64).
No behaviour change; thread-tls/thread-mutex/smp/process-kill + host tests pass.
Each thread gets its own x86_64 thread pointer (FS base) for user-space TLS.
Task.fs_base is restored on every context switch only when it changes (same
conditional-load discipline as CR3; architecture.setFsBase -> wrmsr
IA32_FS_BASE). New set_thread_pointer=44 syscall sets the caller's fs_base and
loads it now. The kernel never touches FS, so no swapgs complication.
The runtime lays a small per-thread TLS block at the top of each thread's stack
(self-pointer at %fs:0 + scratch) and the thread trampoline calls
set_thread_pointer before any user code — so every spawned thread has a private,
switch-stable thread pointer, reclaimed with the stack.
thread-test tls mode: two threads write unique markers to their own %fs:8 and,
after both wrote, read back — a shared fs.base would clobber one (cross-talk).
Deferred: the Zig threadlocal *compiler* layer (ELF variant-II PT_TLS + linker
sections + template copy) — high-uncertainty, no consumer today; this lands the
load-bearing per-thread fs.base it builds on. See docs/threading-plan.md M10.
Gate thread-tls PASS (3x); full guardrail 25/25; build + host tests clean.
join no longer needs a per-thread IPC endpoint. New thread_join(tid) syscall
blocks the caller until the task with id tid exits; the exit paths call
wakeJoinersLocked. join only reclaims the joined thread's USER stack, which the
thread vacates the instant it enters the kernel to exit, so waking at exit time
(not reap time) is safe — no reaper/aspace juggling or user-memory write, and
equally std-shaped (like pthread_join). thread_spawn drops the exit-endpoint arg
(runtime passes no_cap). thread-test's join mode runs 40 spawn+join cycles that
would exhaust the 16-slot handle table under the old endpoint scheme.
Also harden the M8 reaper: its single per-core reap slot could be overwritten by
a second death on that core before draining (a fresh-task/SMP timing window), an
intermittent one-stack leak that made task-reap ~20% flaky. Replace it with a
per-core reap LIST plus a .reaping task state so a pending slot can't be reused
before its stack is freed. task-reap now 11/11 isolated.
Deferred: detached-thread user-stack reclaim (still at process exit, as in M3).
Gate thread-join PASS (3x); full guardrail 26/26; build + host tests clean.
A dead task's kernel stack was leaked (no reaper), so every process/thread death
bled kernel memory. Now exit()/exitUserLocked record the dying task in a per-core
reap_after_switch slot and switch away; the task that resumes on that core frees
the stack in switchTo's tail (on its own stack, lock still held so the slot can't
be reused). reapKillPendingLocked drains the slot on the timer tick as a safety
net for the fresh-task case (a fresh task enters via the trampoline, bypassing
switchTo's tail). A task killed while not running is freed directly in
destroyTaskLocked. live_stack_bytes is the observable.
Fixed a migration bug this exposed: the post-switchContext reap read the pc
parameter, but a migrated task carries a stale pc in its saved switchTo frame ->
it freed the wrong core's pending stack (a #GP under SMP). Re-fetch thisCpu()
after the switch.
Gate task-reap PASS (5x isolated, 2x in the 24-case batch); full guardrail 24/24
incl. fault-recovery/supervision/process-kill/smp/affinity; build + host green.
Move the mmap/mmio grant-arena cursors off Task into the per-address-space object
(scheduler aspace_refs, exposed via aspaceMmapNextPtr/aspaceDeviceMapNextPtr), so
sibling threads in one address space hand out disjoint grants. systemMmap reserves
a range under a brief lock then maps per page under a short-held lock (not the
whole grant): the big lock runs with interrupts disabled, so pinning it across a
multi-MiB memset+map froze other cores. Guard the runtime heap's rawAlloc/rawFree
with a Thread.Mutex, gated on !single_threaded so ordinary binaries compile it out.
thread-test gains an alloc mode: 4 threads x 500 alloc/fill/verify/free cycles;
any overlap between concurrent allocations is caught by the pattern check.
Also fix the affinity guardrail: its 3-billion-iteration busy-loop had
codegen-dependent wall-time (adding a function to tests.zig swung it ~4s -> ~63s
and timed it out). Reworked to wait on the wall clock instead.
Gate thread-alloc PASS (3x); full guardrail 23/23 green; build + host tests clean.
