An all-tracks docs-vs-code audit (the same method that caught the storage drift) found 23 confirmed inaccuracies where a doc's build-status claim no longer matches the source — status markers that were never flipped after a track landed, and a few paths left over from completed flag-days. All verified against the code before editing; docs only, no behavior change. The systemic ones: - IOMMU enforcement (driver-model.md, drivers.md): docs said enforcement was not built and "device_claim = ring 0" / "memory-safe is not true yet". It is built (per-device VT-d/AMD-Vi domains programmed at device_claim, -ECONFINE rollback, dma_alloc buffers bound and torn down at death; fail-open only with no IOMMU). Restated; M16 marker flipped to done. - The FHS flag-day paths: /etc/devices.csv -> /system/configuration/devices.csv (devices-csv.md, new-driver-checklist.md, device-manager.md), /var/log -> /system/logs (logging.md, new-driver-checklist.md), /mnt/usb -> /volumes/usb (process-management.md). Following the old paths silently breaks driver match. - protocol-namespace P4 "remaining" -> landed (only P5 remains); shared-fate fan-out "not yet enforced" -> enforced; wall_clock "not built" -> built; SMP affinity + fault-recovery "left" -> built; process_enumerate raw-pointer trust model -> checked copyToUser/EFAULT; bounds.md maximum_devices static hole -> dynamic per-registrar quota; init spawns fat -> volume-manager; config "hardcoded, move to /etc" -> already CSV data files; vdso.md three- value call; zig-self-hosting library/ layout; python argv "new" -> built. Found and fixed by a multi-agent audit across 12 doc clusters, each finding adversarially verified against the source.
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Logging
Output is a diagnostic convenience, never a correctness dependency: the kernel
and every service must run correctly with zero output channels. On top of that
rule, danos has per-process logging — every process's output is attributed
by the kernel and lands in its own file on the flash volume, which is what makes
a headless real machine (no serial port) debuggable. The display (the
framebuffer surface) is a separate concern with one bootstrap exception: the
kernel's framebuffer console (system/kernel/console.zig) joins the log sinks
at boot, so the whole transcript shows on screen until the display service
claims the framebuffer and silences it; after that only panic/fatal messages
are mirrored to it explicitly (system/kernel/kernel.zig).
The pipeline
process std.log ──▶ debug_write(level) ──▶ tagged kernel ring ──▶ logger service ──▶ /system/logs/<boot-stamp>/<binary-path>.log
kernel log.print ─┘ │
└▶ serial / 0xE9 sinks (QEMU, -Dserial)
-
Emit. A program calls
std.log.info("mounted {s}", .{path})— the runtime'slogFn(installed for every binary by the root shim,library/kernel/logging.zig) formats one line and issues onedebug_writecarrying the level. The payload does NOT contain the process's name.logging.writeremains as the raw/bring-up path (panics, test fixtures); raw bytes ride the same ring, attributed all the same. -
Stamp. The kernel wraps every payload LINE in a record stamped with the sender's pid, task name (its binary path, e.g.
/system/services/fat), level, a per-boot sequence number, and a monotonic timestamp (system/kernel/log.zig+log-ring.zig). Attribution is structural — a payload cannot forge another sender's tag, and an embedded newline just ends the record, so the forged "prefix" lands inside the forger's own next line. -
Retain. The 512 KiB ring overwrites oldest-first; sequence gaps make any loss countable.
klog_read(#32) copies stream bytes from a free-running offset;klog_status(#45) returns the cursors plus the wall-clock time of boot. The framing (abi.KlogRecordHeader) is 32 bytes + name + payload, 8-byte aligned. -
Render. Registered sinks (serial under
-Dserial, the 0xE9 debug console, and the framebuffer console until the display service claims the screen) get a live transcript: kernel/raw output verbatim, leveled records as<binary path>: message— one composed write per line, under the log's own spinlock (never the big kernel lock; panic paths try-acquire with a bound and fall back to sinks-only). Sinks are best-effort and self-guarding; a serial-less machine just goes quiet. -
Persist. The logger service (
system/services/logger) drains the ring every 250 ms and demultiplexes records into one file per source under/system/logs/<boot-stamp>/, e.g./system/logs/2026-07-21T150434Z/kernel.log /system/logs/2026-07-21T150434Z/system/services/fat.log /system/logs/2026-07-21T150434Z/system/drivers/usb-storage.logThe boot stamp is the RTC anchor from
klog_status(FAT-safe: no colons; a dead RTC yields the 1970 directory rather than no logs). Each line carries the record's monotonic timestamp and level. Storage is best-effort and late: the ring buffers a whole boot many times over, and the first successfulmakePathof the per-boot directory (also the readiness probe) triggers a full backlog write. Files close — which is the fat server's SCSI cache flush — after a ~2 s quiet period, bounding data-at-risk without per-record flush thrash. At shutdown init stops the logger FIRST (it is last in the boot order), so its final drain runs over a live storage chain.
Why a ring in the kernel, not a logging server
The storage stack must be able to log. If the fat server wrote its own log file through the VFS it would rendezvous-deadlock on itself; if processes sent records to a logging server over IPC, early boot would need a buffer that is — a ring, one hop later. The kernel ring is that buffer, placed where every process (and the kernel itself) can reach it with one syscall, before any service exists. The logger service is a reader, not a hop.
Two disciplines keep it honest:
- the logger announces itself once — a periodic status line would feed the very stream it drains;
- lost records surface as an explicit
-- N records lost --line, computed from sequence gaps, never silently.
Last-resort channels
Unchanged, and independent of the sink list so they survive a total output
failure: checkpoint (a one-byte POST code on port 0x80) and recordPanic
(a fixed breadcrumb record, log.panic_record, findable in a RAM dump; magic
written last so a reader only trusts a complete record).
Accepted gaps
- A write-spamming process can evict other processes' unread records from the ring (a per-process quota is future work); the loss is at least visible via sequence gaps in every affected file.
/system/logsfiles have no privacy until the VFS grows permissions.- Records emitted after the logger's final shutdown drain reach serial and the ring but not the files.