A protocol is reached by name now, not by a compile-time integer. Init is PID 1 and already knows which binary it started, so init serves /protocol as a vfs backend: bind claims a contract with the provider's endpoint attached, open answers with that endpoint as the reply's capability, and readdir lists what is bound with the task and binary behind it. The kernel reserves the prefix — nothing may mount over it, under it, or unmount it — and ServiceId, ipc_register and ipc_lookup are gone, their syscall numbers left vacant. A bind is authorized by who the caller *is*: the kernel-stamped binary together with the supervising task's identity, matched against /system/configuration/protocol.csv. Identity, not spelling — spawn is ungated, so an attacker can run any bundled binary, and a name-only rule would have let it launder grants through an init of its own making. A name a live process holds is refused to everyone else; a dead one's is released. Three review rounds against a hostile ring-3 process found what 108 green tests could not, because the suite contains no attacker. Publishing init's supervision endpoint as the registry put PID 1's mailbox in every process's hands, where two forged bytes reached the shutdown path: privileged traffic is now believed only from the task that holds the contract it speaks for. A capability arriving on a request outlived every path that ignored it, one handle per call until the table was full — in init, and in the harness ten services share — so the arriving capability is owned by the turn and released unless a handler says otherwise. And the kernel let anyone holding an endpoint handle aim signals, timers, exit notices and interrupts at it: binding now requires having created it. Suite 108/108. The new protocol-registry case asserts eleven properties, each one an attack that must fail.
131 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
131 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
# The power service: events and shutdown
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A laptop lid closes, a battery drains, someone presses the power button — and
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several parts of the system might care: a session manager dims the screen, a
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logger notes it, and ultimately *something* has to turn the machine off. None of
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them owns the hardware that reported the event, and the reporter should not know
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who is listening. So system power is a **service**: an event source **publishes**
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button/lid/battery/AC events, interested processes **subscribe**, and one
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privileged caller — init — can ask it to power the machine off. It is the same
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publish/subscribe shape as the [input service](../device-driver-development/input.md), applied to power.
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## Why a service, and why it is named for the domain, not the firmware
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Where the events come from is firmware-specific — on x86 they ride the ACPI SCI
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([acpi.md](acpi.md)); on a Raspberry Pi they would come from PSCI or a mailbox.
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What subscribers want is not: *the lid closed* means the same thing regardless of
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who noticed. So the surface is **domain-named**. There is a `power-protocol`
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module and a contract named `/protocol/power`; on x86 the **acpi service**
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binds it, and on ARM a PSCI/mailbox service will bind the *same* name.
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Subscribers open `/protocol/power` and never learn which firmware they
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are on — the neutrality the whole [discovery](discovery.md) migration exists to
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preserve, carried one layer up into a running-system surface.
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This is why the protocol is `power`, not "ACPI events": naming a cross-firmware
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surface after one firmware would leak x86 into code the ARM port must reuse
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unchanged.
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## The protocol
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The `power-protocol` module ([library/protocol/power/power-protocol.zig](../../library/protocol/power/power-protocol.zig))
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follows the vfs-protocol pattern — extern-struct messages, a version, reserved
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fields. Three operations:
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| Direction | Operation | Purpose |
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|---|---|---|
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| subscriber → service | `subscribe` | receive published events; the subscriber's endpoint rides as the call's **capability** (the input/device-manager pattern) |
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| init → service | `shutdown` | orderly shutdown's last step: enter S5 (soft off) |
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| service → subscriber | `event` | a published `EventMessage`, delivered as a buffered message (never sent *to* the service) |
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Events are published, not polled: like the input service, the service holds
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subscriber endpoints as capabilities and `ipc_send`s each event as a buffered
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message, so a slow or dead subscriber can never wedge the source. The event
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vocabulary is hardware-neutral:
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- `power_button` — the button was pressed (a fixed ACPI event on x86).
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- `lid`, `ac`, `battery` — the named GPE-driven events.
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- `notify` — a device notification that maps to none of the above; its `code`
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(the ACPI `Notify` argument) and the notifying device's `hid` say which device
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and what happened.