New private syscalls futex_wait(addr, expected, timeout_ns)=40 and
futex_wake(addr, count)=41. A waiter is a .blocked task tagged with
Task.futex_addr (no queue linkage); futex_wait reads the user word under the big
lock and parks only if it still equals expected, so a concurrent wake can't slip
between the check and the block. futex_wake scans the task table and readies up
to count waiters in the same address space. A timed wait also sets wake_at so the
existing wakeExpired times it out; futex_addr staying non-zero (only futex_wake
clears it) distinguishes timeout from a real wake. Waiters park in-kernel, so an
idle core still halts (no busy-wait).
runtime.Thread.Futex mirrors std.Thread.Futex (wait/timedWait/wake). thread-test
gains a futex mode: a waiter parks, the main thread wakes it (serial order
waiting/waking/woke, asserted by the case regex), and timedWait reports a
timeout.
Gate thread-futex PASS (3x); 18 guardrail cases green incl. sleep/event/ipc
blocking paths; build + host tests clean.
thread_spawn takes a 4th arg, an exit-endpoint handle: spawnThreadSupervised
resolves and refcounts it under the spawn lock (like spawnProcessSupervised), so
a thread's death posts a child-exit notification carrying its tid. runtime
Thread.join blocks in replyWait on that (private) endpoint for its tid, then
munmaps the stack; detach relinquishes the join (stack reclaimed at process
exit, for now). New current_core=39 syscall + Thread.currentCore() lets a worker
observe which core it ran on.
The closure now lives at the top of the thread's own (private) stack instead of
the heap, so spawn/join never touch the not-yet-thread-safe runtime heap.
thread-test gains a join mode: 4 workers x 100k atomic increments, joined, with
counter == N*K and >1 core stamped (real parallelism), plus a detached worker.
Gate thread-join PASS (4x, non-flaky); 17 guardrail/M1/M2 cases green; build +
host tests clean.
A thread is a task sharing the caller's address space. New private syscalls
thread_spawn(entry, stack_top, arg)=37 and thread_exit=38: thread_spawn goes
through scheduler.spawnThread (retains the shared aspace), thread_exit ends the
task like a process exit(0) (terminateCurrent -> releaseAspace, so the space
survives while siblings hold it). The closure pointer reaches the new thread in
rdi via a new jump_to_user_arg asm path and a per-task user_arg (0 for a normal
process, whose _start ignores it) - so the runtime trampoline is a plain C-ABI
Zig function, no naked asm.
runtime.Thread (library/runtime/thread.zig) mirrors std.Thread.spawn: mmap a
stack, heap-allocate the args closure, hand the kernel the trampoline + closure.
addThreadedUserBinary opts a binary into single_threaded=false; thread-test is
the first, and proves a worker runs in the shared address space via a shared
global the main thread polls.
Gate thread-spawn PASS; 16 guardrail cases green (incl. args/init/process on the
new jump_to_user_arg path) + aspace-refcount; build + host tests clean.
Route address-space lifetime through a refcount keyed by the page-table root
(scheduler.zig aspace_refs): retainAspace on the spawnUserLocked success path,
releaseAspace from both teardown paths (exitUserLocked, destroyTaskLocked),
destroying the space only when the last task on it exits. Behaviour is identical
today (every space has exactly one task); this is the foundation shared-address-
space threads (docs/threading.md) build on.
Test-observable liveAspaceCount/aspaceDestroyCount + a new aspace-refcount kernel
self-test and QEMU case: spawn and reap 5 ring-3 probes, assert live spaces return
to baseline and destructions advance by exactly 5 (destroyed once each, no leak,
no double-free). Gate passes; 13 guardrail cases green; build + host tests clean.
Generalize capability passing from endpoints to memory objects. The per-task
handle table now holds kind-tagged entries (scheduler.HandleObject{kind, ptr});
closeHandles and shareCapability dispatch by kind, so a shared-memory object
rides an ipc_call send_cap exactly like an endpoint and is refcount-freed only
when its last capability drops.
- shm_create(len) -> vaddr, handle: contiguous, zeroed, cacheable frames wrapped
in a refcounted ShmObject, mapped into the caller's shm arena (PML4[230]).
- shm_map(cap) -> vaddr: map the same physical pages into a receiver that got the
capability. mapUserSharedInto maps WB-cacheable + device_grant, so a sharer's
teardown never frees the shared frames — the object owns them.
- runtime.shm: create(len) -> Region{ptr, handle, len}, map(handle) -> ptr.
