SYSRETQ with a non-canonical RIP raises a general protection fault in ring
0 — on the kernel stack, an instruction after the swapgs that installed the
user's GS base. It is one of the better-known escalation primitives, and
ring 3 reaches it without any kernel bug at all: the processor saves the
address of the instruction after SYSCALL, so a program whose SYSCALL is the
last two bytes of the last canonical page returns to the first
non-canonical address. The new test does exactly that.
The exit path now sign-extends the return address from bit 47 and compares;
if the value changed, it returns through IRETQ instead, which commits the
privilege change before fetching the new address, so the fault arrives from
ring 3 and the process dies like any other. Four register-only operations
and a branch that a correct program can never take — it could not have
executed at a non-canonical address in the first place. Bit 47 is the right
pivot because danos builds four-level page tables and nothing sets the
five-level bit; a future port must move the pivot, and the comment says so.
SFMASK grows one bit while we are here. SYSCALL, unlike an interrupt gate,
does not clear the nested-task flag, so the kernel had been running every
system call with whatever ring 3 last chose — harmless while the only exit
was SYSRETQ, and a question worth not having now that one exit is IRETQ.
The kernel is never nested; ring 3 still gets its own flag back.
Suite 113/113. The new case asserts the refusal counter rather than the
dying process: the emulator we test on kills it either way, so only the
counter distinguishes a guard that ran from one that did not.
SMEP turns the classic escalation — divert kernel control flow into a page
the attacker wrote — from a silent takeover into an immediate fault with
the offending address in the log. The bit is per-core state, so it is set
where the syscall MSRs already are: in the per-CPU bring-up both the boot
processor and every application processor run on their way in. A core that
climbed the trampoline without it would be a hole no boot log would show,
which is why the SMP case now reads CR4 on each core it lands on and
requires every one of them to be hardened, not just the one that printed
the banner.
Enabling it that early is only safe because nothing ring 0 executes is
mapped for ring 3, and that had to be established rather than assumed:
kernel text carries only its ELF flags, the physmap is no-execute, the
trampoline page is mapped supervisor and the core running it has not
enabled the bit yet, and the boot processor turns it on while still on the
loader's tables — which map nothing user-accessible at all. The one
indirect call in the kernel takes a kernel address.
The CPUID probing that was scattered across the timer code becomes a small
shared helper, since the feature question is now asked from two places and
each wanted the same maximum-leaf guard. Absence is tolerated and reported,
like the IOMMU: danos still boots on a machine without the feature, and
says which one it is.
The test harness starts asking QEMU for a CPU that has the bit at all —
its default model has neither SMEP nor SMAP, so the code would otherwise
have been unreachable in every run. No case behaved differently under the
richer model.
Suite 112/112, with a new case that maps an executable user page, calls
into it from the kernel, and requires the fault the CPU is supposed to
raise.
The /loop work list for the committed design set: Phase 0 baseline, PM
(unix-path flag-day), H1 copy discipline, P1 envelope + Channel, P2
registry + ServiceId retirement, P3 open grants, P4a-c protocol rebase,
H2 SMEP, HS sysret guard, H3 SMAP. Ten settled decisions from the
2026-07-31 grounding pass, two corrected on review: every packet carries
the envelope header folded (headerless events rejected), and bind/open
authorization is chain-attested identity (name alone rejected — ungated
spawn makes it a confused deputy). smep-smap.md gains the verified
straggler table: nine syscalls, klog_status the ninth, with the
callee-writer restructuring notes.
The security-track design set. communication.md is the model: four layers
(namespace / protocol / channel / transport), packets and signals, parties
addressed by the channel and objects by target, transports as replaceable
buffer+doorbell mechanisms. protocol-namespace.md is L3+L2: /protocol names
contracts, resolution establishes a channel, init is the registrar,
restriction is per-process namespace delegation (with the microphone-prompt
worked example), the envelope is the universal packet header, migration
P1-P5 retires ServiceId. file-system-hierarchy.md replaces the unix-FHS
spec with the danos-native tree (/applications, /protocol, /system,
/volumes) and its migration table. ipc.md is re-cut as the kernel-ipc
transport document. smep-smap.md designs the kernel hardening: copy
discipline for the eight raw user-pointer syscalls, then SMEP, then SMAP
as a permanent tripwire.
Daniel Samson