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An `EventMessage` carries the `event` tag plus `code` and an 8-byte `hid`, so a
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generic `notify` is fully described without a second round trip.
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**`shutdown` is authority, not information.** It is the only operation that
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*does* something irreversible, so it is gated: the contract is that only init
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(PID 1) may request it, because init is the process that has already run the stop
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sequence over everything else. The acpi service implements this as a **soft
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gate** — it honors `shutdown` only from a process that is a *subscriber*, and
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init is the one subscriber. That stands in for "only the system supervisor may
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power off" without hard-coding a pid, so it still holds under tests where PID 1
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is not init.
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## Orderly shutdown
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Powering off cleanly is where the power service, the [process
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lifecycle](process-lifecycle.md), and [ACPI events](acpi.md) compose. init
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already supervises the services it starts; for shutdown it runs **one event loop
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over one endpoint** that carries three things at once: its children's exit
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notifications, the lifecycle **signals** it can receive (`terminate`), and the
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**power events** it subscribes to — plus a re-arming heartbeat timer proving PID
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1 is alive. (init subscribes with retries, because the power service registers
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`.power` well after init starts; a missing power service is not fatal — a
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`terminate` signal drives the same path.)
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On a `power_button` event or a `terminate` signal, init:
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1. logs that it is shutting down,
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2. runs the standard stop sequence — `process.stop(child, deadline,
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endpoint)` — over its children **in reverse spawn order**, so the VFS stops
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last (other services may flush through it), each child getting the
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*terminate → deadline → kill* escalation from
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[process-lifecycle.md](process-lifecycle.md), and
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3. requests `.power` `shutdown`.
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The service then enters **S5** (soft off) by writing `SLP_TYP | SLP_EN` to the
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PM1 control register(s) from ring 3, with the `SLP_TYP` values taken from its own
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AML parse of the `_S5` object — the kernel has no S5 path of its own. If the
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write returns instead of powering the machine off, it logs loudly so a test
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fails rather than hangs.
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**No new system call was needed for S5.** The broad io_port grant on the
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`acpi-tables` node ([discovery.md](discovery.md)) already put the PM1 control
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ports in the acpi service's hands, so writing S5 from ring 3 is something it
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could physically already do; formalizing it as a protocol operation added a
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contract, not authority. The kernel keeps only **reboot** (`acpi.reboot` in
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`system/kernel/acpi.zig` — the FADT reset register plus the legacy fallbacks, which
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need no AML); it has no poweroff path at all — S5 is not a kernel operation.
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## Verifying it
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Two QEMU scenarios exercise the path, both injecting a real ACPI power-button
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press via QMP `system_powerdown` (there is no other deterministic power event on
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this config):
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- `power-button` proves the source: the acpi service's SCI handler logs the
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press and publishes `power_button` (the ACPI half is in [acpi.md](acpi.md)).
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- `orderly-shutdown` proves the whole composition: button → init logs shutting
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down → children stopped → the service enters S5 → QEMU exits. The ordered
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regex is the proof, and QEMU's self-exit through S5 is the pass.
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## Scope
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Interface-complete but validated on real hardware (the author's laptop) later,
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because QEMU does not emulate them: battery `_BST`/`_BIF` evaluation beyond the
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interface stubs, lid and AC events, and the embedded controller's `_Qxx`
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queries. Deliberately out of scope for now: reboot over the power protocol, S3
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sleep, per-device D-states (a future lifecycle-vocabulary extension, since
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"suspend" has the shape of a signal every driver must answer and has no consumer
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until laptop sleep), and thermal zones.
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## See also
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- [acpi.md](acpi.md) — where the events come from on x86: the SCI, the power
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button fixed event, and GPE/Notify dispatch in the acpi service.
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- [discovery.md](discovery.md) — why the surface is domain-named, and the
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firmware neutrality that makes a PSCI backend drop-in on ARM.
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- [process-lifecycle.md](process-lifecycle.md) — the stop sequence
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(`terminate → deadline → kill`) and signals init composes into shutdown.
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- [device-manager.md](../device-driver-development/device-manager.md) — the supervision model init mirrors for
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its own children.
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