Gate: qemu_test.py shm — shm-client creates a region, writes a pattern, passes
its capability to shm-server, which maps it and reads the same bytes back
(shm: shared 4096 bytes ok). ipc/ipc-call/ipc-cap/supervision/dma/usermem/
display-service and host tests all still pass — the handle change broke no IPC.
Two gaps a real-hardware crash exposed, both in onException's terminal path (and
the panic path):
- The report was anonymous. Add the faulting task's id + name and whether it
trapped in ring 3 (a user process) or ring 0 (the trusted base) — so a fatal
fault says WHAT crashed and WHERE, not just the vector. scheduler gains
currentIdSafe/currentNameSafe (early-boot-guarded, like currentCpuIndex, so the
reporter can't fault a second time).
- halt() never released the big kernel lock, so a core that died holding it
deadlocked every other core spinning in acquire() — the whole machine hangs,
not just the one core the design promises. The BKL now records its owner
(architecture.cpuLocal(), a unique per-core token); sync.releaseIfHeldHere()
frees the lock only if this core holds it, called before halt on both fatal
paths. Caveat: if we held it mid-mutation the shared state may be inconsistent,
but letting the other cores + the supervisor keep running is strictly more
recoverable than a guaranteed total hang.
Applications ask the device manager for the tree (enumerate: a header
plus ChildEntry records) and subscribe to published add/remove events by
handing their endpoint over as the call's capability — the input-service
pattern; events are the same ChildAdded/ChildRemoved structs the bus
drivers send, one encoding in both directions. device-list is the first
client: it prints the tree, subscribes, and narrates the events through
a driver restart. The protocol's message maximum is capped at the
kernel's IPC MESSAGE_MAXIMUM (256 bytes, ten entries per reply; paging
joins the protocol when a tree outgrows one message). The startUserTask
debug print is gone: it wrote to serial unserialized against user-space
lines and sheared concurrent log markers in half — the root cause of the
scenario flakes.
Signals are statements delivered as coalescing notifications to the
endpoint a process nominates with signal_bind — never a hijacked stack,
never a question (liveness is the zero-length ping the harness answers).
process_signal is supervisor-or-self gated, like kill; unbound targets
accumulate a pending mask delivered on bind. timer_bind is the missing
timed wait: a one-shot deadline landing in the same replyWait as
everything else — what stop(), hello deadlines, and restart backoff are
built from. runtime.service.run folds requests, signals, and
notifications into callbacks; the VFS conversion deletes its hand-rolled
loop and gains the whole lifecycle contract. The signals scenario drives
ping, reload, terminate->exited, the timer, and the deaf-child
deadline->killed path from ring 3. docs/process-lifecycle.md increments
1-4 are now as-built.
The kernel records an ExitReason at all three death sites — clean exit,
fault (classified by vector), and process_kill — into a bounded ring
before the exit notification posts, so a supervisor's query never races
the notice. process_exit_reason is gated by the same supervisor check as
kill; runtime.process.exitReason is the stable interface. This is the
input restart policy reads (docs/process-lifecycle.md iron rule 2).
process_enumerate snapshots the task table (the device_enumerate shape, so
ps is a user program); system_spawn returns the child id, records the caller
as supervisor, and takes an exit endpoint; process_kill is allowed only for
the supervisor. Every death — exit, fault, or kill — posts a child-exit badge
to that endpoint (the IRQ-as-IPC pattern as SIGCHLD). A target caught off-CPU
is reaped in place; a running one is condemned and finished at its next
system call or tick, guarded so teardown never lands mid-kernel-operation.
Tested by process-list, process-kill, and supervision (a ring-3 supervisor
exercising the whole surface); design notes in docs/process-management.md.
Processes now start with C-compatible arguments: the kernel builds the
System V AMD64 entry block (argc, argv, empty envp, auxiliary vector)
at the top of the stack, argv[0] is the path or initial-ramdisk name
the process was spawned as, and system_spawn carries an optional
NUL-separated blob that becomes argv[1..]. The runtime parses the block
(runtime.argumentCount/argument) and its spawn wrappers pass arguments
through. The name is also recorded on the task, so a fault report says
which binary died, not just its id.
The user stack grows from one page to eight (32 KiB,
parameters.user_stack_pages), with the page below left unmapped as a
guard so an overflow faults into a clean process kill rather than
corrupting the image. Task.name_buffer is zero-initialised, not
undefined: an undefined default is materialised as a 0xAA fill that
moved the static task pool out of .bss and made the whole kernel ~7x
slower under QEMU TCG (caught by the affinity test).
Proven end to end by the new args test: args-echo respawns itself with
arguments via the syscall blob, burns more stack than one page could
hold, and echoes its argv intact. Full suite: 44/44.
An HCD programs a bus-master engine: it needs a descriptor ring that is physically
contiguous, at a physical address it knows, uncacheable, and pinned. mmap gives none
of those. Add dma_alloc(len, flags) -> vaddr (rax), paddr (rdx) and dma_free(vaddr,
len): grant contiguous, zeroed, pinned, strong-uncacheable memory in a per-process DMA
arena (PML4[228]) and hand back both addresses.
Pieces: pmm.allocContiguous(count, max_phys) finds a run of contiguous free frames
below a cap (dma_below_4g for 32-bit engines); mapUserDmaInto maps them uncacheable
(PCD|PWT) but WITHOUT device_grant, so unlike an MMIO grant these frames are real RAM
and freeSubtree returns them on teardown — a driver that dies leaks nothing. dma_free
is bounded to the DMA arena so it can never unmap the caller's stack/heap/MMIO.
dma_write_combining is accepted but falls back to coherent (WC needs PAT programming).
Runtime: runtime.dma.alloc/free (a two-return-value stub, like replyWait). New `dma`
kernel test drives the mechanism directly — contiguity, the below-4G cap, coherent
mapping, and reclaim-on-teardown (no leak). The thin syscall wrappers follow the tested
mmap/mmio_map shape and land their first real use with the first DMA driver. Suite
38/38 plus host tests.
ipc_call and ipc_reply_wait grow a `send_cap` argument (r9) and a `received_cap`
return (r8): an endpoint travels alongside a message, installed into the receiver's
handle table. The transfer is a share, not a move — the endpoint's refcount is bumped
and the sender keeps its handle. If the receiver's table is full the call fails
-ENOSPC and the message is NOT delivered (a half-delivered capability is worse than a
failed send); a bad handle fails -EBADF. Both directions carry a cap: a client's call
hands one to the server (seen in the server's replyWait), and the server's reply hands
one back (seen in the client's call return).
This is the "open" primitive the driver model was blocked on: a bus driver mints a
per-device endpoint and hands it to a class driver, giving it a private channel to one
device without the 8-slot global name registry.
Kernel: shareCapability in ipc-synchronous.zig at both copy points; new
setSystemCallResult3 (r8, saved/restored by the syscall stub); Task gains
ipc_send_cap / ipc_received_cap. Runtime: callCap + Reply, replyWait gains send_cap
and Received.cap; plain call/replyWait delegate with no_cap. New abi.no_cap.
New ipc-cap test (two kernel tasks exercise both directions, each verifying the
endpoint it received is the same object shared, refcount bumped to 2). No class driver
consumes callCap yet — it lands with the first one. Suite 37/37 plus host tests.
The source layout now mirrors the runtime filesystem hierarchy
(docs/danos-file-system-hierarchy-FSH.md): what lives under system/ in the
source is what a running danos represents under /system. Each service and
driver is a sub-project directory that is its own Zig module — cross-project
references go by module name, never by a path into another project's files.
Moves (all git mv, history preserved):
- src/ -> system/ (danos internals; the self-representation)
root.zig -> danos.zig (the kernel<->user contract module)
kernel/arch/ -> kernel/architecture/ (arch -> architecture)
device/ -> devices/ (what /system/devices reflects)
boot/ -> /boot (the loaders, top level)
- sbin/ -> split by role:
init, vfs -> system/services/<name>/<name>.zig
hpetd, busd -> system/drivers/<name>/<name>.zig
vfs-test -> system/services/vfs/vfs-test.zig (inside the vfs project)
- lib/ -> library/runtime/ (room for other libraries beside runtime)
The VFS wire protocol becomes its own module, system/services/vfs/protocol.zig
("vfs-protocol"): the vfs sub-project exposes its interface, and the runtime's
file layer imports it by name. First instance of the "protocol module" pattern
(docs/driver-model.md); usb/block will expose theirs the same way.
Also: fix a naming-standard violation in the protocol — Op -> Operation (and
req -> request, _pad -> _padding). Docs updated: /system/services added to the
FHS doc, a repository-layout section added to the docs index, and stale source
paths swept across comments and docs.
Runtime boot paths are unchanged (the bootloader still loads /sbin/init);
aligning the runtime filesystem to the FHS is a separate follow-up. Suite 35/35
plus host tests green.
Daniel Samson
Daniel Samson